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Questions of judicial impartiality inspire strong assessments
and emotions that now run particularly high in the wake of Caperton
v. A.T Massey Coal Co.,' Citizens United,2 and another season of
big money, interest group, sound-bite laden judicial elections 3 that
1. 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009). In Caperton, the Court in a 5-4 decision held that
due process required West Virginia Supreme Court Justice Brent Benjamin to
recuse himself in a case involving review of a $50 million judgment levied against
a company where the company's CEO had accounted for $3 million in campaign
support for the state court justice in a hotly contested election in which the Justice
unseated an incumbent. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Impeach Brent Benjamin Now!?,
Giving Adequate Attention to the Failings of Judicial Impartiality, 47 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 1, 2-62 (2010) (concluding that Justice Benjamin's conduct was so clearly
in violation of established law as to call into question his competence or integrity);
see also Jeffrey W. Stempel, Completing Caperton and Clarifying Common Sense
Through Using the Right Standard for Constitutional Judicial Recusal, 29 REV.
LITIG. 249, 250-68 (2010) (summarizing Caperton decision and arguing for
expansion of Caperton's constitutional recusal standard as a backstop in cases of
severe error in failing to recuse by state court judges).
2. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 889
(2010) (relying on the First Amendment to greatly limit the range of permissible
government regulation and interpreted by many to permit largely unlimited
corporate spending on electoral contests).
3. See James Sample et al., The New Politics of Judicial Elections,
JUDICATURE, Sept.-Oct. 2010, at 50 (explaining that special interest groups put
millions into campaigns in an attempt to affect their outcomes); Richard L. Hasen,
Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581, 591-604
(2011) (summarizing decision); see also id. at 611-15 (predicting that Court will
apply the decision differently regarding judicial elections and spending as
contrasted with legislative and executive elections).
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included the failure of merit selection initiatives4 and the removal of
three Iowa Supreme Court Justices for the "crime" of issuing a
5decision striking down state prohibition of same-sex marriage.
As Professor Charles Geyh has noted, issues of judicial
impartiality and disqualification are at the forefront of contemporary
debates about the state of the legal system.6 Judicial disqualification
4. For example, a proposed revision to the Nevada Constitution to adopt a
variant of the Missouri Plan, in which judges are initially appointed by the
governor from a short list generated by a merit selection committee that includes
lawyers and laypersons and then are required to prevail in retention elections to
maintain their posts, was soundly defeated. See General Election Results, LAS
VEGAS REv.-J., Nov. 4, 2010, at 4B (stating that ballot Question No. 1 regarding
judicial appointments lost with 58% (390,370 votes) voting "No" and 42%
(285,746 votes) voting "Yes"). In a bit of a dark day for judicial reform, creation
of an intermediate appellate court (Nevada is the largest state with no such court)
lost by a 53% to 47% vote. Id. But see Sylvia R. Lazos & Chris W. Bonneau,
Appoint judges? No thanks, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Oct. 31, 2010, at 4D (departing
from prevailing academic sentiment, a law professor and political scientist support
election of judges).
5. See A. G. Sulzberger, Ouster of Iowa Judges Sends Signal to Bench,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2010, at Al (stating that voters chose to remove all three
justices on the liberal Iowa Supreme Court who were seeking new terms). See
also Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 872 (2009) (holding unanimously that
Iowa's definition of marriage as between man and woman violated the state and
federal constitutions). But see Editorial, Iowa's Total Recall, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6,
2010, at A12 (cheering the defeat of the judges and describing gay marriage
decision as "precisely the kind of judicial arrogance-finding a right to gay
marriage in the state constitution after many decades in which no one noticed it-
the recall election was designed for," and criticizing Missouri Plan merit selection
as "allowing the lawyers guild that dominates the nominating process to get virtual
lifetime tenure for their selections," but supporting executive appointment of
judges rather than election; stating "[a] better system would be to let the Governor
nominate anyone he chooses and have the legislature offer advice and consent, as
in Washington").
6. See Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Disqualification Matters.
Again., 30 REV. LITIG. 671, 673-74 (2011) (noting that the combination of the
2007 revisions to ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, high-spending, high-
profile state court elections, and the Supreme Court's Caperton decision has
focused greater attention on judicial disqualification). See also Leslie Abramson,
Remarks at Current Issues in Judicial Disqualification: Assessing the Landscape
Post-Caperton, Citizens United and the 2007 ABA Model Code of Judicial
Conduct (Jan. 7, 2011) (stating that although the ABA 2007 Model Code seeks to
expand grounds for judicial disqualification to include receipts of campaign
contributions from interested litigants or counsel, states have been slow to adopt
proposed change and abandon historical norms viewing campaign support as non-
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is "hot" and "matters-again."7  Judge M. Margaret McKeown
might respond that judicial impartiality has always mattered and that
the judicial establishment has been addressing the issues vigorously8
despite occasional news stories that portray some members of the
bench in an unfavorable light.9 My own view is that while many
judges and much of the judicial establishment are to be commended
for the seriousness with which disqualification and other ethics
issues are addressed,' 0 the problem remains under-addressed rather
than overstated.'1
In that regard, I largely agree, but take some modest issue
with, aspects of Professor Geyh's contribution to this symposium in
which he embraces, seemingly with more resignation than
enthusiasm, "procedural" or process-oriented approaches as a
pragmatic but perhaps second-best response to the problem of
disqualifying; the status quo continues not to see political friendships as
disqualifying).
7. Geyh, supra note 6, at 671, 672. In her contribution to this symposium,
Professor Margaret Tarkington touches on these themes and the importance of
counsel as legal "canaries" in the litigation "coal mine" who must be sufficiently
free to question judicial impartiality and to question alleged misconduct in order
for the system to work properly. Margaret Tarkington, Attorney Speech and the
Right to an Impartial Adjudicator, 30 REv. LITIG. 849, 850 (2011).
8. Examining the State of Judicial Recusals After Caperton v. A.T.
Massey: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 2-4 (2009)
(prepared testimony of Hon. M. Margaret McKeown). Judge McKeown, Chair of
the Committee on Codes of Conduct of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, noted the extensive system of financial disclosure, judicial education, and
advice regarding disqualification as well as the comprehensive rules regarding
recusal. Id. at 1-12.
9. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Bad Judges, 83 TEX. L. REv. 431, 431-40
(2004) (collecting instances of judicial misfeasance). See also Geyh, supra note 6,
at 674 (describing impeachment of Louisiana District Judge G. Thomas Porteous,
"in part for failing to disqualify himself from a case in which he had solicited
money from an attorney in a pending case" (citation omitted)).
10. See McKeown, supra note 8, at 4-10 (describing extensive
infrastructure designed to raise ethical consciousness of federal judges).
11. See Stempel, Impeach Brent Benjamin Now!?, supra note 1, at 62-82
(noting with disappointment that despite great lapses in judicial professional
responsibility, there have been no disciplinary consequences for Justice Benjamin,
the non-recusing justice of Caperton fame); Stempel, Completing Caperton, supra
note 1, at 296-326 (arguing for broader and more aggressive use of Due Process
Clause to police egregious situations in which state court judges fail to follow
applicable law ofjudicial disqualification).
736 [ Vol. 30:4
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judicial recusal.12 A strengthened proceduralist approach to judicial
disqualification is an important and practically necessary means of
helping to enhance judicial impartiality and public confidence in the
courts.13 But more than Professor Geyh, I also embrace a regime of
appearance-based judicial recusal-one strongly supported by
effective procedural prerogatives for litigants-as a potentially
effective, realistic means of improving judicial disqualification
practice and outcomes.14 In particular, a broader concept of what
constitutes a "reasonable question as to impartiality" is one that does
12. See Geyh, supra note 6, at 719 ("[A]t a time when the appearances-
based regime is crumbling because consensus on the application of substantive
disqualification rules is lacking, reorienting the focus toward procedural reform is
a natural next step.").
13. Id. I also agree with Professor Geyh's succinct but illuminating history
of attitudes toward judicial disqualification in which he observes four major
approaches: (1) the Blackstonian Common Law's "almost iron-clad" and nearly
irrefutable presumption "that judges were uniformly impartial and essentially
immune from disqualification"; (2) a regime that "carved out exceptions" to this
presumption by requiring disqualification for particular conflicts of interest such as
being a "judge in one's own case" where the outcome of the matter could affect
the judge's financial interests; (3) a brief, almost abortive approach in which
judges were to be automatically disqualified "if aggrieved parties made specific
allegations pursuant to specified procedure"; and (4) the current regime, which
Professor Geyh views as under attack and perhaps losing sway, that "dwells upon
appearances, by organizing disqualification standards around the principle that a
judge should step aside" when the judge's impartiality may be reasonably
questioned, "in other words, when [the judge] might appear less than impartial to a
reasonable person." Id. at 677-90.
14. For purposes of this article (and in my writings on the subject
generally), I treat "disqualification" and "recusal" as synonyms. However, there
traditionally has been a technical distinction between the two terms in that
disqualification is more often used to connote a legal requirement that a judge not
participate in a case, while recusal traditionally carries the connotation of a judge
voluntarily stepping aside even when perhaps not absolutely required. In modem
practice, the terms are used interchangeably. See, e.g., RICHARD E. FLAMM,
JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES § 20.8
(2d ed. 2007) (noting a traditional distinction but using the terms interchangeably
throughout the treatise); J. ALFINI, STEVEN LUBET, JEFFREY M. SHAMAN &
CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS § 4.04 (4th ed. 2002)
(tending to use disqualification as a preferred term but using recusal as an
acceptable synonym); Debra Lyn Bassett, Judicial Disqualification in the Federal
Appellate Courts, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1213, 1223 (2002) (using the terms
interchangeably); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Refocusing Away from Rules Reform and
Devoting More Attention to the Deciders, 87 DENVER U. L. REV. 335, 338, n.10
(2010) (noting that despite some traditional differentiation between the terms,
disqualification and recusal are used as synonyms today).
Symposium 2011] 737
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not implicitly seek an unattainable consensus but instead recognizes
that the health of the judicial system is threatened whenever a
substantial portion of the public harbors significant, nonfrivolous
concern over the neutrality of a judge who insists on continuing to
preside over a matter.
If the legal system is to achieve its aspiration of impartiality
beyond reasonable question, greater procedural protections are of
course required, notwithstanding some attendant additional logistical
burdens. There must also be a broadened definition of the existence
of reasonable question as to impartiality and greater sensitivity on
the part of bench, bar, and the public. Like Odysseus, who tied
himself to the mast to prevent him from leading his ship to ruin in
response to the Sirens' Song,' 5 the judiciary would be wise to
institute a more stringent system of recusal practice than currently
prevails. One can view judicial recusal as an example of a situation
where the imposition of stronger pre-existing rules (both procedural
and substantive) constraining or "nudging"' 6 judicial authority can
enhance judicial impartiality by forcing necessary recusal that would
15. HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 76-77 (Robert Fagles, trans., Penguin Books
1996). Odysseus was returning from the Trojan War, a task taking a decade (an
Odyssey by any definition) and forcing his encounter with all manner of
dangerous, strange, and wonderful things. Id. Among them were the Sirens,
women who dwelled near a rocky shoreline and sang a song so sweet that it lured
sailors so close to the shore that their ships wrecked and they drowned. Id. at 76-
77. Odysseus wanted to both hear the Sirens' Song and avoid death and loss of
ship and crew. He arranged for his crew to wear earplugs (thus protecting them
from the seductive allures of the Sirens' Song) and to lash him (sans earplugs) to
the ship's mast, where he could hear the Song and, squirm and yell as he might,
would not be able to direct the ship too close to the rocky shore. Id.
Notwithstanding its creepy sexist origins (attractive but deadly women luring
clueless or insufficiently disciplined men to their deaths), the story of Odysseus
and the Sirens has become a staple of philosophical, political, and legal discussion
regarding the wisdom of imposing pre-existing constraints in order to avoid
making mistakes in moments of haste, weakness, or temptation. The classic
discussion is in JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN THE
SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY (1983). As of December 2010, Elster's work has
been cited more than 300 times in law review literature while the Odysseus story
has been cited more than 400 times. See also RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND
HAPPINESS 41-42 (2008) (popularizing cognitive psychology of decision-making
by employing the Odysseus example).
16. See THALER & SuNSTEIN, supra note 15, at 11-13 (stating that people
can be guided toward better decisions through use of mental framing devices,
regulation, limitation of choices, and paternalism).
738 [Vol. 30:4
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not result if individual jurists were left to their own devices under the
status quo.
Judges and the legal body politic should move toward more
frequent use of the appearance-based standard of impartiality, which
is slower to accept judging by those who may have inclinations to
favor certain litigants on the basis of social, economic, and political
affiliation.' 7  This requires that the legal system and society must
move away from what appears to be the implicit governing notion as
to when a reasonable question exists as to impartiality, wherein the
judge will only recuse if she is convinced that nearly every sane
person would hold a reasonable question regarding the judge's
impartiality. This system tends to minimize concerns of partiality if
the concern falls short of a consensus. Traditionally, this has meant
that the court deciding the recusal motion must be convinced that the
mythical "objectively reasonable" person, accurately informed of the
situation, would entertain serious doubts as to the neutrality of the
judge.
This standard overlooks the reality that in the modern (or
post-modern) world there will be disagreements and differences in
perception among "reasonable" people. In many disqualification
cases, it will be impossible, as a practical matter, to attain the type of
consensus or near-unanimity presupposed by the traditional
articulation of the appearance of impartiality standard. Rather than
ignoring this elephant in the room, the legal system should confront
the problem by requiring disqualification whenever a substantial
portion of adequately informed, objectively reasonable observers
would entertain serious questions as to the impartiality of the judge
under challenge.
Beyond procedurally based protections, the modern status
quo of judicial disqualification would also profit from an enhanced
conception of a "reasonable question" as to impartiality and a
recognition that there need not be consensus-or even a clear
majority view-about a given situation to support disqualification.
17. An important component of enforcing this improved regime regarding
judicial recusal is the greater "breathing space" for attorneys urged by Professor
Tarkington. See Tarkington, supra note 7, at 876 (urging that attorney speech
central to client representation be judged according to a FRCP 11 or Rule of
Professional Conduct 3.1 standard as to whether attorney assertions have a basis in
law or fact, while attorney criticisms of judges be assessed according to a N. Y.
Times v. Sullivan actual malice inquiry as to whether counsel knew statements
were false or were uttered with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity).
Symposium 2011] 739
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Thus, both a stronger definitional sense of the appearance of fairness
and some substantial judicial consciousness-raising are in order.
Coupled with the procedural protections advocated by Professor
Geyh'8 and most others in the academy (as well as the protection of
attorney speech urged by Professor Tarkingtonl 9), a sounder, more
confidence-enhancing recusal regime is possible.
Whether this improved recusal regime is attainable in the
current climate remains questionable. Jurists-particularly at the
Supreme Court level-have occasionally shown a disturbing
defensiveness, insensitivity, and even some seeming ignorance
regarding the area of recusal.20 As Professor Geyh notes, there is a
gulf separating traditionalist judges with a strong presumption of
judicial impartiality from realist judges with a much weaker, more
easily rebutted presumption of judicial impartiality.21 Without
doubt, the realist judges are correct. Only a modest presumption of
judicial impartiality should reign. Until the judiciary accepts this
notion, litigants are inadequately protected from potential judicial
bias and public confidence is inadequately nurtured.
I. FACING REALITY: JUDGING AND JUDGES IN THE REAL WORLD
A. Unconscious Bias and Insufficient Self-
Awareness
Judges are, of course, human beings. 22 Like all humans, they are
18. Geyh, supra note 6, at 676.
19. Tarkington, supra note 7, at 851.
20. See infra notes 278-81 (Scalia), 302 (Breyer), 318 (Ginsburg, Scalia,
and Olson) (describing questionable recent behavior of some Justices).
21. See Geyh, supra note 6, at 698-99 (noting the divide between judges
with strong presumption of judicial impartiality and judges more willing to accept
the notion that judicial neutrality may be compromised by various external
factors).
22. See Jerome Frank, Are Judges Human?, 80 U. PA. L. REv. 17, 42
(1931) (concluding, perhaps unsurprisingly, that the answer is "yes" and that the
law must account for this humanity rather than projecting unrealistically Herculean
qualities upon judges); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES
POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 15, 74, 118-19
(2006) (finding significant correlation between political backgrounds of judges and
rulings in particular classes of cases); Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Why the
Supreme Court Cares About Elites, Not the American People, 98 GEO. L.J. 1516-
740 [Vol. 30:4
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subject to cognitive constraints when assessing their own conduct or
that of friends, co-workers, or those with whom they identify.23
Applied in the judicial context, one can make a persuasive argument
24that the natural human foibles such as status quo bias,
overconfidence, 2 5 and false consensus biaS26 become exacerbated,
rather than reduced, because of the isolation in which judges work
and the pedestal upon which they are placed.
Additionally, there now exists extensive literature
establishing that humans are likely to have extensive unconscious
biases and prejudices regarding people, companies, attorneys, race,
gender, ethnicity, religion, national origin, and other matters.27 The
17, 1580-81 (2010) (concluding that Justices' very human motivations and
responses to incentives make the Court more interested in elite opinion,
particularly elite opinion about the Court's performance, rather than the long-term
impact of Court decisions on society).
23. See infra notes 26-36 and accompanying text (noting that people's
perspectives vary by demographic traits and pointing out that judges are not
immune from this trait).
24. See infra note 41 and accompanying text (stating that "status quo bias"
or a "general tendency to stick with the current situation" is a prevalent human
trait); see also THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 15, at 34-36 (same).
25. See infra notes 34-35 and accompanying text (noting that people,
including judges, tend toward excessive optimism and overconfidence); see also
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 15, at 31-33 (same).
26. See Lawrence M. Solan et al., False Consensus Bias in Contract
Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1268, 1269 (2008) (stating that individual
readers of contract language are quite certain that they know what the language
means and that others agree with them, and that as a whole, readers assign
substantially different meanings to the same language).
27. Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Only Skin Deep?: The Cost of Partisan
Politics on Minority Diversity of the Federal Bench, 83 IND. L.J. 1423, 1433-35
(2008); see Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive
Social Psychology, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1241, 1276-1281 (2002) (applying cognitive
psychology literature to posit that judges and juries, like everyone else, are subject
to biases and prejudices and advancing strategies for overcoming these traits);
Joshua Correll et al., Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and Racial Bias in
the Decision to Shoot, 92 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1006, 1006 (2007)
(stating that police officers are more likely to shoot at black subjects than white
subjects when actions of the subject are ambiguous); see also SUNSTEIN ET AL.,
supra note 22, at 15, 74, 118-19 (finding significant correlation between political
backgrounds of judges and rulings in particular classes of cases); Theresa M.
Beiner, The Elusive (But Worthwhile) Quest for a Diverse Bench in the New
Millennium, 36 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 597, 603-09 (2003) (summarizing empirical
research regarding gender and racial differences in judicial behavior); Howard
Gillman, What's Law Got to Do With It? Judicial Behavioralists Test the "Legal
Symposium 2011] 741
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point is so uncontroversial that it is reflected in a recent ABA
Litigation Section calendar.28 As Professor Geyh has noted,
"disqualification practice proceeds on two implicit assumptions: that
judges are able to assess the extent of their own bias; and that judges
are able to assess how others reasonably perceive their conduct.
Neither assumption is safe."29
Well before modem research regarding cognitive theory, the
point was recognized as a matter of common sense by an anonymous
law student, who observed that "[a] biased mind rarely realizes its
own imperfection." 30 Although judges may be able to dampen these
reactions through training, experience, and discipline, it is highly
Model" ofJudicial Decision Making, 26 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 465, 467-78 (2001)
(reviewing the political science research on judicial behaviorism); Perry L.
Moriearty, Framing Justice: Media, Bias, and Legal Decisionmaking, 69 MD. L.
REV. 849, 882-93 (2010) (noting impact of implicit bias in media accounts of
crime and adjudication); Natalie Bucciarelli Pedersen, A Legal Framework for
Uncovering Implicit Bias, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (accepting as a
given reality the implicit biases and prejudices in people), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/6013/papers.cfm?abstract id=1701966.
28. See American Bar Association, Section on Litigation, 2011 Calendar,
February 2011 (discussing "implicit bias" and the Litigation Section's implicit bias
training film and program as well as noting "Drs. Kenneth and Mamie Clark's
famous 'doll studies"' cited by the Court in Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483 (1954)); see also Implicit Bias in the Judicial System, A.B.A.,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/initiatives/goodworks/implicit bias
in-thejudicial system.html (last visited March 14, 2010).
There is compelling scientific research showing that the unconscious and
conscious associations built up over time shape people's preconceptions
and responses to life's situations.
One study showed that prospective jurors given the same set of
facts for a defendant named "William" versus one named "Tyrone" more
frequently remembered aggressive details for the one named "Tyrone."
American Bar Association, Section on Litigation, 2011 Calendar, February 2011.
Interestingly, the Litigation Section's focus was on implicit bias in jurors
rather than judges, although there is no basis for believing that judges are any less
influenced by the William-Tyrone perception than are jurors. Criticism of the
Court's invocation of the Clark doll studies in Brown and the bona fides of that
study are beyond the scope of this paper.
29. Geyh, supra note 6, at 708.
30. Note, Disqualification of a Judge on the Ground of Bias, 41 HARV. L.
REV. 78, 81 (1927).
[Vol. 30:4742
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unlikely that judges can consistently overcome or even recognize
their own biases and prejudices.3 1
Studies reveal that people are generally poor at self-
assessment, and tend to be overly optimistic evaluators of their own
abilities. Inflated preconceptions of their abilities, in turn, lead
subjects to over-estimate their competence in performing specific
tasks. Unsurprisingly, then, test subjects "report being less
susceptible than their peers to various cognitive and motivational
biases."32 They tend to exhibit a blind spot to their own biases, take
their perception of the world as objective reality, and attribute
contradictory perspectives to bias in others, rather than themselves. 33
The trait of self-serving or egocentric bias, like all biases, is
well-established in people generally and has been reflected in judges
as well. 34 Judges, like all of us, simply think they are better than
31. Traditional usage sometimes characterizes "bias" (and the term is so
used in Solan et al., supra note 26, at 1268-69) as a preference for someone or
something, while "prejudice" is an antipathy to someone or something. Thus, a
traditionalist might distinguish the two terms and speak in favor of being biased in
favor of X and prejudiced against Y. Modem usage, however, treats the two
words as synonyms meaning "a personal and sometimes unreasoned judgment."
MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 110 (10th ed. 1996). For ease of
reference, this article will at times use the terms interchangeably.
32. Emily Pronin et al., The Bias Blind Spot: Perceptions of Bias in Self
Versus Others, 28 PERSONALITY AND Soc. PSYCHOL. BULLETIN 369, 374 (2002).
33. Geyh, supra note 6, notes 146-52 and accompanying text (footnotes
omitted).
34. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 15, at 31-33 (stating that surveys
of students "reveal a high degree of unrealistic optimism about performance in the
class" and "people are unrealistically optimistic even when the stakes are high"
which "can explain a lot of individual risk-taking;" applied to judges, these
prevalent human traits suggest that judges will be unduly slow to recognize
situations in which their ability to be neutral is impaired and the degree to which
outside observers will concur in their assessments); Pat K. Chew & Robert E.
Kelley, Myth of the Color-Blind Judge: An Empirical Analysis of Racial
Harassment Cases, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1117, 1156-58 (2009) (finding
significant differences in rulings based on race of judge); Chris Guthrie et al.,
Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 811-16 (2001) (finding judges
susceptible to cognitive bias and error at rates substantially similar to that of the
general population); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias
Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1197-1204 (2009)
(concluding that the answer largely is "yes" and noting presence of implicit biases
among judges that appear to impact decision-making); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,
Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or Adaptation?, 79 OR. L. REV.
61, 101 (2000) (finding judges subject to same cognitive factors affecting all
persons).
Symposium 2011] 743
HeinOnline  -- 30 Rev. Litig. 743 2010-2011
THE REVIEW OF LITIGATION
they actually are. Because judges have considerably more power
over the lives of others than do most people, this essentially human
trait becomes more troublesome in judges (as well as police officers,
prosecutors, business executives, high public officials, and military
leaders) than it would be in most other settings in which the over-
confident have less opportunity to adversely impact others. What
may be tolerable where individuals have relatively little practical
power to do harm becomes unacceptable in the judicial setting and
requires potentially over-inclusive protection in order to avoid
35
injustice.
This type of cognitive error is often accompanied by false
consensus bias as well. A false consensus bias occurs when one is
erroneously overconfident that everyone else-or at least all
objectively rational, intelligent people-see a situation in the same
35. For example, a law professor's excessive self-confidence may produce
the erroneous belief that his or her more recent manuscript is a paradigm-shifting
breakthrough. If, however, the professor is wrong (which is almost certainly the
case, as real breakthroughs of this sort are comparatively rare), the realistic worst
that can happen is that misguided members of a legal periodical may share the
same misconception and publish the manuscript in lieu of better submissions.
Alternatively, articles editors have the power to deny space to the manuscript
altogether and readers are of course free to skip the article or disagree with it, even
to ridicule it. When the professor submits the supposedly path breaking
manuscript to the law review at her own school, this could raise genuine questions
of whether the students at the professor's own school are sufficiently impartial
about the merits of the manuscript. No one treats this as a serious problem because
article selection is not adjudication and is simply not that important in the grander
scheme of the world. However, if the professor were to blackmail students in an
attempt to attain publication (e.g., withholding or awarding grades on the basis of
the review's decision) or retaliate against students if the article were rejected, a
rational law school would presumably take stem action to discipline the professor
and protect the students.
By contrast, the law professor as a teacher has considerably more authority
when conducting class and awarding grades (although it is, of course, a lot less
power than that exercised by judges twenty to thirty times per day). If there are
allegations of prejudice against a student (e.g., because the student is an employee
of a company involved in litigation against the professor or bullied the professor's
child during high school), the professor may be inclined to think that he would not
discriminate against the student in assigning grades. No law school in the country,
however, would keep the student in Professor X's class under these circumstances
(assuming the allegation is accurate). The academy, whatever it lacks in other
regards, understands that the person impacted is unlikely to be a good judge of his
actual impartiality and that-more important by analogy to the Judicial Code-
there are serious grounds for doubting Professor X's impartiality under such
circumstances.
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way. For example, experiments have suggested that people reading
contracts or other texts, no matter how turgid or arguably ambiguous
the language, tend to decide the text has a particular meaning and
then believe that almost all readers of the text would assign it the
same meaning.37 Often, however, there is much greater division of
opinion about the text than the initial reader acknowledges. 3 8  I
other words, the presumed consensus does not exist.
By analogy, a judge assessing his or her own impartiality is
likely to perceive that no other reasonable observer could disagree
with the judge's conclusion and that there exists no reasonable
question as to the judge's ability to be impartial in a pending case,
but there will almost certainly be more disagreement than the judge
anticipated. Case law reflects this through reversals of decisions
declining disqualification and the division we have seen at the
United States Supreme Court on matters of judicial disqualification.
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., for example, was a 5-4
decision. 39  Nevertheless, each individual Justice writing alone
36. See Solan et al., supra note 26, at 1290 (interpreting answers to a
questionnaire and finding that "subjects overestimate the extent to which other
participants understand the term the same way they do").
37. See Solan et al., supra note 26, at 1289-92 (finding that lay people
overestimate, by a significant deviation, how many of their peers would give an
ambiguous word the same meaning they would give it; also noting that people are
excessively confident in the accuracy of their predictions).
38. Id.
39. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2256, 2263-64
& 2268 (2009) (finding situation carries unacceptably high risk of actual bias in
favor of campaign supporter or against his litigation opponents, while dissenting
Justices Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito not only disagree with the reach of the
Due Process Clause as applied to disqualification, but see little risk that West
Virginia Supreme Court Justice Brent Benjamin would be swayed by $3 million in
campaign support received from interested litigant); see also, Liljeberg v. Health
Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 864-65 (1988) (5-4 decision reversing
lower court where trial judge presided over case notwithstanding his status as
trustee of University that stood to gain from particular litigant's victory); Aetna
Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 821 (1986) (setting aside, in 5-4 decision,
Alabama Supreme Court decision on due process grounds where participating
justice had pending similar suit against insurer party to the case); Tumey v. Ohio,
273 U.S. 510, 531-35 (1927) (overturning imposition of traffic violation
conviction where trial judge funded by revenues generated from traffic citations
and convictions); United States v. Tucker, 78 F.3d 1313, 1325 (8th Cir. 1996)
(reversing trial judge's failure to recuse in case involving political ally of President
Clinton due to trial judge's personal friendship with Hillary Rodham Clinton);
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would believe that the overwhelming majority of observers agreed
with his or her assessment, just as West Virginia Supreme Court
Justice Brent Benjamin appears not to have contemplated that
anyone could entertain reasonable questions as to his impartiality.40
As discussed in Part II.B of this article, the tendency of judges to
think no reasonable observer could disagree with the judge's
conclusion argues for a broader and more robust approach to
disqualification based on reasonable questions as to impropriety in
addition to a requirement that recusal motions be heard before a
judge other than the judge who is the target of the disqualification
motion.
Other commonly found cognitive biases can also hamper
judging. Research has identified a "hindsight bias" which "suggests
that people often think, in hindsight, that things that happened were
inevitable, or nearly so."4 1 This undoubtedly can contribute to the
spoliation-like problem discussed below,42 in which an appellate
court reviewing rulings by a judge who should have been
disqualified may make excessive use of the harmless error concept
and be unable to see how the case could have come out differently
had an untainted judge presided.
Related to this is the availability heuristic in which persons
overestimate the chance of a future event (e.g., an alligator attack)
Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347, 352 (10th Cir. 1995) (reversing an Oklahoma City
federal trial judge's failure to recuse himself in trial of alleged bomber).
40. See Stempel, Impeach Brent Benjamin Now!?, supra note 1, at 34-55
(noting Justice Benjamin's repeated assertions of impartiality and hostility to those
who questioned his continued participation in case). Similarly, the individual
decisions denying recusal by Justice Scalia in Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 542 U.S.
367 (2004), and Justice Rehnquist in Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824 (1972), met
with widespread, nearly universal criticism, again illustrating the sometimes
embarrassing gulf between judicial opinion and public perception. See Jeffrey W.
Stempel, Chief William's Ghost: The Problematic Persistence of the Duty to Sit,
57 BUFF. L. REv. 813, 851-68, 900-07 (2009) (discussing adverse public and
professional reaction and substantial criticisms of Justices Scalia's and Rehnquist's
failures to recuse).
41. See CASs R. SuNsTEIN, BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 4 (Cass R.
Sunstein, ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2000) ("[P]eople often think, in hindsight,
that things that happened were inevitable, or nearly so. The resulting 'hindsight
bias' can much distort legal judgment.").
42. See discussion infra Part I.C (discussing spoliation concerns;
suggesting that "both private and public decisions may be improved if judgments
can be nudged back in the direction of true probabilities").
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where there has been a recent well-publicized such event.43
Although this cognitive trait is less likely to affect disqualification
practice, it holds potential to bring about bad decisions (of either
undue resistance or hair-trigger disqualification) due to recent high
profile episodes of recusal motion abuse or undue judicial resistance
to disqualification.4
In addition, there is the representativeness heuristic that
prompts people to complete an indeterminate picture in accord with
pre-conceived patterns of thought, experience, or association.45
Applied to disqualification practice, this may make judges too quick
to dismiss recusal motions as merely mirroring previously
unsuccessful similar motions, or to reflexively deem recusal motions
strategic rather than meritorious, or insufficiently serious based on a
judge's long-standing track record of generally avoiding criticism
despite a longstanding practice of being resistant to recusal.
Without doubt, people are generally subject to a status quo
bias in which they harbor a "general tendency to stick with their
43. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 15, at 26.
44. For example, in 2006, an investigative reporting series by the Los
Angeles Times suggested that Las Vegas area judges were overly influenced by
powerful litigants and lawyers. See Michael J. Goodman, Juice vs. Justice: A
Judge Who Isn't Playing by Fast and Loose Rules, L.A. TIMES
(June 8, 2006), available at http://www.latimes.com/news/politics/
la-na-vegasside8junO8,1,4286554.story (highlighting Judge John S. McGroaty's
avoidance of conflicts of interest in a "juice town," referring to money and
influence); Michael J. Goodman & William C. Rempel, Juice vs. Justice: For this
Judge and his Friends, One Good Turn Led to Another, L.A. TIMES (June 9,
2006), http://articles.latimes.com/2006/jun/09/nation/na-vegas9 (describing pattern
of some judges in regularly awarding court-appointed receiver or special master
work to lawyers with whom they have personal or professional ties); Michael J.
Goodman & William C. Rempel, Juice vs. Justice: In Las Vegas, They're Playing
with a Stacked Judicial Deck, L.A. TIMES (June 8, 2006),
http://articles.latimes.com/2006/jun/08/nation/na-vegas8 (describing discrete
judicial treatment of cases that could be embarrassing to influential litigants);
Michael J. Goodman & William C. Rempel, Juice vs. Justice: Special Treatment
Keeps them Under the Radar, L.A. TIMES (June 10, 2006),
http://articles.latimes.com/2006/jun/10/nation/na-vegasl0 (exploring the alleged
corruption of Las Vegas's senior judges). In response, local attorneys and others
perceived a reaction of greater judicial willingness to recuse in reaction to the
black eye the newspaper series had inflicted on the local bench. Of course, this
perception may have been due to cognitive error by the observers.
45. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 15, at 26-28 (exploring the
representativeness heuristic).
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current situation."46 Because, by definition, disqualification motions
(other than peremptory challenges of right) occur after a judge has
been assigned to the case, status quo bias generally works against the
grant of a disqualification motion. With Judge X already on the
case, both Judge X and any colleague to whom the recusal motion is
assigned will tend to oppose granting the motion if the case is close,
to better maintain the status quo. Added to this may be a notion of
professional pride that attaches some stigma to being too quick to
recuse.
Another important cognitive trait is "anchoring," in which
"people make probability judgments on the basis of an initial value,
or 'anchor,' for which they make insufficient adjustments" even
though "[t]he initial value may have an arbitrary or irrational
course." 47 For judges (and the legal system generally), an important
anchor is the presumption of judicial impartiality. For many judges,
the anchor is firmly set in favor of a very strong, hard to rebut
presumption of impartiality, although even realist and less
traditionalist judges also have this anchor.
In all cases, then, judges will resist disqualification motions,
sometimes resisting greatly with the traditionalist's anchor
outweighing information which calls impartiality into question. To
the extent that a strong impartiality presumption is arbitrary,
irrational, or even merely overstated, this cognitive trait of humans
will warp recusal decisions, particularly where, like all humans,
judges make insufficient adjustments once their anchor point is set.
Humans also are subject to "loss aversion" behavior in which
they place greater value on retaining something than in gaining
something new.48 A cognitive cousin is the "endowment effect" in
46. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 15, at 34-36 (exploring status quo
bias).
47. SUNsTEIN, supra note 41, at 5 (noting that when anchor points are
arbitrary or have an irrational source "probability assessment may go badly
wrong"); THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 15, at 23-25.
48. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 41, at 5 ("People are especially averse to
losses. They are more displeased with losses than they are pleased with equivalent
gains-roughly speaking, twice as displeased."); Daniel Kahneman & Amos
Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47
ECONOMETRICA 263, 269 (1979) (finding that a "psychological principle-the
overweighting of certainty-favors risk aversion in the domain of gains and risk
seeking in the domain of losses").
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which already owned items are valued at a rate above market value.49
This is why someone will refuse to accept $20 for a widget already
owned even when that same person would never pay $20 for the
same widget in a store.5 0
Applied to judging, one might reasonably posit that the
initially assigned judge gains "possession" of a case or is endowed
with the case. A disqualification motion then presents the possibility
of loss. The judge, like other humans with loss aversion, may be
overly inclined to avoid the loss and keep the case even in the face of
serious questions regarding impartiality. Similarly, the judge with a
case in hand may be unwilling to "sell" it back to the clerk of court
for reassignment because the judge has subconsciously assigned the
currently possessed case a greater value than a prospective
51
replacement case.
In short, there are a several cognitive traits that suggest
judges will be unduly inclined to reject disqualification motions. In
the face of these factors, the legal system needs to ensure that its
rules and procedures regarding judicial disqualification are
sufficiently vigorous to overcome these cognitive barriers.
49. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 41, at 5 ("Contrary to economic theory,
people do not treat out-of-pocket costs and opportunity costs as if they were
equivalent."); id. at 6 (indicating that assignment of a legal entitlement "creates an
endowment effect, that is, a greater valuation stemming from the mere fact of
endowment").
50. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 15, at 33-34 (using example of
mug given to half of class of college students, with result that students with mugs
demand higher price to sell than students without mugs will pay to buy).
51. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 41, at 5-6 (applying the concept to conclude
that the Coase Theorem is at least partially incorrect).
Recall that the Coase Theorem proposes that when transaction costs are
zero, the allocation of the initial entitlement will not matter, in the sense
that it will not affect the ultimate state of the world, which will come
from voluntary bargaining. The theorem is wrong because the allocation
of the legal entitlement may well matter, for those who are initially
allocated an entitlement are likely to value it more than will those without
the legal entitlement.
Id.
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B. The Inevitable Socio-Political Element of
Adjudication
Because of the cognitive factors noted above, there is almost
no question that different judges will react differently to the same
cases, litigants, lawyers, and legal questions. In this sense, complete
uniformity of dispute outcomes is an unattainable goal. 52 Inevitably,
judges will bring their own values, orientations, ideologies, and
jurisprudential views to the adjudication task. Justice Rehnquist's
memorandum defending his erroneous decision not to recuse in
Laird v. Tatum is deservedly maligned, but the memorandum
contains at least one kernel of truth, noting that a judge without any
legal or world views coming to the bench would not be fit to take the
bench. 54
Jurisprudential and demographic diversity may actually
contribute to improved adjudication even at the cost of uniformity in
that these types of variances among judges create a type of judicial
52. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Shady Grove and the Democracy-Enhancing
Potential of Erie Formalism, 44 AKRON L. REv. (forthcoming 2011) (arguing that
Erie "hawks" preferring to apply state law even when it is part of the state's
procedural code are excessively concerned with symmetry of state and federal
court outcomes, a forlorn quest because similar legal and factual disputes
invariably produce disparate adjudication outcomes because of differences in
litigant and lawyer charisma, juries, timing, and outside influences).
53. See Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 826-28 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., mem.)
(explaining and defending Justice Rehnquist's refusal to recuse in case challenging
Department of Defense domestic surveillance program even though he had
approved program as a Justice Department official prior to joining Court); JOHN
MACKENZIE, THE APPEARANCE OF JUSTICE 222-23 (1977) (criticizing Rehnquist's
decision not to recuse and noting its effect on the credibility of the Court); John
Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judicial Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV.
237, 246-48 (1986) (criticizing Rehnquist decision in Laird v. Tatum and
identifying Justice Rehnquist as outside the mainstream of opinion regarding
judicial disqualification); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Chief William 's Ghost, supra note
40, at 860-62 (2009) (noting criticism of Justice Rehnquist's failure to recuse and
the content and rationale of his memorandum, in particular criticism of noted legal
ethics experts); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal, and Reform, 53 BROOK.
L. REv. 589, 593-96 (1987) (discussing Justice Rehnquist's memorandum and its
aftermath).
54. See Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 835 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., mem.)
("Proof that a Justice's mind at the time he joined the Court was a complete tabula
rasa in the area of constitutional adjudication would be evidence of lack of
qualification, not lack of bias.").
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pluralism5 5 similar to electoral pluralism that traditionally has been
56
praised by political scientists and policymakers. But when the
55. See, e.g., Nadia A. Jilani et al., Gender, Consciousness Raising, and
Decision Making on the Supreme Court of Canada, JUDICATURE, Sept.-Oct. 2010,
at 59 ("The analysis of patterns of voting by male justices indicates quite clearly
that as the number of women on the Court increased, the behavior of male justices
changed in ways that were both statistically significant and substantively
important.").
A particular example from the article involved Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No.
I v. Redding, which concerned the constitutionality of a school's strip search of a
13-year-old girl to discover whether or not she had illegal drugs in her possession.
129 S. Ct. 2633, 2638, 2642-44 (2009). Two judges considered similar in
jurisprudential philosophy appeared to clash because of different perspectives on
the intrusiveness of such a search:
Justice Breyer suggested that it's no big deal when kids strip. After all,
they do it for gym class all the time. [Plaintiff] Savana Redding didn't
reveal her body beyond her underclothes, said Breyer. Justice Ginsburg,
the court's only female justice, bristled, her eyes flashing with anger. She
noted that there's no dispute that Savana was required to shake out her
bra and the crotch of her panties. Ginsburg seemed to all but shout, boys
may like to preen in the locker room, but girls, particularly teenage girls,
do not.
Nina Totenberg, Supreme Court to hear school strip search case, NAT'L PUB.
RADIo (April 21, 2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyid=103334943. See also Transcript of Oral Argument at 45,
Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. I v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009) (No. 08-479),
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument transcripts
/08-479.pdf ("I'm trying to work out why is this a major thing to say strip down to
your underclothes, which children do when they change for gym . . . .").
Ultimately, Justice Breyer, like Justice Ginsburg and the Court majority, ruled that
the school's strip search violated the girl's Fourth Amendment rights. Safford
United, 129 S. Ct. at 2641-43. This perhaps provides more evidentiary support for
the thesis that availability of a woman's perspective on the bench can make a
difference.
Of course the value of adding different life experiences and attendant
consciousness raising to a court is not the same thing as judges voting for the
stereotypes and biases of their own demographic group. Consequently, I am not
suggesting that the type of seemingly beneficial education judges may receive
when serving with judges of different backgrounds makes a case for seeking a
more variegated bench of judges exercising unconscious bias. I am willing to be
agnostic, however, on the question of whether the negative additional biases in
judging may co-exist with the positive of a more aware bench due to its diversity.
Alternatively, even if a diverse bench is at its worst a fractured bench of judges
unconsciously biased toward their favored groups, this still may be an
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judicial variance stems not from a different intellectual attack on
legal questions but instead results from cognitive bias due to extra-
judicial traits, injustice rather than enrichment seems the more likely
result.57
Some "slanting" of the bench becomes inevitable to the
extent that members of the legal profession exhibit different beliefs,
values, ideologies, and jurisprudential preferences, and to the extent
that the larger political context occasionally favors some beliefs,
values, ideologies, and jurisprudential preferences over others. To
use an obvious example, Republican presidents and governors will
tend to appoint a greater percentage of politically and legally
conservative judges than will Democratic presidents and governors.
Executives of both parties will be constrained in their choices by
legislatures, merit selection panels, the organized bar, and other
factors-with the mix of these factors changing over time. The same
holds true where judges are elected in that the relative electoral
impact of the plaintiffs bar, the defense bar, organized labor,
business, civil rights groups, and law enforcement will vary over
*58time.
improvement of a more uniform bench tending to be biased toward a particular
group or groups.
56. See ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 124-51
(1965) (arguing that pluralist contest among various interests is generally healthy,
producing sound public policy and making for robust democracy). During the past
50 years, however, intellectual opinion has tended to shift from optimism about
pluralism to concern over the undue influence of powerful interest groups not
necessarily representative of the greater public good. See ROBERT A. DAHL,
DILEMMAS OF A PLURALIST DEMOCRACY: AUTONOMY VS. CONTROL 40-52 (1982)
(discussing independent organizations and their potential role in stabilizing
injustices and distorting the public agenda); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 118-20 (1971)
(discussing group theory and potential problems of pluralism).
57. A biased or even a corrupt judge is not necessarily chronically in error.
Just as a broken clock is correct at least twice each day, it may be the case that
litigants unfairly aided by a judge's prejudices (or litigants that purchased the
judge's decision) are legally entitled to victory under the prevailing law if fairly
applied. However, even if this were true more often than the broken clock gives
the correct time, it would hardly be a justification for a more relaxed attitude
toward judicial impartiality.
58. See Curtis Wilkie, In Search of the South Long Lampooned for its
Backwater Politics and Plantation Mentality, the Region Now Defies Stereotypes.
Today's Presidential Candidates Find Themselves Confronted with a Diverse and
Shifting Landscape, GLOBE (Boston) Mar. 6, 1988, at 14, available at 1988
WLNR 618982 (detailing the changing demographics of the Southern electorate);
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To the extent that these variances reflect only differing
judicial orientation of appointees and candidates, this is not only
inevitable but probably unobjectionable. No thinking person
familiar with a subject is totally without at least tentative views
about it. Recusal on this basis would lead to the absurdity warned
about in the otherwise faulty and justly infamous Rehnquist
Memorandum in Laird v. Tatum. 59  However, where a judge's
orientation goes beyond legal philosophy or opinion and becomes
pre-existing extra-judicial preference for particular litigants or case
outcomes, this violates judicial impartiality. Sound recusal policy
would reach these situations where there is an appearance of such
impartiality.60
C. Spoliation Concerns
1. The Inherent Difficulty of Demonstrating the
Impact of a Tainted Judge and the Harm of
Harmless Error Analysis
In addition to the difficulty of self-evaluation, there exists the
perhaps larger problem of sorting out the impact, if any, on
adjudication presided over by a judge whose impartiality is subject to
question. In many cases, the presiding judge may be subject to a
reasonable question as to his or her impartiality. Nevertheless, the
judge may continue to sit under circumstances clearly in violation of
the law, or at least under circumstances that cause discomfort but
where there may be little or no indication that the same outcome
would not have been obtained before a completely impartial judge.
As a result, appellate review based on impact will likely be
insufficient as it is often difficult to demonstrate that a particular
outcome resulted from lack of impartiality rather than the closely
see also CURTIS WILKIE, THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF ZEUS: THE RISE AND RUIN
OF AMERICA'S MOST POWERFUL TRIAL LAWYER 81-89 (2010) (describing the
downfall of prominent plaintiffs attorney Richard "Dickie" Scruggs, the extensive
culture of corruption and favoritism in Mississippi, and the pitched electoral and
financial battle for ideological/political control of the Mississippi Supreme Court).
59. See Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 835 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., mem.)
(noting that complete absence of thought in general legal area of concern suggests
lack of judicial competence more than neutrality).
60. See infra text accompanying notes 215-55 (discussing recusal
standards and the "substantial group of doubters" trigger for recusal).
Symposium 2011] 753
HeinOnline  -- 30 Rev. Litig. 753 2010-2011
THE REVIEW OF LITIGATION
contested merits of the case. In addition to the problem of cognitive
and unconscious bias, judicial decision-making is affected by what
might be termed a spoliation problem. Even where a clearly
ineligible judge presides over a proceeding, it is often difficult to
determine whether the tainted judge's participation affected the
outcome.61 As a result, reviewing courts may be disinclined to undo
the resulting case outcome.
Although one scholar has implicitly defended this
phenomenon by advocating for an "actual justice" test rather than the
articulated "reasonable question as to impartiality" test,62 such a
move would only make judicial disqualification worse by leading to
insufficient disqualification in cases where actual injustice has
probably resulted but cannot be affirmatively demonstrated. By
contrast, the appearance standard, while perhaps leading to some
over-disqualification, provides greater protection to litigants at
relatively low cost in terms of judicial resources and probably no
cost in terms of substantive outcome. As Professor Geyh correctly
observed:
The problem of over-disqualification is largely one of
squandering judicial resources on the administration
of unnecessary disqualifications, whereas the problem
of under-disqualification is one of subjecting litigants
to the loss of life, liberty or property in an unfair (or
seemingly unfair) process. As between promoting
fairness and administrative efficiency, the former goal
is intuitively more compelling ... .6
Going a step beyond this observation, my own normative
assessment is that there is no doubt that a legal system should be
more concerned with ensuring the fairness of presiding judges than
in conserving judicial resources unless the efficiency savings are
enormous. Almost certainly, whatever savings would result from a
61. See supra text accompanying note 41 (discussing hindsight bias).
62. Sarah M. R. Cravens, In Pursuit of Actual Justice, 59 ALA. L. REv. 1,
7-8 (2007).
63. Geyh, supra note 6, at 714; see also Stempel, Completing Caperton,
supra note 1, at 324-25 (arguing that any adjudication presided over by a judge
whose impartiality is not beyond reasonable question deprives litigants of due
process and that Caperton's higher "unreasonable probability of actual bias"
standard is insufficiently protective of litigants and justice).
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stingier recusal regime would be modest. It simply is not very
burdensome to adopt the procedural protections urged in this article,
nor is it very burdensome to err on the side of disqualification
through the use of the appearance-of-impartiality-standard rather
than to err on the side of unfairness through the proof-of-actual-
injustice standard.
Although harmless error is a valuable judicial concept that
can provide substantial economy and even justice, it becomes
problematic when applied to failure-to-recuse cases. Despite this,
the harmless error doctrine has substantial support in recusal
practice. Although "[t]he traditional rule was that when a
disqualified judge sat in violation of an express statutory standard,
his rulings were to be vacated on appeal," 64 the majority of states and
at least a substantial number of the federal circuits appear to apply
65the harmless error doctrine to recusal, particularly if there has been
66
extensive activity in the case prior to recusal or failure to recuse.
Where risk of actual bias (as opposed to questions of
neutrality and appearance) is thought low,
. . . and no prejudice to the complaining party has
been shown, or is readily apparent on review of the
appellate record, appellate courts have proven
reluctant to reverse a lower court's judicial
64. FLAMM, supra note 14, § 33.8, at 1012.
65. See FLAMM, supra note 14, § 33.8 at 1012-13 (listing jurisdictions that
do not necessarily require reversal of judgments or vacatur of orders handed down
by judges who failed to recuse themselves); see also, e.g., Doddy v. Oxy USA,
Inc., 101 F.3d 448, 458 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that judge erred in reentering case
after prior recusal but error did not require vacating all trial court rulings); United
States v. Troxell, 887 F.2d 830, 833 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that the trial judge
was not required to recuse himself); Lyons v. Sheetz, 834 F.2d 493, 495 n. 1 (5th
Cir. 1987) (noting that even if the judge should have recused himself from the
third action since he presided over the first action and was a party himself to the
second action, his failure to recuse himself was harmless error since "no other
judge could reasonably have reached a different result"); Powell v. Anderson, 660
N.W. 2d 107, 115 (Minn. 2003) ("[N]ot every case involving judicial
disqualification deserves vacatur.").
66. See FLAMM, supra note 14, § 33.8, at 1013 ("[I]t is generally agreed
that only those errors that result in an unfair trial, or deprive a party of its
substantial rights, are sufficient to warrant reversal or remand."). See generally
Tennant v. Marion Health Care Found., Inc., 459 S.E.2d 374, 386 (W. Va. 1995)
(holding that violation of the recusal standard "involving only the appearance of
impropriety does not automatically require a new trial").
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disqualification decision, either in civil cases or in
criminal ones. This is so even where the lower court
judge clearly erred in failing to disqualify himself.6 7
Where there was a substantial risk of actual bias by the judge
rather than merely a reasonable question as to impartiality or a
seemingly minor violation of one of the financial, professional, or
factual grounds for disqualification found in 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) or
ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct R. 2.11,68 failure to recuse is
often not treated as harmless error.69 But at the same time, "even
when actual bias has been shown, disqualification or reversal will
not necessarily be ordered unless the situation is one in which it
would be unreasonable to require the complaining party to establish
prejudice." 70
67. FLAMM, supra note 14, § 33.8 at 1013-15 (citations omitted).
68. See infra note 106 and accompanying text (reviewing these grounds for
disqualification).
69. See FLAMM, supra note 14, § 33.8, at 1013 (stating that where the risk
that the judge was actually biased is substantial, the error in failing to recuse is not
harmless, and any judgment rendered by the judge may be reversed).
70. Id. at 1015 (citations omitted).
Reversal of a decision based on a judicial bias claim is especially unlikely
to be ordered where the malfeasance alleged is either excusable; where
only an appearance of bias or impropriety is involved, rather than actual
bias or impropriety; where the complaining party, despite knowledge of
grounds for disqualification, did not seek to disqualify the trial judge
before his decision on the merits of the matter was rendered; or where the
appellate court is in a position to either remedy any inequities that
arguably may have been occasioned by the challenged judge's failure to
disqualify himself, or to independently confirm the correctness of the
lower court judge's decision on the merits. Under such circumstances the
error may be deemed to be harmless, and the disqualification issue may
be deemed to be moot.
Id. at 1015-16 (citations omitted). Flamm further notes that "[t]he harmless error
rule is especially likely to be invoked in circumstances in which the case came to
the appeals court upon the grant of a motion for summary judgment," because the
appellate court, in giving plenary review to the summary judgment grant will, if
affirming the grant, likely think that where "summary judgment was proper,
remanding the case to another judge would be an exercise in futility." Id. at 1016-
17 (citations omitted). See also Pierce v. Pierce, 39 P.3d 791, 799 (Okla. 2001)
("We have indicated in a divorce case that we would affirm a decree if it was just
and equitable even if a trial judge showed bias. . . . On the other hand, we have
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A significant number, but still a seeming minority of
jurisdictions, take the view that "once an appearance of partiality has
been shown prejudice is presumed," and the matter must be
remanded, heard, and decided again by a new judge.7  The Supreme
Court, despite not being consistently clear on the issue, stated in
Arizona v. Fulminante that the administration of a case by a judge
lacking impartiality is among the "structural defects in the
constitution of the trial mechanism, which defy analysis by
'harmless-error' standards," 72 but the Fulminante case appears to
have been one of actual bias rather than merely a reasonable question
as to judicial impartiality. 73  Moreover, in its most significant
modem decision applying the federal disqualification statute, the
Court stated that reversal of a decision was likely only where there
said that a party is entitled to reversal of a proper judgment when the judge was
statutorily required to disqualify.").
71. FLAMM, supra note 14, § 33.8, at 1012; see, e.g., United States v.
Antar, 53 F.3d 568, 573 n.7 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating that the integrity of the
judiciary is the touchstone of recusal); United States v. Van Griffin, 874 F.2d 634,
637 (9th Cir. 1989); Buttrum v. Black, 721 F. Supp. 1268, 1296 (N.D. Ga. 1989).
72. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991); accord Neder v.
United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1999) (stating that the harmless error analysis is
not apt in cases involving a biased trial judge); Bigby v. Dretke, 402 F.3d 551, 559
(5th Cir. 2005) (stating adjudication before a biased trial judge "represents a
structural error subject to automatic reversal"); State v. Esparza, 660 N.E.2d 1195,
1196 (Ohio 1996) (stating that if judge who is not impartial is present on the
bench, it is structural constitutional error).
73. Arizona v. Fulminante involved the voluntariness of a confession given
by a murder suspect to an undercover informant. 499 U.S. at 282-84. A new trial
was ordered without admission of the tainted confession. Id. at 284. Although the
discussion was not strictly necessary to its decision, a majority of the court drew a
strong distinction between "classic 'trial error' that involves a mere mistake by
the adjudicator and structural error that invalidates the entire proceeding, using as
one example the lack of an impartial judge. Id. at 309-10. In Fulminante, the
Court used failure to provide counsel in felony prosecutions, exclusion from grand
jury on basis of race, denial of right to self-representation, and denial of public trial
as examples of structural error. Id. Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court appears to have
rejected a harmless error approach to erroneous failure to recuse. See, e.g., Del
Vecchio v. Ill. Dept. of Corr., 31 F.3d 1363, 1371 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[B]ad
appearances alone should not require disqualification to prevent an unfair trial.
What may appear bad to an observer, especially in hindsight, may not have
influenced-or more importantly, may not have had any real possibility to
influence .. . the judge .... ).
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was actual bias or impropriety rather than merely the appearance of
bias or impropriety.74
Harmless error review thus appears to be the norm in cases
where disqualification is sought based on appearance, financial
holdings, past professional affiliations, or factual connections to a
case. Judicial failure to recuse on these grounds will not require
reversal if the reviewing court believes the same outcome would be
obtained before a neutral judge. Although this may seem a
reasonable exercise in judicial economy, it unduly weakens the
disqualification regime.
As one judge put it, "[t]he issue is not whether a judge whose
partiality might reasonably be questioned has been shown to be
biased . . . [but, rather,] whether a judge whose partiality might
reasonably be questioned should even conduct the proceeding in the
first place." 75 The answer, of course, is that the judge about whom
there exists a reasonable question regarding impartiality should not
preside. Everything taking place in the case after the improper
failure to recuse is wrongful, and the resulting outcome should
logically be viewed as a nullity even if it is not viewed as an
abomination.
In addition to this logical ground for vacating the outcomes at
trials presided over by tainted judges, adjudication before a judge
that should have recused creates difficult forensic problems of
assessing the degree to which lack of judicial neutrality was a factor
in the result and determining whether other reasonable outcomes
could have resulted absent the tainted judge's participation.
In many cases, determining whether a tainted judge's
participation affected trial results will be reminiscent of that genre of
science fiction movies in which modems travel back in time to the
site of famous historical events.76 Will the intrusion of the modems
alter the subsequent course of history? No one knows until the final
scene when, in nearly all cases, history remains unchanged, due to a
little luck and audience suspension of disbelief.77
In similar fashion, appellate courts reviewing trial outcomes
may find it difficult to believe that a seemingly clear case could have
74. See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 858-59
(1988) (describing the recusal rule under 28 U.S.C. § 455a).
75. Lofton v. State, 944 S.W.2d 131, 136 (Ark. App. 1997) (Griffen, J.,
dissenting).
76. E.g., BACK TO THE FUTURE (Universal Studios 1985).
77. Id.
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come out differently had it been officiated by a judge free of
disqualifying traits. Perhaps. However, one is hard-pressed to make
this determination post hoc. Metaphorically, it attempts to put the
genie back in the bottle or close Pandora's Box. Trial outcomes are
at least as path dependent as other parts of life, perhaps more. The
judge's initial orders (e.g., injunctive relief, scheduling, etc.) and
interaction with the parties, including even subliminal reaction to the
case on the merits, logically affects everything else going forward.
Judicial rulings on discovery, which almost never get tested on
appeal, can have a particularly shaping effect.
Under these circumstances, it is unwise to apply a harmless
error analysis to judicial error in failing to recuse. Requiring vacatur
and remand in such cases creates in the courts a strong incentive to
treat disqualification matters seriously and to err on the side of
disqualification in close cases, a generally preferable approach to the
resistance to recusal that has frequently animated the courts. 8
Disqualification matters can be complicated or close, and
many denials of disqualification are not obviously incorrect. In such
cases, a de facto form of harmless error analysis may animate
reviewing courts. Where a case looks clear on the merits, the
reviewing court may be excessively inclined to resolve recusal
questions against disqualification, particularly if the failure to recuse
is not an egregious misapplication of the law.
In effect, the appellate court will be tempted to affirm a
failure to recuse under questionable circumstances because it
appears, at least subconsciously to the appellate judges, that the trial
judge's participation did not change the seemingly inevitable
outcome of the case. Perhaps the trial judge made the same internal
calculus when declining to recuse in the first instance,
subconsciously finding recusal and transferring to (i.e., burdening)
another judge a greater cost than the perceived modest risk of biased
judging.
A variant of this problem may have been at work in Caperton
and other disqualification cases that have divided the Supreme Court
under circumstances where the judge under review appears clearly to
have erred in failing to recuse. The overt split in the Caperton Court
was over the wisdom of extending constitutional due process
78. See infra text accompanying note 191 (discussing procedural reforms
designed to prompt more serious treatment of judicial disqualification decisions by
courts).
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protections to litigants harmed by a state court judge's failure to
recuse (and Justice Benjamin's failure to disqualify himself was
clear error under the applicable law of West Virginia). 79  The
dissenters, however, may have been motivated by a "does it make
any difference?" inquiry, cou led with an "is this worth the time and
effort of remand?" question.
Without doubt, the Caperton litigation had already been
extensive and, despite plaintiff Caperton's $50 million verdict at
trial, several state supreme court justices had accepted defendant
Massey's legal defenses based on arguments of claim preclusion and
failure to enforce a forum selection clause. My own analysis, like
that of the Caperton dissenters in the West Virginia high court, 82 is
that those arguments were woefully weak. They nonetheless
79. See Stempel, Impeach Brent Benjamin Now!?, supra note 1, at 20-25
(detailing substantial and repeated legal error by Justice Benjamin in approaching
and deciding four separate disqualification motions; noting that Justice Benjamin
consistently applied a subjective approach asking whether he personally thought he
could be fair rather than the required approach of asking whether an observer
might have reasonable questions as to his impartiality). Caperton itself stands as
an example of the negative things that can happen when judges do not take
appearance standards sufficiently seriously.
80. See Stempel, Impeach Brent Benjamin Now!?, supra note 1, at 25-30
(noting variety of dissenter concerns).
81. According to the U.S. Supreme Court, the West Virginia Court's
rationale for vacating the trial court decision was, in part, "that a forum-selection
clause contained in a contract to which Massey was not a party barred the suit in
West Virginia, and second, that res judicata barred the suit due to an out of state
judgment to which Massey was not a party." Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co.,
129 S. Ct. 2252, 2258 (2009) (citations to record omitted).
82. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E. 2d 223, 284 (W. Va.
2008) (Albright & Cookman, JJ., dissenting) (labeling state court Caperton
majority opinion setting aside judgment against Massey on claim preclusion and
forum selection grounds as "unsupported by the facts and existing case law").
83. See Stempel, Impeach Brent Benjamin Now!?, supra note 1, at 15 n.50
(reviewing Massey's preclusion and forum selection arguments and finding them
unpersuasive); see also Stempel, Completing Caperton, supra note 1, at 257-59
(discussing Massey's procedural attacks on Caperton verdict in more detail).
In brief, Massey argued that because a Caperton company, Harman Mining,
had previously won a breach of contract suit against a Massey subsidiary, this
judgment precluded the business fraud claim prosecuted by Caperton in West
Virginia. The argument is not well-taken because the scope and nature of the West
Virginia fraud litigation is so different in quality and kind than the breach of
contract action in Virginia. Although it is correct that Massey's alleged intentional
breaching of the Virginia contract was part of its purported scheme to destroy
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enjoyed support from three real jurists who were not subject to the
same ethical cloud that hovered over Justice Benjamin. 84 After the
U.S. Supreme Court's remand, the Caperton verdict was again set
aside, this time by a 4-1 vote, as the West Virginia Court ruled that a
forum selection clause in a coal contract between a Caperton
company and a Massey subsidiary required trial of all "related"
Caperton, it was but a part of a much larger, company-wide effort that went far
beyond a single contract, transaction, or facility.
At the very least, a finding of claim preclusion under these circumstances is an
unusually broad application of the doctrine, prompting one to wonder why some
West Virginia Justices would be so eager to extend a doctrine that effectively
limits a plaintiffs day in court and permits a company to escape punishment for
allegedly very bad business behavior. Subsequent events have made the West
Virginia Court's affection for Massey all the more puzzling. Massey, it should be
recalled, is the parent company of Upper Big Branch Mine, the site of a tragic
mining disaster in which nearly thirty miners died. The mine had been the subject
of approximately 1,300 safety infractions in five years. Ken Lawless, Massey 's
Massive Massacre, INDUSTRIAL WORKER, Oct. 2010, at 11.
Defenders of the Court will undoubtedly argue that this simply means that
even unsavory defendants such as Massey and Blankenship received fair and
objective application of "the law" of res judicata. In my view, however, they
received an excessively generous application of the doctrine. One might have
expected that from a Court faced with an impoverished widow and young children
being subjected to multiple SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
Participation) designed to throttle their objections to construction of a planned
polluting facility in a residential neighborhood. It makes no sense to see expansion
of a doctrine that has the potential to prevent full adjudicative airing of alleged
reprehensible business behavior, particularly in the context of a predatory
company attempting to comer more of the coal market, to the potential
disadvantage of West Virginia consumers, workers, and competing businesses.
84. Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling, Caperton was heard and
decided twice by the West Virginia Supreme Court. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey
Coal Co., No. 33350, 2007 WL 4150960 at *4 (W. Va. Nov. 21, 2007), vacated,
679 S.E.2d 223 (W. Va. 2008). In the first decision, the court voted 3-2 to reverse
the decision, with two justices joining the ultimately disqualified Justice Benjamin.
Id.
The rehearing and recusal motions were based on information about state
court Chief Justice Spike Maynard vacationing on the French Riviera with Massey
CEO Don Blankenship, a childhood friend of Maynard's, while the case was
pending. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2258. Justice Maynard ultimately recused
himself, as did Justice Larry Starcher, who had voted in favor of Caperton in the
first decision. Id. Justice Benjamin, as acting Chief Justice, appointed two judges
to replace Maynard and Starcher. Id The replacement judges split on the
questions of claim preclusion and forum selection, resulting in another 3-2 victory
for Massey in the Court's second decision of April 2008. Caperton, 679 S.E.2d at
223.
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matters-including Caperton's allegations of an effort to destroy
him-in Buchanan County, Virginia, making the West Virginia
proceedings-and Hugh Caperton's $50 million verdict-a nullity.85
Although this seems to be an additional miscarriage of
justice, the forum selection clause and claim preclusion arguments
cannot be totally dismissed and are, whatever their analytical
shortcomings, the "law" of West Virginia. 86  Under these
circumstances, where a case comes out the same with or without a
tainted judge who should have been recused at the outset, many
judges may view the situation, at least unconsciously, as evidence
that excessive sensitivity about the appearance of judicial
impartiality merely adds additional cost without affecting substantive
case outcomes.
Similarly, the Supreme Court's most prominent
disqualification case prior to Caperton was Liljeberg v. Health
Services Acquisition Corp., was also a 5-4 decision. The Court
divided over the propriety of the conduct of a New Orleans federal
trial judge who failed to recuse in a case in which Loyola University,
on whose board he sat, had a financial interest.88  In addition to
disputing the judge's state of mind and the wrongfulness of the
85. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 690 S.E. 2d 322, 332 (2009)
(vacating judgment for Caperton on forum selection clause grounds; claim
preclusion argument not addressed by Court on remand).
86. Technically, of course, the West Virginia Court's 2008 decision on
claim preclusion has been vacated but it nonetheless, as a practical matter, stands
as support for Massey's position on the issue. Caperton, 679 S.E. 2d at 223. On
the other hand, the failure of the Court to address claim preclusion in its November
2009 decision, 690 S.E. 2d 322, finding for Massey on the merits based on only
the forum selection clause, may reflect some judicial retreat from the broad view
of res judicata expressed in the Court's November 2007, No. 33350 (W. Va. Nov.
21, 2007), and April 2008 opinions. 679 S.E. 2d 223.
87. 486 U.S. 847 (1988).
88. Id. (Stevens, J., for the majority; Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting; O'Connor,
J., dissenting). See also id. at 870 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting, joined by White
and Scalia, JJ.); id. at 874 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor's dissent,
however, was partially procedural in that she "believe[d] the issue [of whether the
trial judge had actual knowledge of disqualifying information] should be addressed
in the first instance by the courts below" and "would therefore remand . . . ." Id.
Like the other dissenters, however, she refused to find that a trial judge's
constructive knowledge of disqualifying information could be a "basis for a
violation of 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)." Id.
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judge's conduct, 89 the Liljeberg dissents can be read as reflecting
hesitancy to set aside a judgment that may have been correct
(particularly since the dissenters were reluctant to find actual
knowledge of disqualifying information by the trial judge despite a
"quite remarkable" set of facts raising suspicion) 90 and would merely
result again after disqualification, remand, and a repeat of court
proceedings.91
Although such sentiments are understandable, they make for
an inappropriate approach to judicial disqualification. To be sure,
there are many cases that will come out the same way regardless of
the judge's biases or prejudices. The party favored by judicial
bias-even a bribing or blackmailing party-may deserve to win on
the merits just as a party against whom the judge is prejudiced may
deserve to lose on the merits. But such bottom line concerns miss
the point. A central tenant of the judicial system is adjudication
before a neutral judge and fair jury. The alleged inevitability of an
outcome cannot justify a lax attitude toward recusal.92
That reviewing judges, or judges assessing their own
impartiality, seldom state openly their view that the case is "clear" or
"easy" does not negate the real risk that they are doing so silently
and subconsciously. To combat this tendency, a more rigorous
89. Ultimately, the Liljeberg majority appears to have been dramatically
vindicated on the issue of whether the trial judge in question was being "punished"
through disqualification merely because of inadvertence, or whether there was
something more nefarious afoot. The judge was later convicted for bribery,
conspiracy, and obstruction of justice and sentenced to seven years imprisonment.
STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW
AND ETHics 602 (8th ed. 2009). Despite this, he refused to resign and "continued
to draw his salary while in prison" before finally resigning in the face of
impending impeachment. Id. He was also disbarred. Id.
90. Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 851-52 & 855-58 (reviewing damning facts
suggesting judicial impropriety); see also Kenneth M. Fall, Liljeberg v. Health
Services Acquisition Corp.; The Supreme Court Encourages Disqualification of
Federal Judges Under Section 455(A), 1989 Wis. L. REV. 1033, 1049-51 (1989)
(describing Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 858-59
(1988), noting questionable conduct by trial judge that would give rise to concern
about neutrality).
91. It appears that the Liljeberg litigation settled after remand as there are
no further reported adjudicatory proceedings.
92. This is why any move toward an "actual justice" standard, see, e.g.,
Cravens, supra note 62 and accompanying text, rather than strict enforcement of
the reasonable-question-as-to-impartiality standard, is mistaken in light of the
goals and commitments of the legal system.
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attitude toward disqualification is required. As discussed in Part
II.B.5 of this article, this should include replacement of the abuse of
discretion standard of review and elimination of a harmless error
approach when a trial judge erroneously fails to recuse.
A more practical and less normative objection to relaxing
judicial recusal in cases where no miscarriage of justice seems to
have resulted is the difficulty in determining whether results in a
case were, in fact, largely preordained by the inarguable merits of the
case. This is particularly true where failure to recuse occurs at trial.
At least on appeal, there are other judges familiar with the record
who can see the matter differently and call out the non-recusing
appellate judge, as took place in Caperton.93 The trial judge acts
alone, however, in shaping the record that will be reviewed on
appeal and characterizing the nature of the parties' legal arguments.
With the case so cast by a judge that should have recused, the
results may seem on their face to be obvious and inevitable; but
what if a different judge, not subject to disqualification, had shaped
the record and assessed the arguments in first instance? Even
searching re-examination by an appellate court often (perhaps
usually) cannot answer these questions. The "genie" of a tainted
opinion by a tainted judge is out of the metaphorical bottle and
cannot be put back in the container. Only a new proceeding before a
judge whose impartiality is not subject to reasonable question can
ensure that the case on appeal is fairly presented.
2. The Inherent Difficulty of Uncovering and
Demonstrating Bias or Prejudice in Judges
In addition, questions of judicial impartiality are afflicted
with another, perhaps even more difficult, type of spoliation
problem. Sometimes, perhaps most of the time, it is very hard to
determine the prejudices of a decision-maker. To take an extreme
example, a judge may harbor deep-seated racism, sexism, or
homophobia but be sufficiently cautious in utterances that she is
never found out. While a judge disciplined enough to avoid any
93. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223, 284 n.16 (W. Va.
2008) (Albright, J., dissenting); see also Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S.
Ct. 2252, 2258 (2009) (citing Judge Starcher's dissent in the superseded No. 33350
(W. Va. Nov. 21, 2007), in which he called the majority decision "morally and
legally wrong").
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such public utterances or conduct may also be disciplined enough to
keep these prejudices outside the adjudication process, this is
unlikely. More probably, the hidden biases of such judges manifest
themselves in a subtle manner adverse to the disfavored litigants or
lawyers: a refusal to adequately credit the testimony of a woman;
excessive reliance on the testimony of a Hispanic witness or member
of the same college fraternity; concern that a black plaintiff has been
insufficiently willing to persevere through pain to get back to work.
To the extent any of this happens, some litigants are not getting
adequate due process.
Even though judges are relatively high profile members of
society, the risk of failure to discover these attitudes is significant.
Consider the latest revelations about former President Richard
Nixon, who led the nation from 1969 until his Watergate-fueled
resignation in mid-1974.94 For a quarter-century, Nixon was a
significant force in national policy as a congressman, senator, vice-
president, and as President elected in 1968 and re-elected in 1972 in
a landslide. 9 5 Although Nixon had more than a few critics during his
rise to power and reign, he was not regarded as racist, bigoted, or
anti-Semitic. 9 6  Had Nixon been a judge,97 no one would have
94. Richard M Nixon, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/
about/presidents/richardnixon (last visited March 14, 2011).
95. Returning to California after service in the Pacific during World War
II, Richard Nixon became a rising political star, elected first to the U.S. House of
Representatives, then as the state's U.S. Senator before being chosen as President
Dwight Eisenhower's 1952 vice-presidential running mate, a position he held for
eight years before losing the 1960 presidential election to John F. Kennedy. Id.
Nixon also lost the 1962 California gubernatorial election to Edmund G. "Pat"
Brown, father of current California Governor Jerry Brown and went into a period
of political exile during which he became a named partner in New York's Mudge
Rose law firm. Id. Nixon continued to serve as an elder statesman and intellectual
leader of the Republican party between 1962 and 1968. Id. His rehabilitation was
so sufficiently complete in 1968 that he emerged as the GOP nominee and was
elected President, defeating Democrat Hubert Humphrey, Lyndon Johnson's vice-
president and long-time U.S. Senator, as well as Alabama Governor George
Wallace, who ran as a third-party candidate. Id. See generally MELVIN SMALL,
THE PRESIDENCY OF RICHARD NIXON (2003); RICHARD REEVES, PRESIDENT
NIXON: ALONE IN THE WHITE HOUSE (2001); ROGER MORRIS, RICHARD MILHOUS
NIXON: THE RISE OF AN AMERICAN POLITICIAN (1990); IRWIN F. GELLMAN, THE
CONTENDER: RICHARD NIXON: THE CONGRESS YEARS 1946-1952 (1999);
RICHARD NIXON, RN: THE MEMOIRS OF RICHARD NIXON (1978).
96. This is not to say that Nixon's policies were not accused of being anti-
black, anti-woman, and so on, in that Nixon frequently supported conservative
policies generally unpopular with some groups, such as a "law-and-order"
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successfully obtained his disqualification on this basis. However,
the secret tapings of White House conversations he ordered have
raised substantial questions about his prejudices toward certain
groups. In these private conversations, Nixon made very disparaging
remarks about Jews, blacks, Italians, and the Irish.9 8
Thus, as a judge, Nixon could have presided for decades over
cases involving litigants and lawyers who he disliked or discounted
simply because of their background. Imagine Judge Nixon presiding
over a barroom brawl assault and battery case where one of the
combatants was an Irish-American who had consumed a few beers
before the incident, or a job discrimination case filed by an Italian-
American where the purported reason for discharge was the
employee's disorganization, or a similar suit by an African-
campaign platform, support for restrictive abortion laws, etc. Id. Nixon was also
accused of corruption, a charge he successfully defused in his famous "Checkers"
speech (so named for a dog he received as a gift which he used to illustrate the
idiocy of charges that he had been accepting improper donations). See Richard
Nixon, Address at University of Virginia (Sept. 23, 1952); "Checkers" Speech
(September 23, 1952) Richard Milhous Nixon, UNIV. VA.,
http://millercenter.org/scripps/archive/speeches/detail/4638 (last visited March 14,
2011). Despite all this, it does not appear that any credible critic ever successfully
tagged Nixon with the label of being biased or prejudiced on the basis of sex, race,
ethnicity, national origin, or religion-at least not until the release of the White
House tapes.
97. This is hardly a far-fetched hypothetical. Despite spending most of his
adult life as a full-time politician, Nixon was a lawyer and by all accounts one with
strong legal skills, some of which were on display as early as 1936. See, e.g.,
Richard M. Nixon, Note, Changing Rules of Liability in Automobile Accident
Litigation, 3 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 476 (1936). Had his political fortunes not
revived during the mid-1960s, Nixon would have been a strong and credible
nominee for a judicial post in a Republican Administration.
98. Adam Nagoumey, In Tapes, Nixon Rails About Jews And Blacks, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 11, 2010, at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/12/1 l/us/politics/1 1nixon.html. For example, in a conversation with an
adviser, Nixon denied being prejudiced but stated that he "just recognized that, you
know, all people have certain traits," mentioning Jews as an example. Id. "[Tlhe
Irish can't drink. What you always have to remember with the Irish is they get
mean." Id. As for Jews, "they are just . . . very aggressive and abrasive and
obnoxious" [but] "insecure. And that's why they have to prove things." Id.
Regarding blacks, Nixon took issue with his Secretary of State's opinions that
black Americans were making progress after decades of oppression and suggested
that black progress would be slow because of inadequate support in black culture
for achievement and too much "inbreeding." Id. By contrast, "Italians, of course,
those people course [sic] don't have their heads screwed on tight. They are
wonderful people, but [voice trailing off]." Id.
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American accused of insufficient work ethic. What about business
disputes between Christians and Jews in which the Jew was accused
of fraud, duress, or bad faith opportunism? Any reasonable member
of any of these groups who was aware of Judge Nixon's private
attitudes would presumably want Judge Nixon off their case.
However, without revelations such as the White House tapes (which
would never have come into existence if the man had been Judge
Nixon rather than President Nixon), there would be no apparent basis
for recusal under current federal law. The attorneys for these
disfavored litigants might have a strong hunch that Judge Nixon had
his prejudices but they would be stuck with Judge Nixon for the
duration of the matter.
It is likely that there are many cases of undiscovered bigotry
on the bench (and in the Oval Office and in Congress). While it may
be that the constraints of the system prevent such judges from
harming litigants because of hidden biases, realism requires a strong
commitment to paying more, rather than less, attention to judicial
impartiality. The extent to which discovering the "true self' and
inner-most attitudes of a judge is difficult or impossible, which
strongly argues for setting high substantive standards of impartiality
and enforcing them through a broad set of procedural protections.
Although this may result in some unbiased judges occasionally
passing a case on to a judge with a greater perception of fairness, it
seems a fair price to pay for enhancing confidence in the courts.
II. THE PROMISE OF PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS
A. Per Se Disqualification Standards (Without
Exception) as Useful Procedural Protections
Faced with a situation where evaluating judicial behavior and
its impact on ultimate case outcomes is difficult, the judicial system
has wisely (if at times haphazardly) evolved in the direction of
procedural and process-based disqualification. 99  Continuing and
enforcing the trend holds the best promise for protecting judicial
impartiality in the post-Caperton world.
99. See Geyh, supra note 6, at 727-31 (noting modem movement toward
objective and per se, procedurally based disqualification justified by particular
connections between judge and litigants or lawyers, such as financial investments,
family ties, or professional affiliations).
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As discussed above, attaining accurate information about
judicial biases and prejudices is difficult.100  Even when there
appears to be a substantial basis for questioning a judge's
impartiality, many judges will be reluctant to recognize the problem
or will be unwilling to recuse despite a compelling reason to do
so.101 Judges appear to divide substantially as to the degree of
suspicion that requires disqualification.102 On appeal, reviewing
judges are likely to defer to the non-recusing judge, particularly if
the judge enjoys an otherwise good reputation and the case for
disqualification is anything less than clear-cut.103  Even where
recusal was clearly required, the reviewing court may find that the
judge's failure to disqualify did not affect the case outcome.104
Under these circumstances, any softening of attitudes toward
judicial disqualification could be disastrous. One can make a strong
case that under the status quo, many judges subject to serious
questions about their impartiality fail to recuse in too many cases.
To combat the factors that promote under-policing of judicial
impartiality, the legal system needs to strengthen its procedural
protections. While a cost-benefit analysis is problematic due to the
difficulty of quantifying the recusal situation, it favors erring toward
recusal, at least if the system assigns a reasonably high value to
achieving greater impartiality and public confidence. The cost of a
stronger recusal regime simply is not that significant.1 05 It largely
100. See supra Part I.C.2 (observing that because educated, sophisticated,
politically savvy people such as lawyers and judges seldom vocalize their
prejudices, detecting bias is inherently difficult).
101. See supra Part I.C.1 (explaining that high settlement rates of cases and
the possibility that a party was favored by a biased judge limits ability to detect
and correct disqualification errors on appeal).
102. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (noting division of the
Supreme Court in Caperton and Liljeberg cases, both 5-4 decisions in instances
where it appears clear that recusal was required).
103. See supra text accompanying notes 76-78 (pointing out that the
tendency of reviewing judges to give judge under review benefit of the doubt
combined with hindsight bias further limits review on appeal as a correction for
disqualification errors).
104. Id.
105. As a percentage of government and social expenditures, adjudication as
a whole is cheap, generally consuming only 3% or so of government budgets. See,
e.g., LEGISLATIVE BUDGET BOARD, TEXAS FACT BOOK 46 (2010), available at
http://www.lbb.state.tx.us/FactBook/TexasFactBook_2010.pdf (showing that
only 4% of the state budget goes to the judiciary). Consequently, even a
disqualification regime that increases adjudication costs considerably will never be
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involves only the logistical burdens of transferring cases to judges
who are not subject to impartiality concerns.
To be sure, the Code of Judicial Conduct and federal
disqualification statutes go a long way in advancing procedural
protections by providing for automatic disqualification in cases of
disqualifying financial or family ties,106 but some substantive fine-
tuning is required. For example, in addition to the substantive
appearance standard and the requirement that a judge recuse where
the judge "has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or
personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceeding,"' 07 both state and federal law require that a judge
disqualify himself from further proceedings where the judge:
* served as a lawyer in the matter, had a artner
serving as counsel, or was a material witness;
* served while in government as counsel, advisor or
material witness in the matter, or expressed an
"opinion concerning the merits of the particular case
in controversy;"l09
a particularly large proportional imposition on governments, taxpayers, or the
citizenry as a whole. Although judicial assignment and scheduling will be more
complex under an aggressive disqualification regime, it is unlikely to be
burdensome even if it may at times be sufficiently annoying to engender judicial
complaints. By analogy, law schools providing rescheduled examinations and
insisting on anonymous grading of exams raises administrative costs for the law
school. Nevertheless, no one in the academy doubts that these costs are greatly
exceeded by the benefits of greater fairness to students and a perception that
grades are not the product of a professor's personal liking or disliking of a student
exam-taker.
106. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2)-(3) (2006) (professional ties), (b)(4)-(5) (family
ties); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11(A)(2)-(3) (2007) (family and
financial ties), (A)(6) (professional ties).
107. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) (2006); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R.
2.11(A)(1) (2007).
108. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2) (2006); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R.
2.1 l(A)(2)(6) (2007) (including as grounds for disqualification that judge
"previously presided as a judge over the matter in another court"). Although
federal case law is in accord with this additional aspect of the Model Judicial
Code, 28 U.S.C. § 455 could be improved by specifically setting forth this ground
for disqualification.
109. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(3) (2006); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R.
2.11 (A)(2)(6) (2007).
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* has knowledge that in individual or fiduciary
capacity, he or a minor resident child has a financial
interest in the subject matter in controversy or is a
party to the proceeding, or any other interest that
could be substantially affected by the outcome of the
proceeding.110  In addition, the judge must "inform
himself about his personal and fiduciary financial
interests, and make a reasonable effort to inform
himself about the personal financial interests of his
spouse and minor children residing in his
household[;]""
* has a spouse or other reasonably close relative who
is a party, a lawyer in the proceeding, [is] likely to be
a material witness, or [is] "known by the judge to
have an interest that could be substantially affected by
the outcome of the proceeding. ... 12
These are important bulwarks of judicial impartiality and
public confidence in the courts, the product of the forward-looking
1972 version of the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct
(continued through with the 1990 and 2007 versions of the Model
Code) and the 1974 amendments championed by former U.S.
Senator Birch Bayh.113 But there remain some gaping holes in this
110. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4) (2006); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R.
2.11(A)(3) (2007).
111. 28 U.S.C § 455(c) (2006); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R.
2.11(B) (2007).
112. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5) (2006); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R.
2.1 1(A)(2) (2007).
113. See generally MACKENZIE, supra 53, at 209-23 (explaining that
changes to the federal statute governing judicial disqualification were prompted by
changes in the ABA Model Code and an adverse reaction to Rehnquist's failure to
recuse in Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 826-28 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., mem.));
John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges: In Support of the Bayh Bill, 35 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 43, 62-63 (1970) (discussing later-enacted legislation proposed
by Birch Bayh (D-Ind.) designed to widen grounds for disqualification and
eliminate or narrow exceptions); Leubsdorf supra note 53, at 247 (explaining that
the 1974 amendments to the disqualification statute were designed to address
perceived problems, including resistance to recusal exemplified by Justice
Rehnquist's failure to recuse in Laird v. Tatum); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Chief
William's Ghost, supra note 40, at 825-32 (describing history and development of
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edifice designed to be a bulwark of required disqualification in what
are the most objectively obvious sources compromising judicial
integrity.
1. Limiting Waiver
A significant shortcoming of the ABA Model Code, upon
which most state disqualification laws are patterned, is that the Code
permits the litigants to waive disqualification except in cases where
the judge has "personal bias or prejudice concerning a party's lawyer
or personal knowledge of facts that are in dispute in the
proceeding."' 1 4  By contrast, federal law prohibits judges from
accepting waiver of disqualification in cases involving any of the
these largely financial, business, or litigation connected ties listed in
28 U.S.C. § 455(b)." 5
Although there is some safeguard in that lawyers and litigants
may not be forced to make this decision in the potentially
intimidating presence of the judge or court personnel (who may
1972 Model Judicial Code and 1974 legislation); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Rehnquist,
Recusal & Reform, supra note 53, at 631-32 (same).
114. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11(A)(1) (2007) (listing
personal bias or prejudice as grounds for disqualification). The Model Judicial
Code Rule 2.11(c) provides the following:
A judge subject to disqualification under this Rule, other than for bias or
prejudice under paragraph (A)(1), may disclose on the record the basis of
the judge's disqualification and may ask the parties and their lawyers to
consider, outside the presence of the judge and court personnel, whether
to waive disqualification. If, following the disclosure, the parties and
lawyers agree, without participation by the judge or court personnel, that
the judge should not be disqualified, the judge may participate in the
proceeding. The agreement shall be incorporated into the record of the
proceeding.
115. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(c) (2006) (forbidding judges from accepting
waiver of disqualification grounds based on § 455(b)). See also text
accompanying notes 46-51 (highlighting that although parties may consent to trial
before the judge becomes subject to § 455(a) reasonable-question-as-to-
impartiality disqualification, consent is not permitted where disqualification is
based on one or more enumerated grounds of § 455(b)). In contrast to the
corresponding Model Code provision, § 455(c) states that "[n]o justice, judge, or
magistrate judge shall accept from the parties to the proceeding a waiver of any
ground for disqualification enumerated in subsection (b)." 28 U.S.C. § 455(c)
(2006).
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themselves be intimidating or will report to the judge a party's
hesitancy or unwillingness to waive disqualification), the Model
Code approach nonetheless permits too much danger that lawyers
and litigants will be mugged by the "velvet blackjack" of de facto
coercion. 116
Where a financial, professional, or factual basis for
disqualification arises, it is seldom symmetric. Almost by definition,
it favors one party over others. Consequently, the favored party
(absent concerns of reversal on appeal" 7 or a judge's overcorrection
in favor of the opposite party in order to refute any suspicion of
bias),"' will likely be quite willing to waive. The party
116. See MACKENZIE, supra note 53, at 97 (using the term to describe the
situation where Judge Learned Hand would ask litigants to consider waivers of
disqualification based on Hand's investment in companies involved in dispute).
117. Although a waiver of disqualification may be technically correct and
not in itself reversible, the outcome of the case at trial may be more vulnerable on
appeal in cases where a reviewing appellate court may be uncomfortable about a
judge's participation notwithstanding obtainment of a waiver of disqualification.
118. The federal judge for whom I clerked, Raymond J. Broderick (E.D.
Pa.), was convinced this type of overcorrection took place in a case in which he
appeared before a Pennsylvania state court trial judge (Judge Flood) who had been
his "preceptor" (a type of assigned mentor at a time when such
mentorship/apprenticeship was required for bar admission in Pennsylvania), but
this was not viewed as a problem by counsel or the parties in the case, who
proceeded through with a bench trial before Judge Flood.
Judge Broderick was surprised to suffer an adverse outcome in the case, one
in which he was convinced that the facts and law strongly favored his client.
Years later, he broached the matter with Judge Flood, who replied that perhaps he
had been unduly tough on young lawyer Broderick "because I wouldn't want
anyone to think I was favoring you." Rather than try to cite to a specific
"interview" with Judge Broderick, I simply note that he was sufficiently upset
about the episode decades later for me to hear the story at least three times during
my two-year clerkship. In retrospect, Judge Broderick stated that he would have
insisted on Judge Flood's disqualification in order to have assigned a judge
completely freed of possible temptations for favoritism for a former mentee or the
alternative over-correction against the mentee so that observers would not wonder
about judicial bias.
It is of course possible that Judge Broderick misconstrued the situation
(although in my experience he was a shrewd and accurate observer of courtroom
events and the relative strengths and weaknesses of cases) or that Judge Flood was
engaged in some mistaken etiquette by ascribing the case loss to being too close to
the presiding judge. My point is simply that episodes of this type, which should
give rise to concern, can be eliminated entirely by barring waiver of financial,
professional, or personal connection grounds for recusal.
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disadvantaged by the financial or other connection may find it
difficult and uncomfortable to resist waiver.
When the great Southern District of New York Judge
Learned Hand presided over trials, his apparently diversified
financial interests raised recusal issues with some frequency, with
the financial interest in question often being significant but not
overwhelming. In what came to be known as the velvet blackjack,
Judge Hand routinely sought and obtained waivers from the
The Broderick/Flood view that one may "bend over backwards" to avoid
being accused of favoritism to one side and in the process unwittingly give undue
favor to the opposite side has support in academic literature. See, e.g., Christin
Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, and Richard H. Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, in SUNSTEIN, BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS, supra note 41, at 13,
24-26 (describing Matthew Rabin's "model of fairness" and concluding that
reputation and aspirations to be seen as fair are powerful motivators).
Although less obviously applicable, the literature on context-dependent
decision making is consistent with the occasional tendency of judges to over-
correct even if the general norm is one of resistance to recusal. See Mark Kelman,
Yuval Rottenstreich & Amos Tversky, Context-Dependence in Legal Decision
Making, in SUNSTEIN, BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS, supra note 41, at 61
(presenting results of a series of case studies tending to prove that context affects
the legal decisions of judges and jurors). In the normal context, where the
disqualification norm involved common professional connections not normally
seen as grounds for recusal, a jurist like Judge Flood presumably is making
whatever decision he would otherwise make. But where the context changes to
involve a former mentee but the judge fails to recuse, the internal cognitive
dissonance (to use Leon Festinger's memorable phrase) about deciding a case with
this greater degree of professional tie could push the judge toward deciding against
the mentee. See generally LEON FESTINGER, HENRY W. RIECKEN & STANLEY
SCHACHTER, WHEN PROPHECY FAILS (1956) (introducing the social psychology
theory of internal cognitive dissonance).
Similarly, a person's tendency to make a "second-order" decision, defined as
"decisions about the appropriate strategy for reducing the problems associated with
making a first-order decision" could explain part of a judicial over-correction.
Cass R. Sunstein & Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Second-Order Decisions, in
SUNSTEIN, BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 41, at 187. In this
anecdote, Judge Flood made a first-order decision not to recuse (just as then-
attorney Broderick made a decision not to seek recusal). Thereafter "stuck" with
his decision to stay on the case, Judge Flood may have consciously or
unconsciously realized that one way to mitigate any criticism of his participation in
the case was to rule against his former law clerk. I am applying the term a bit
differently than Sunstein and Ullmann-Margalit in that they suggest that use of
second-order decisions (e.g., forming a commission or delegating to an
administrative agency) is often a way of avoiding that first-order decision
altogether rather than compensating for a first-order decision.
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parties.11 9  Informed by this episode, the drafters of the 1974
revisions to 28 U.S.C. § 455 included the non-waiver provision.120
For similar reasons, the Model Judicial Code should follow suit.
Under the Code's approach, no matter how honorable the intentions
of those involved, it is impossible to prevent the impression that
waivers are obtained (and possibly coerced) under circumstances
where the ground for disqualification is weighty enough that the
judge should not have presided, notwithstanding the litigants'
apparent agreement that the judge's financial, professional, or factual
tie to the case was not a problem.
2. Eliminating De Minimis Exceptions to
Financial, Professional, or Factual
Disqualification
Another shortcoming is that the ABA Model Code is not as
rigorous as federal statutory law. Although the Code provides for
the disqualification of judges where the financial ties listed above are
present, it defines the requisite "economic interest" triggering
disqualification as "ownership of more than a de minimis legal or
equitable interest," with a de minimis interest defined as "an
insignificant interest that could not raise a reasonable question
regarding the judge's impartiality."l 2 1 In addition, unless the judge
119. See MACKENZIE, supra note 53, at 97 (describing Hand's conduct). Of
course, it is possible that litigants agreed to Judge Hand's participation because he
was Learned Hand, one of the most revered judges in American law. See James L.
Oakes & Roger K. Newman, Learned Hand, in YALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY
AMERICAN LAW 248 (2009) ("Although appellate opinions often resemble pebbles
cast in a passing stream, Judge Hand's opinions have cast a long intellectual
shadow."). Oakes and Newman also note that Hand "recognized that he had biases
and struggled to be impartial," and described Hand's examination of patents and
re-creation of accidents in a manner that could suggest inappropriate judicial
investigation rather than assessment of facts introduced at trial. Id.; See generally
GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE (1994) (providing
an overview of Judge Hand's approach to judicial decisions).
120. See MACKENZIE, supra note 53, at 98 (noting that the absence of a de
minimis exception to recusal based on financial ties to litigant in federal statute
was a reaction to perceived abuses in which judges extracted waivers from litigants
in cases of small financial holdings, as exemplified by Judge Hand's practice);
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal & Reform, supra note 53, at 628-31
(describing congressional awareness of problem of extracted waivers of
disqualification).
121. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Terminology (2007).
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is managing the economic interest or it is one that "could be
substantially affected by the outcome of a proceeding before a
judge," it does not include investments in mutual funds, government
securities or religious and charitable securities, deposits in mutual
savings associations, credit unions, or similar holdings.122
This escape route from financial disqualification, although
well intended, unfortunately leaves open the door to self-serving
assessments by challenged judges and charitable review on appeal.
State disqualification practice, which generally follows the ABA
Model Code, would be improved by adopting the strict federal
approach in which there is no exception for de minimis financial ties.
Any of the listed financial interests should be sufficient to disqualify
the judge.
Although the Code's definition of de minimis interests
contains the objective "reasonable person" ground for assessing the
possible impact of judicial financial ties to a litigant or dispute,
policing this aspect of the Code with any rigor requires significant
expenditure of judicial resources that becomes unnecessary if there
instead exists a per se bar to judicial participation where the judge
has any of the Code or § 455(b)'s forbidden financial ties.
122. Id. In its effort to be brief, the summary in the text may lack precision.
The complete language of the exception discussed reads as follows:
Except for situations in which the judge participates in the management
of such a legal or equitable interest, or the interest could be substantially
affected by the outcome of a proceeding before a judge, it does not
include:
(1) An interest in the individual holdings within a mutual or common
investment fund;
(2) An interest in securities held by an educational, religious, charitable,
fraternal, or civil organization in which the judge or the judge's
spouse, domestic partner, parent, or child serves as a director, an
officer, an advisor, or other participant;
(3) A deposit in a financial institution or deposits or proprietary interests
the judge may maintain as a member of a mutual savings association
or credit union, or similar proprietary interests; or
(4) An interest in the issuer of government securities held by the judge.
Id. "Fiduciary" is defined to include "relationships such as executor,
administrator, trustee, or guardian." Id.
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Further, what may be termed insufficiently large to create a
"reasonable" concern over impartiality itself requires some difficult
determinations on which courts have divided.123 In addition,
accurate determinations of "reasonable" risk may be hard to obtain
where the judge's own cognitive biases and a reviewing court's
tendency to avoid suggesting that a fellow judge may be cheaply
bought or that the financial tie in question, although small, is but the
tip of the iceberg of strongly held judicial attitudes toward a
particular entity, industry, or activity.
A variant of this problem is presented when enforcing the
provisions of federal and state law that require disqualification "in
any proceeding in which [the judge's] impartiality may be
reasonably questioned."1 24 Nevertheless, the presence of a catch-all
criterion for disqualification regarding questionable impartiality is
necessary to catch threats to judicial independence that do not fall
neatly within the enumerated categories of statute or code.12 5 The
use of a potentially elastic term like "reasonable" is probably a
necessary evil when crafting such a catch-all.126
123. See supra text accompanying note 87 (noting sharp division of the U.S.
Supreme Court in Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847
(1988)).
124. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2006); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R.
2.11(A) (2007).
125. Certainly, this has been the view of the legal profession for the past
four decades during which the reasonable question as to the impartiality standard
has been part of the ABA Model Judicial Code and the federal disqualification
statute. The importance of this ground for disqualification is reflected in the
frequency with which it is invoked and addressed by courts. For example, 3,788
cases in the Westlaw database mentioned 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) between 1975 and
January 1, 2011-an average of 108 per year. Search for "28 U.S.C. § 455(a),"
WESTLAW, http://www.westlaw.com (last performed Apr. 20, 2011) (filtering
citing references for 28 U.S.C. § 455 by (1) document type, federal and state cases;
(2) locate terms and connectors, "455(a)"; and (3) date, after 1/1/1975 and before
1/2/2011).
126. During development of the 1972 ABA Model Code of Judicial
Conduct, in which this ground for disqualification first appears, and during
amendment of 28 U.S.C. § 455, there was considerable focus on the wording of the
provision and the means of operationalizing the concept that disqualification
should be required where a reasonable observer might have doubts about a judge's
neutrality even though there was no proof of actual bias or prejudice. The
"reasonable question as to impartiality" language resulted, and it is now widely
accepted throughout the profession. See JAMES J. ALFINI ET AL., supra note 14, at
§4.04 (reviewing development of the "reasonable question as to impartiality"
standard); FLAMM, supra note 14, at chs. 1-2 (reviewing development of the
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By contrast, it is a mistake to introduce the concept of the
reasonable observer's degree of concern when attempting to apply
sound recusal policy based on the judge's financial ties to a case.
Where financial ties are considered, there is no need to introduce
potential disagreements and difficulties of empiricism in determining
what people may think. Rather, a broad, easily applicable bright-line
rule is more useful. A simple statement that disqualification for any
financial interest of the type prohibited by § 455 and Rule 2.11 limits
problems of application and removes the risk that self-serving bias or
deference to colleagues will prevent the system from recognizing
that a relatively small economic interest is indeed large enough to
warp judgment and undermine fairness.
By way of comparison, one cannot help but note that both
federal law and the Model Code use such an approach to the question
of disqualification based on prior professional or factual connection
to the case. The rules do not provide for disqualification only if the
judge's former lawyering activity related to the matter (or that of a
colleague) was significant, important, or would lead a reasonable
observer to wonder about the judge's neutrality. On the contrary, if
the judge was involved in the matter, disqualification is required,
period.127
Similarly, disqualification on the basis that the judge was a
material witness in a matter does not depend on what reasonable
observers would think. If the judge has been a witness,
disqualification ensues.128 Even for less measurable problems such
as whether a former government lawyer "expressed an opinion
disqualification catch-all provision and the bases for disqualification); Leslie W.
Abramson, Appearance of Impropriety: Deciding When a Judge's Impartiality
"Might Reasonably Be Questioned", 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55, 70 (2000)
(discussing the difference between objective and subjective assessments of
impartiality).
127. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2) (2006) (requiring disqualification where in
private practice the judge served as a lawyer in the matter); MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11(6)(a) (2007) (requiring disqualification for former
legal activity of judge or former colleague regardless of the quantity or depth of
such involvement).
128. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2) (2006) (requiring disqualification when the
judge has been a material witness concerning the matter); MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11(6)(c) (2007) (requiring disqualification where judge
serves as a witness regardless of importance or impact of testimony and regardless
of whether judge's perceptions have changed or whether testimony and past
impressions are still remembered by judge).
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concerning the merits of the particular case in controversy," there is
no escape hatch similar to that available for de minimis economic
interests. 129 The former government lawyer is not asked whether his
prior opinion was well-developed, deeply held, tentative, or
irrevocable. The mere existence of the prior opinion requires
disqualification.130
If economically based disqualification is to be applied with
sufficient seriousness, it too should be stripped of any possible
avoidance based on differing notions of what amount of economic
interest might compromise a judge's ability to be fair. Although the
financial tie in question may not be large in absolute terms or in
relation to the judge's overall wealth, it may still hold considerable
power to warp judgment.'31 Investment or ownership may easily
create a type of allegiance that undermines impartiality and may be
especially problematic in cases where the value of the economic
interest is relatively small and thus affects the judge subconsciously
while the judge believes he has banished from his mind the
possibility that the economic tie has colored his perception.132
2. Recognizing Substantial Campaign Support as
a Disqualifying Interest
Perhaps the greatest weakness of the economic interest
aspects of current disqualification law is the degree to which it
largely overlooks the problems created by judicial election
campaigns. Until the 2007 revisions, the ABA Model Code
essentially avoided the issue. The current Model Code encourages
states with elected judiciaries to adopt a version of Rule 2.11(4),
which provides that a judge should disqualify where the judge has
129. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(3) (2006).
130. Id.; MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11(6)(b) (2007).
131. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 15, at 33-35, 120-21 (observing
that the phenomena of status quo bias and "loss aversion," in which people tend to
overvalue what they already possess relative to what could be gained, may make
judges reluctant to transfer a case to another judge due to a perceived inability to
handle the matter and cause judges to be wary of alienating supporters by creating
situations in which supporters are effectively punished by not being able to have
their cases heard by judges originally thought qualified).
132. See supra text accompanying notes 23-26, 30 (discussing cognitive
biases and the difficulties people have in realizing their own biases and
prejudices).
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received substantial campaign contribution support from a party or
the party's lawyer.' 33
To date, only two states have adopted the ABA's proposed
standard requiring disqualification where the judge has received
significant electoral support form lawyers or parties,1 34 although a
few states have provisions giving greater scrutiny to disqualification
where the judge has received campaign support from a litigant or
lawyer. 135 Roughly eighty percent of the state systems have some
form of judicial elections,' 3 6 although only about twenty states have
what might be termed direct elections in the matter of other political
offices (six partisan and fifteen non-partisan), 1 3 7 while many states
provide for retention elections after judges are initially appointed to
the bench through some type of merit selection process.
133. See infra text accompanying notes 147-50 (describing the serious
problems of campaign contributions in judicial elections). A "contribution" is
defined as "both financial and in-kind contributions such as goods, professional or
volunteer services, advertising, and other types of assistance, which, if obtained by
the recipient otherwise, would require a financial expenditure." MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Terminology (2007). "Aggregate" contributions "mean[] not
only contributions in cash or in kind made directly to a candidate's campaign
committee, but also all contributions made indirectly with the understanding that
they will be used to support the election of a candidate or to oppose the election of
the candidate's opponent." Id.
134. ARiz. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 2, Rule 2.11(A)(4) (2010);
UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 2, Rule 2.11 (A)(4) (2010).
135. ALA. CODE § 12-24-2(c) (2006); Miss. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
3E(2) (2008); see also Adam Skaggs & Andrew Silver, Promoting Fair and
Impartial Courts Through Recusal Reform, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE 7-8
(2011) ("To date, however, only Utah and Arizona have adopted the [ABA Model]
rule . . . . Since Caperton, several states have implemented new rules that, to
varying degrees, respond to the different forms of spending seen in today's
expensive judicial election environment.").
136. See Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST.
L.J. 43, 52-53 (2003) (highlighting that forty-two states "call for at least some of
their judges to stand for election," while eighty percent of American judges are
subject to some form of election).
137. See Jan Witold Baran, Judicial Elections: Changes and Challenges, 42
CT. REV. 16, 16 (2006), available at http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1021&context-ajacourtreview&seiredir-1l#search=%22Ju
dical+Elections:+Changes+and+Challenges,%22 ("Six states have partisan
elections, 15 have nonpartisan elections, and 17 have uncontested retention
elections after an initial appointment." (citations omitted)).
138. See Geyh, Judicial Elections, supra note 136, at 52-53 (summarizing
state selection methods); Baran, supra note 137, at 16-17 (same); AM. JUDICATURE
SoC'Y, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE STATES, APPELLATE AND GENERAL
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To perhaps state the obvious, this creates a situation in which
judicial candidates (even the incumbents facing only a retention
election) tend to need, and usually do receive, significant financial
support. Not surprisingly, much of that support comes from business
entities or lawyers with a substantial amount of litigation business;
the typical contributor to a judicial election or retention campaign is
not an individual sending a small check in the mail.139
Although judges in judicial election states are not permitted
to have more than a de minimis investment or employment interest in
the litigants or in their counsel, the current system simultaneously
permits judges to receive large, perhaps even vital economic aid
from litigants and lawyers appearing before them. Whatever
misgivings one may have about the de minimis exception to the
economic interest disqualification standard, it at least is a standard
that attempts to prevent compromised judges from presiding over
cases. By contrast, the rules regarding electoral support are
comparatively no rules at all, save for whatever campaign finance
regulations may exist.
State regulation on judicial campaign spending varies and, in
some cases, sets fairly tight restrictions on direct campaign
contributions to judges seeking election or retention. Even this,
however, is too little protection for judicial impartiality and public
confidence. In the notorious Caperton v. Massey situation, West
Virginia limited permissible direct campaign contributions to $1,000,
an amount for which judges presumably would not sell out. 140
JURISDICTION COURTS, INITIAL SELECTION, RETENTION, AND TERM LENGTH
(2009), available at http://www.ajs.org/selection/docs/Judicial%20Selection%20
Charts.pdf (same).
139. See James Sample, Court Reform Enters the Post-Caperton Era, 58
DRAKE L. REv. 787, 791 (2010) (emphasizing that primary sources of judicial
campaign contributions are "often the litigants, lawyers, and litigation stakeholders
appearing before the judges they support"). See also AM. JUDICATURE SoC'Y,
JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS AND ELECTIONS (2011), available at
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial-selection/campaignsand-elections/campa
ignfinancing.cfm?state (last visited Apr. 25, 2011) (listing campaign
contributions by state; reflecting large portion made by attorneys and commercial
or institutional entities likely to be more frequent litigants than individuals).
140. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2257 (2009). See
also Stempel, Impeach Brent Benjamin Now!?, supra note 1, at 3-5 (describing the
reaction to Caperton); Stempel, Completing Caperton, supra note 1, at 281-90
(analyzing the criticisms of Caperton).
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Massey CEO Don Blankenship1 41 evaded this restriction by
establishing an advocacy group to which he contributed
approximately $2.5 million that was largely spent in support of
judicial candidate Brent Benjamin; 142 Blankenship also spent
$500,000 of his own money on behalf of the Benjamin candidacy
without funneling the funds through the official Benjamin
campaign. 14 3  Where campaign finance laws are so easily
surmounted, the case for an expanded recusal regimen based on
campaign support grows.
The problem of money in judicial politics is serious. Surveys
consistently suggest that a large majority of the electorate perceives
that judicial decisions are impacted by campaign contributions. 144 In
Caperton, the plaintiffs, after having lost three prior disqualification
motions, conducted a survey showing that West Virginians
supported Justice Benjamin stepping aside in view of the large
financial support he had received from Blankenship. 145
141. Blankenship has since resigned as Massey CEO, apparently as a result of
adverse publicity and criticism regarding Massey's poor safety record and the
2010 Upper Big Branch mining disaster in which twenty-nine coal miners died.
Clifford Krauss, Massey Energy's ChiefIs Quitting, Renewing Talk of a Takeover,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2010, at B7. Prior to this eventual capitulation, Blankenship
appeared relatively impervious to criticism. He was outspoken in his pro-business,
anti-labor, anti-government, anti-environment beliefs and his seven-figure support
of the Benjamin supreme court candidacy. See Stempel, Impeach Brent Benjamin
Now!?, supra note 1, at 4 n.5 (describing Blankenship's support of Benjamin).
142. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2255-60; See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Playing
Forty Questions: Responding to Justice Roberts' Concerns in Caperton and Some
Tentative Answers About Operationalizing Judicial Recusal and Due Process, 39
Sw. L. REv. 1, 9-20 (2009) (describing case background and Blankenship's
financial support of Justice Benjamin).
143. Id.
144. See Facts & Stats, JUSTICE AT STAKE,
http://www.justiceatstake.org/resources/facts stats and quotes/facts stats.cfm
(last visited Mar. 19, 2011) (pointing out that "76% of Americans believe
campaign contributions have at least some impact on a judge's courtroom
decisions").
145. Stempel, Impeach Brent Benjamin Now!?, supra note 1, at 47.
Undaunted, Justice Benjamin refused to disqualify himself for a fourth time,
labeling the survey an unpersuasive "push poll" designed for litigation rather than
research. Id. at 49.
Although his skepticism was not without some basis in that the question was a
bit loaded, the concern expressed by the survey respondents was so overwhelming
that, absent proof of outright fraud in the polling, it should have mattered more to a
reasonable judge facing a recusal motion in a large, high profile case. Public
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To the extent that substantial campaign support creates the
impression (and perhaps the reality) that special interests can shape
the bench to their liking, it greatly undermines both the ideals of
neutrality and fairness, as well as public confidence in and support
for the courts. Where judges receive contributions from those who
appear before them or who have direct interest in case outcomes, the
public (to the extent it knows of the situation) likely becomes more
disillusioned. At a minimum, losing litigants and counsel are less
likely to accept judicial outcomes, which may lead to the specific
problems of protracted appeals, attempts to avoid paying judgments
or complying with injunctions, as well as the more general problem
of diminished authority of the courts. 146
The contrast between elected judges in the states with
campaign fundraising and appointed judges in the federal system
indicates the breadth and depth of the problem. In the most recent
example of federal judicial corruption to hit the headlines, Eastern
District of Louisiana Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr. was impeached
"in part for failing to disqualify himself from a case in which he had
confidence in the West Virginia high court was clearly at risk, but Justice
Benjamin, as he did consistently over a two-year period, applied an erroneous legal
analysis to the issue of his participation and continued to incorrectly conclude that
he could participate in the case so long as he personally felt he could be impartial.
See id. at 38 (describing errors of Justice Benjamin's legal analysis); see supra text
accompanying note 93 (noting that the presence of additional judges sitting on an
appellate panel or state supreme court may create greater informal pressure for
recusal of an individual judge or justice); see infra text accompanying note 215
(discussing application of reasonable-question-regarding-impartiality standard of
judicial recusal).
146. An extreme example of unwillingness to accept a case outcome
(although, ironically from a state where judges are not elected) is Demoulas v.
Demoulas Super Markets, Inc., 677 N.E.2d 159 (Mass. 1997). Two lawyers
representing elements of the Demoulas family in a pitched battle for control of the
family's grocery store interests were so obsessed with losing at the trial court level
that they engaged in extensive deception and role-playing designed to get the
judge's law clerk to provide information about the judge's corruption (which the
law clerk and all credible sources knowledgeable about the matter denied).
Crossen, Curry disbarred by Mass. Supreme Judicial Court, MASS. LAWYERS
WEEKLY, Feb. 11, 2008, available at http://masslawyersweekly.com/2008/02/1 1/
crossen-curry-disbarred-by-sjc/. The overarching ruse involved pretending to be
interested in recruiting the law clerk for a fictitious job with a fictitious entity,
followed by harassment of the clerk. Id. Eventually, the two distrustful-cum-
paranoid attorneys were disbarred. Id.
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solicited money from an attorney in a pending case."1 47 Without
attempting to undervalue the importance of other factors leading to
the impeachment, one could describe this aspect of the basis for
disciplining Judge Porteous as merely everyday business-as-usual in
many state courts. In the states with judicial elections, judges
preside every day over cases where the lawyers, the parties, or both
have contributed to their campaigns, often asymmetrically. What
might get a federal judge removed from the bench is standard
operating procedure in many state courts.
To its credit, the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct
attempts to prompt states to combat the problem. ABA Model Code
Rule 2.11(4) invites states to adopt a provision requiring recusal
where the judge
[k]nows or learns by means of a timely motion that a
party, a party's lawyer, or the law firm of a party's
lawyer, has within the previous [insert number]
years[s] made aggregate contributions to the judge's
campaign in an amount that [is greater than $[insert
amount] for an individual or $ [insert amount] for an
entity][[is reasonable and appropriate for an
individual or an entity].148
Under the ABA approach, states with elected judiciaries are
encouraged to adopt a customized rule of recusal for judicial
disqualification in cases where the amount of campaign support is
sufficiently high to raise reasonable questions as to a judge's
impartiality. "Contributions" are defined in the ABA Model Code as
"both financial and in-kind contributions, such as goods, professional
or volunteer services, advertising, and other types of assistance
which, if obtained by the recipient otherwise would require a
financial expenditure."l 49  An "aggregate" contribution could be
"contributions in case or in kind made directly to a candidate's
campaign committee" or "all contributions made indirectly with the
understanding that they will be used to support the election of a
147. Geyh, supra note 6, at 674; H.R. Res. 1031, 111th Cong. (2010)
(impeaching of Judge Porteous); Jennifer Steinhauer, Senate, for Just the 8th Time,
Votes to Oust Federal Judge, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2010, at A27.
148. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11(4) (2007).
149. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Terminology (2007).
Symposium 2011] 783
HeinOnline  -- 30 Rev. Litig. 783 2010-2011
THE RE VIEW OF LITIGATION
candidate or to oppose the election of the candidate's opponent." 50
The intent is to address all monetary support from all sources and not
only direct contributions to a judicial candidate's official
campaign.15  Many states have specific statutes limiting the amount
of such direct contributions,' 52 but as the Caperton case revealed,
such limitations on direct campaign funding are easily evaded.
As of the end of 2010, only two states have adopted some
version of the ABA's suggested limit on campaign support. 5 3 Most
states have declined the ABA's invitation to take action. Those that
have acted have set the bar at a level quite solicitous of judicial
candidates and their potential contributors, permitting substantial
financial assistance to judicial campaigns without triggering an
obligation to recuse. 154 For example, in Nevada, the state judiciary
150. Id.
151. It remains to be seen whether even the broad language of the ABA
Model Code of Judicial Conduct would reach all so-called independent
expenditures for judicial candidates, such as the $3 million in campaign support
from Don Blankenship that ultimately resulted in Justice Benjamin's
disqualification in Caperton. Although Blankenship's intent to aid the Benjamin
candidacy (and to diminish that of Benjamin's opponent, incumbent Justice
Warren McGraw) was obvious, in less severe situations one might argue that
contributions to advocacy groups were made with a sufficiently clear
"understanding that they will be used to support" a candidacy. See id. (explaining
that the definition of "aggregate contributions" also includes indirect contributions
made with the understanding that they will be applied to support a candidate or
attack the candidate's opposition).
For a description of the manner in which the Blankenship money was used to
fund an advocacy organization and to purchase advertising support, see Caperton
v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2257 (2009) (discussing Blankenship's
contributions to "And For the Sake of Kids," an advocacy organization that
attacked Benjamin's opponent); Stempel, Completing Caperton, supra note 1, at
256 (discussing how Blankenship used the "Kids" organization to purchase
advertising highly critical of incumbent Justice Warren McGraw and implicitly
supportive of Benjamin); Stempel, Impeach Brent Benjamin Now!?, supra note 1,
at 12 (describing how in addition to "Kids" attack ads directed at McGraw,
Blankenship individually purchased pro-Benjamin advertisements).
152. See Judicial Campaigns and Elections, AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y,
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial selection/campaigns_and
elections/campaignfinancing.cfm?state (last visited Mar. 11, 2011) (reporting
large campaign expenditures in judicial elections, particularly for state supreme
court seats in large states).
153. CYNTHIA GRAY, AM. JUDICATURE SoC'Y, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION
BASED ON COMMITMENTS AND CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS 2 (2011), available at
http://www.ajs.org/ethics/pdfs/Disqualificationcommitmentscontributions.pdf.
154. Id. at 4-7.
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rejected the unanimous recommendation of its Advisory
Commission in an episode that illustrates the difficulty faced by
recusal reformers.155
In mid-2008, the Nevada Supreme Court constituted an
Advisory Commission (the Commission) to review the 2007 ABA
Model Code of Judicial Conduct and to make recommendations
regarding Nevada's potential adoption of the Model Code.156 For the
most part, the Commission endorsed the Model Code,
recommending it to the Nevada Supreme Court in 2009; the court
largely adopted the Commission's recommendations' 5 7 -except to
the extent that the Commission attempted to broaden and toughen
recusal practice.
In addition to recommending abolition of the duty to sit,
Nevada's Commission, acting in the wake of Caperton,
recommended a version of ABA Model Rule 2.11(4) that would
require per se disqualification where a judge received more than
$50,000 in campaign support and would provide for recusal on a
reasonable question as to the impartiality where there existed
significant financial support below $50,000. 158 The Nevada
Supreme Court rejected both recommendations without official
155. See supra text accompanying note 139 (noting limited success of ABA
Model Code's effort to prompt states to require recusal based on campaign
support).
156. I was a member of the Commission and its lone law school professor,
joined by University of Nevada-Reno political scientist and sociologist James
Richardson, an expert in judicial disqualification and campaign finance. See, e.g.,
James Richardson, Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey of Judges on
Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 433
(2001) (discussing the application of the Daubert test to judicial decisions). The
Commission was chaired by retired Nevada Supreme Court Chief Justice A.
William Maupin, with former Clerk of Court Janette Bloom serving as Reporter,
and benefited from the assistance of ABA General Counsel George Kuhlman. It
was comprised of six judges and a dozen distinguished practitioners representing a
variety of fields and practices. Obviously, I am biased, but I think any objective
observer would have to characterize it as a pretty sophisticated, representative
group, well-positioned to represent the larger public interest.
157. Compare NEVADA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2009), with COMM'N
TO REVISE THE NEV. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, NEVADA SUPREME COURT,
FINAL REPORT: EVALUATION OF THE 2007 ABA MODEL CODE app.A (2009)
(proposing a Revised Code of Judicial Conduct).
158. See COMM'N To REVISE THE NEV. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT,
NEVADA SUPREME COURT, FINAL REPORT: EVALUATION OF THE 2007 ABA
MODEL CODE app.A (2009) (proposing a Revised Code of Judicial Conduct).
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comment,' 59 although the chief justice of the court was quoted
describing the recommendation as "killing a fly with a
sledgehammer."l 60
Perhaps as one of the authors of the Commission's rejected
proposal I am unduly sensitive. Nonetheless, it is a little disturbing
to have one of the top jurists of an American state characterize
problems of judicial impartiality and disqualification as a mere "fly"
buzzing around the figurative head of the justice system. Like other
members of the Commission, I find this characterization inapt in
light of the history of insufficient judicial recusal and the recent
Caperton case.161 Whatever the chief justice thought about the
159. See NEVADA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11 (2009) (containing
no version of ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct R. 2.11(4)). In perhaps a
partial victory for the Commission, the current Nevada Code does not endorse the
duty to sit, as did its predecessor. See NEVADA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
CANON 3(e)(1) (2009) (otherwise patterned on 1990 ABA Model Code of Judicial
Conduct). That development presumably makes it easier for the Supreme Court in
subsequent decisions to end the duty to sit or at least ignore or diminish it. See
Ham v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 566 P.2d 420, 424 (Nev. 1977) (adopting the duty
to sit doctrine); see also Millen v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 148 P.3d 694, 696-97
(Nev. 2006) (reaffirming duty to sit and balancing against party right to choose
counsel, concluding that "when a judge's duty to sit conflicts with a client's right
to choose counsel, the client's right generally prevails, except when the lawyer was
retained for the purpose of disqualifying the judge and obstructing management of
the court's calendar."); Las Vegas Downtown Redev. Agency v. Eighth Judicial
Dist. Ct., 5 P.3d 1059, 1061 (Nev. 2000) (requiring trial judge who had recused to
preside over case). Ironically, Nevada embraced the duty to sit after Congress
rejected it in the 1974 amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2006). See Ham v.
Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 566 P.2d 420, 424 (Nev. 1977) ("A trial judge has a duty to
preside to the conclusion of all proceedings, in the absence of some statute, rule of
court, ethical standard, or other compelling reason to the contrary."). Without
diminishing the progress made in removing the codification of a problematic
doctrine, one would have preferred that the Court eliminate the duty to sit doctrine
altogether. See discussion infra Part II.B.4 (discussing detriments of duty to sit
doctrine).
160. Jane Ann Morrison, Judge's Duty to Sit Still Knows No Contribution
Limits, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Jan. 11, 2010, http://www.lvrj.com/news/judges-duty-
to-sit-still-knows-no-contribution-limits-81121272.html (quoting then-Chief
Justice of the Nevada Supreme Court, James Hardesty).
161. While it may not rival West Virginia, Nevada's track record in this
regard is nothing to crow about. See Stempel, Chief William's Ghost, supra note
40, at 918-34 (providing an extensive description of the traditionally lax attitude
toward judicial disqualification in Nevada); see, e.g., Valladares v. Second Jud.
Dist. Ct., 910 P.2d 256, 257 (Nev. 1996) (indicating that the judge was not
disqualified from presiding over a case in which his former election opponent was
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Commission's proposal, the problem it sought to address was not
trivial.
Similarly, it seems almost hyperbolic to label the proposed
recusal-triggering contribution amount of $50,000 as a
"sledgehammer," with its connotation of overkill, when describing
the notion that a judge who has received $50,000 from a litigant or
lawyer should not sit in judgment on the contributor's cases. Hit
men (admittedly hit men of lower stature than George Clooney) 162
reportedly can be hired for a tenth of that amount. 163 Even when one
counsel even though judge had questioned the honesty and competence of counsel
during the judicial election campaign).
162. See THE AMERICAN (Focus Features 2010) (telling the story of an
international assassin hiding out in picturesque Italian hill town from enemies and
former colleagues turned enemies, indulging-because he is, after all, George
Clooney-in fine food, wine, and the companionship of an upscale prostitute).
163. It appears that one can find people willing to kill total strangers with
whom they have no conflict at shockingly low prices. See Art Barnum, No bail
for ex-husband in plot; Supposed hit man was undercover cop who recorded
alleged job offer, CHI. TRIB., July 17, 2009, at 10C (noting the stated fee used by
undercover officer, which ex-husband was willing to double for killing of former
wife, was $1,500); Missy Diaz & Barbara Hijek, From Matrimony to Murder Plot;
Whether Motivated by Greed or a Messy Divorce, Amateur Killer-For-Hire Cases
in South Florida Usually Involve a Spouse or Lover, FT. LAUDERDALE SUN-
SENTINEL, Nov. 18, 2009, at lA (according to the Palm Beach County Sheriffs
Office, the "going rate for a contract killing is between $5,000 and $10,000"); Tom
Jackman, Scam, Like A Nesting Doll, Hid Even More; Cigarette Probe Found
Sweatshop, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 2009, at Cl (discussing how an organized
criminal offered $2,500 to undercover cop for contract killing); Susan Jacobson,
Restaurateur charged in plot to kill ex-worker, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 27, 2008,
at Al5 (discussing a $3,000 fee for a thwarted contract killing that was to include
beheading of victim). See also Kieran Crowley et al., L.I. Wife Got a Cheap
'Hit'-Thrilled With 20G Price: DA, N.Y. POST, Mar. 6, 2010, at 7 (discussing
how a wealthy Long Island housewife "allegedly hired" undercover cop to kill
husband for $20,000).
Of course, the average judge has dramatically more scruples than the average
hit man, as well as significantly more to lose if caught. However, judicial
partiality, if it is even recognized, is hardly the functional equivalent of cold-
blooded murder. Even the most honest judge may easily convince himself that he
finds the defendant's witnesses more credible based on the merits of their
testimony and not because defendant's law firm collectively donated $100,000 to
his re-election campaign. Nonetheless, the bench as a whole refuses to recognize
the problem. But see Editorial, Bold Step for Fair Courts in New York, N.Y
TIMES, Feb. 14, 2011, at A28 (discussing New York Court of Appeals Chief Judge
Jonathan Lippman and state judicial board's proposed ban on elected judges
"hearing cases involving any lawyer or party who contributed $2,500 or more to
the judge's campaign in the preceding two years").
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accounts for the ordinarily law-abiding nature of judges, is it realistic
to suggest that the $50,000 demarcation point is so trivial to the
judicial campaign enterprise that no judge will be influenced, even
subconsciously, by the munificence of an interested litigant or
lawyer? If this is the attitude of the state court bench, the prospects
for improved disqualification jurisprudence appear dim indeed. 164
Given the lukewarm reaction to ABA Model Code of Judicial
Conduct Rule 2.11 (A)(4) to date, it further appears that increased
rigor regarding policing of electoral financial support and
disqualification will need to come from legislators. In addition to
maintaining and perhaps strengthening existing campaign spending
laws, state legislatures should enact appropriate versions of Rule
2.11 (A)(4) to reduce the influence of money in judicial politics
and--equally important-the perception that money makes a
difference in states that elect judges.
B. A Punch List ofProcedural Improvements
In addition to the expansion of stringent application of the
grounds for disqualification that admits of no de minimis exceptions,
the legal system would benefit from a universal application of a
number of sound procedural protections for litigants seeking judicial
neutrality. Regarding financial interest disqualification, the federal
The prospect of contributions of this magnitude is not far-fetched, even when
examined solely with reference to state campaign spending laws. For example, in
Nevada, the maximum direct contribution to a judicial campaign is $10,000. See
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 294A.100(1) (1997) ("A person shall not make a contribution or
contributions to a candidate for any office, except a federal office, in an amount
which exceeds $5,000 for the primary election . . . and $5,000 for the general
election . . . ."). In a firm with ten equity partners, the firm can easily-and
legally-give $100,000 to the judge's candidacy, notwithstanding what in isolation
appear to be reasonably stringent campaign contribution limits.
164. Justice Hardesty, the quipster behind the "killing a fly with a
sledgehammer" quote, is generally regarded in the Nevada Bar as a good jurist
concerned with law reform. Attorneys who practice before the court, who wish
not to be identified by name, have privately told me they consider him one of the
"intellectual leaders" of the court. He overwhelmingly won re-election with no
serious challenge. See Richard Lake, Most Candidates Paid Dearly, LAS VEGAS
REV.-J., Nov. 8, 2010, http://www.1vrj.com/news/most-candidates-paid-dearly-
106873943.html (reporting that Hardesty was re-elected to state supreme court seat
with seventy-five percent of the vote). If this type of judge is not only unwilling to
support enhanced recusal practice, but also finds it necessary to belittle the
enterprise, the prospects for state court-led recusal reform are hardly heartening.
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courts have been stronger than most state courts.165 In particular, the
federal system stands significantly ahead of states with elected
judiciaries in protecting litigants from the potential corruption of a
judge's financial ties. Regarding procedural protections, some state
courts have outpaced the federal system; nevertheless, both state and
federal systems stand in need of improvement in this area.
1. Peremptory Challenges
One area in which the federal judicial system has lagged is its
acceptance of litigants' peremptory challenges of judges. Under this
sort of system, each litigant in a dispute has one opportunity, usually
exercisable only at the outset of the case, to have the initiall'
assigned judge removed without question or articulated cause.
This approach to recusal operates in the manner of a peremptory
challenge of prospective jurors.167 Litigants or counsel may ask for a
different judge simply because of their bad feelings about or prior
bad experiences with the judge.168 As part of this process, all
courts-including the federal courts-should embrace a system
where each litigant is afforded one peremptory challenge to the
initially assigned judge.
Although reasonably widespread among the states, the idea
of judicial peremptory challenges has been controversial. Critics
have labeled it a system in which a litigant can "pick" his or her
165. See supra text accompanying note 106 (describing different federal
statutory and ABA Model Code approaches to financial interest disqualification;
urging that ABA and states take a zero-tolerance approach and eliminate the de
minimis exception to financial interest disqualification).
166. See FLAMM, supra note 14, at §26.1, 753-54 (describing nature of
peremptory challenges).
167. See 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (2006) (providing for peremptory challenges to
prospective jurors); see also FLAMM, supra note 14, §§ 26.1, 26.3-26.4 (describing
procedure for exercising preemptory disqualification rights).
168. See FLAMM, supra note 14, at § 26.3 (describing automatic and
peremptory challenges of judges and identifying states that permit some variant of
this approach); id. at §§ 26.1-27.19, at 790-822 (listing specific peremptory
disqualification provisions for the eighteen states providing for peremptory
challenge of judge); see also JAMES SAMPLE ET AL., FAIR COURTS: SETTING
RECUSAL STANDARDS, 26-27 (2008), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/
content/resource/faircourts settingrecusalstandards/ (identifying nineteen
states with peremptory challenges and recommending wider adoption of the
device).
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judge, but that is a mischaracterization of the approach. 169 Federal
judges in particular have resisted the idea, appearing to regard it as
an attack on the overall integrity and competence of the federal
bench. 170 Federal judges may also find this an undue imposition in
view of their already extensive procedures for maintaining
impartiality.17 1 The costs of the approach, however, are minimal,
and the potential gains significant.1
Although the "reasonable question as to impartiality"
standard for recusal reflected in 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and Rule 2.11 of
the ABA Model Code is already reasonably stringent,' 7 3 it is not self-
169. To perhaps state the obvious, if a litigant is given but one peremptory
challenge of a judge, it hardly follows that the litigant or lawyer is able to obtain
the judge of one's choice, even in a jurisdiction with a relatively small number of
judges. When a peremptory challenge is exercised, this simply means that the
initially assigned judge is removed from the case and that another judge is
assigned to the case. In a multi-party case, there exists the possibility of several
peremptory challenges and judicial assignments, but without doubt no single
litigant or lawyer is provided with any right (and hardly any possibility) of
obtaining a preferred judge. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (2006) ("In civil cases,
each party shall be entitled to three peremptory challenges. Several defendants or
several plaintiffs may be considered as a single party for the purposes of making
challenges, or the court may allow additional peremptory challenges and permit
them to be exercised separately or jointly."). State peremptory challenge systems
largely follow the federal model. See, e.g., Nev. Rev. Stat. § 16.40 (1997)
(providing that each party has four peremptory challenges as a matter of right; in
multi-party cases, judge has discretion to give all parties on one side minimum
requirement of four challenges or to provide up to eight challenges).
170. See McKeown, supra note 8, at 2-4; David Ingram, Congress
Examines Judge Recusals: House Panel Considers Changing Disqualification
Rules for Federal Judiciary, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 2, 2009, at 1.
171. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(3) (2006) (requiring recusal where immediate
family member has even a modest financial interest in a litigant); 28 U.S.C. §
455(b)(4) (2006) (requiring recusal where first cousins or closer relatives of judge
have even modest professional or financial ties to litigants); 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1)
& (2) (2006) (requiring recusal where judge has relatively modest professional
connection to case or "has been a material witness" concerning case); see also
McKeown, supra note 8, at 3-8 (describing aspects of current system supportive of
judicial impartiality). By contrast, ABA Model Judicial Code 2.1 1(A)(2), which
requires recusal for family financial connections to the case, nevertheless permits
an exception where the interest is "de minimis," defined as "an insignificant
interest that could not raise a reasonable question as to the judge's impartiality."
Id. at Terminology.
172. See infra text accompanying notes 273-74 (outlining minimal costs of
transferring a case from one judge to another).
173. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2006) ("Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge
. . . shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might
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executing. The substantive standard has the power to police judicial
recusal only to the extent that it is correctly applied with sufficient
frequency by the bench. There exists considerable disagreement
within the legal profession as to when the standard is met.1 74
Further, even if there were a uniform, conscious, and articulated
consensus regarding the definition of a reasonable question as to
impartiality, there would remain the problems of unconscious bias
and cognitive error that sufficiently blind judges (like all persons), so
that they might frequently fail to recognize when they should apply
their own standards for disqualification.
In addition, a widely followed regime of peremptory
challenges provides an important indication of judicial performance
as well as greater protection against cases being heard before a judge
lacking sufficient neutrality. When litigants and lawyers "vote with
their feet" to remove the initially assigned judge from a case and to
obtain a new judicial assignment, they are not only registering
concerns about Judge A's impartiality, but are often also expressing
reservations about Judge A's competence. Although challenging a
judge's competence may not be the primary goal of the judicial
peremptory challenge, it is, in my view, a valuable collateral benefit
that can help court administrators and policymakers identify
problematic judges. Perhaps this is why the judiciary resists it so
much.
Here, Nevada provides a positive illustration on the issue (as
contrasted with the state's embarrassing embrace of the duty to sit
and resistance to financial contribution limits with teeth). Nevada
reasonably be questioned."); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11(A)
(2007) (A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the
judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, defining impartiality in the
Terminology section as "absence of bias or prejudice in favor of, or against,
particular parties or classes of parties, as well as maintenance of an open mind in
considering issues that may come before a judge.").
174. See Geyh, supra note 6, at 676 ("[T]he appearances-based
disqualification regime is in trouble . . . [in part because] the legal establishment is
deeply divided over when it is reasonable for the presumption of impartiality to
yield to the suspicion that extralegal influences may have compromised the judge's
impartial judgment.").
175. See supra text accompanying notes 22-32 (describing cognitive traits
that undermine judicial ability to correctly identify disqualification issues).
176. See supra text accompanying notes 156-58 (describing Nevada's
reluctance to abolish duty to sit and resistance to the idea of automatic recusal
based on financial contributions).
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law provides that litigants may move to disqualify the initially
assigned judge from the case; each party gets one such peremptory
challenge.1 7 7 If the litigant who has used a peremptory challenge
dislikes the subsequently assigned judge, the litigant is "stuck"
unless there exists an affirmative ground for recusal pursuant to the
Judicial Code.178
In practice, lawyers have used peremptory challenges not
only to replace judges thought to be biased or prejudiced, but also to
replace judges disfavored because their legal abilities are widely
questioned in the organized bar. Over time, a pattern has emerged in
which a small group of trial judges is most frequently targeted by
such recusal motions.1 7 9  Logically, this same handful of judges
cannot be more biased or prejudiced regarding particular litigants or
cases than the bench as a whole. What must be happening (and what
lawyers privately tell me is happening) is that certain judges are
challenged not only because of bias or prejudice, but also because
they are simply not considered very good by lawyers in the
community. 18 Often these judges are removed because counsel
177. See NEV. SUPREME COURT R. 48.1 (providing that party may disqualify
initially assigned judge as a matter of right upon paying $450 administrative fee;
thereafter, any attempt to remove judge must be for cause); FLAMM, supra note 14,
§ 27.11 (describing Nevada peremptory challenge process). See also Towbin
Dodge, LLC v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 112 P.3d 1063, 1066 (Nev. 2005) (discussing
judge's discretion to reject untimely request for change in judge); Turnipseed v.
Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist., 13 P.3d 395, 399 (Nev. 2000) (ruling peremptory
challenge may not be exercised after judge has ruled on contested matter in case).
178. See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 1.230 (1997) (listing grounds for recusal); see
also Nev. Supreme Court R. 48.1 (allowing each side only one peremptory
challenge as a matter of right).
179. Judicial Performance Evaluation - 2010, LAS VEGAS REv.-J.,
available at http://media.lvrj.com/documents/Judicial _Report_2010.pdf; see also
Frank Geary, Lawyers Give Poor Scores to Nine Judges, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., May
10, 2010, at lA (noting that nine judges had approval ratings-defined as
respondent's willingness to retain judge-of less than fifty percent). Peremptory
challenges are directed toward these judges at higher-than-average rates. On
condition of anonymity, area lawyers inform me that their use of such challenges
against these (and some other judges) is often based on concerns about judicial
competence rather than a belief that these judges are more frequently compromised
by issues of bias or prejudice toward litigants or counsel.
180. This assessment has been communicated to me repeatedly during the
past ten years or so by Nevada lawyers. Although, like any collection of anecdotes
(or inferences drawn from broader data), it could be wrong-but I find it
persuasive. Every lawyer making this observation to me over the years was a
reasonably successful, well-respected attorney. Presumably their judgment both
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thinks the judge will not correctly understand the case and will not
rule wisely on discovery, joinder, and summary judgment motions,
jury instructions, and evidence. In some cases, the judge is removed
because he or she is perceived as inconsistent, erratic in demeanor,
slow, or prone to error that may result in needless reversal.181
Although some may decry the situation as a misuse of
recusal-driven peremptory challenges, I rather like the market system
feedback it provides. By examining the pattern of peremptory
challenges, one can get a pretty good idea of which judges are held
in low esteem by the bar and, conversely, which judges are highly
regarded by a wide spectrum of litigants and lawyers. Although this
pattern appears not to translate into meaningful electoral feedback,182
this information at least has the potential to affect whether judges
keep their seats in subsequent elections. More immediately,
however, it provides a relatively low-cost way for wiser counsel to
keep weaker judges from presiding over their cases. To the extent
that wiser counsel are associated with more complex, high-stakes
cases with substantial impact, the system provides a benefit in the
reduced chance that a weaker judge will preside over a complex
matter. 183
about the abilities of judges and the motivations of their colleagues, formed after
years of practice, is relatively accurate. At a minimum, they know their own
reasons for exercising a peremptory challenge and, as far as I can determine, have
no reason to misrepresent their motivations in casual conversations with me.
181. Again, I base these assessments on years of informal conversations
with Nevada litigators, largely from the Las Vegas area. For obvious reasons, I am
disinclined to attribute the comments to particular lawyers who must practice
before judges regarded as problematic. I am also refraining from naming the
judges in question, although it is no secret in the local legal community that a half-
dozen or so of the Clark County trial judges are considered noticeably weak, just
as some are considered exceptionally good.
182. The judges who are most frequently the subject of peremptory
challenges appear to win re-election with comparative consistency and ease and at
the same rate as do highly regarded judges. See Judicial Performance Evaluation -
2010, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., available at http://media.1vrj.com/documents/Judicial
Report 2010.pdf; Geary, supra note 179. Despite the considerable variance in
approval ratings, nearly all incumbent Nevada trial judges are re-elected,
notwithstanding adverse publicity sometimes received as a result of the Judicial
Performance Evaluation survey. Since 2000, only six Las Vegas area trial judges
have lost their seats due to adverse election outcomes.
183. To a degree, the Eighth Judicial District of Nevada has institutionalized
this goal of putting the most complex or difficult cases in the hands of judges
thought to have particular expertise in that it has established a "business court"
docket in which complex, large, or protracted commercial cases
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2. Recusal Motions Should Be Heard by
Independent Judges
As noted above, the cognitive limitations of human beings
make them particularly ill-suited to examine their own conduct
objectively.14 Simply put, a challenged judge is often simply too
invested in the matter to be in the best position to assess the merits of
a recusal motion. West Virginian Justice Benjamin's stubborn
refusal to step aside in Caperton provides an amazingly extreme
example of judicial recalcitrance which indicates the extent to which
judges' emotional investments in disqualification may blind them
and cause them to produce poor legal analysis.' 8 5  The solution is
obvious: recusal motions should be heard and decided, even in first
instance, by another trial judge in the relevant district. Where a
challenge targets an appellate judge, it should be heard and decided
by other members of the panel or, if necessary, by the court as a
whole. Where the challenge targets a United States Supreme Court
Justice or a judge or justice of any other jurisdiction's highest court,
the disqualification decision should be made by the entire court. 186
are assigned to a subset of judges widely viewed as particularly
adept. See NEV. 8TH JuD. DIST. CT. R. 1.61 (2009), available at
http://www.leg.state.nv.us/CourtRules/EighthDCR.html (establishing "business
court" docket in which particularly involved or complex cases are assigned to
particular judicial departments; although not readily apparent from the face of the
Rule, the business court is intended to be something of an elite court. Rule 1.61(c)
provides for designation of business court judges by the chief judge with no
mention of criteria for selection. But to date, the designation has thus far been
given to trial judges considered particularly competent and experienced).
184. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text (noting that it is "highly
unlikely that judges can consistently overcome or even recognize their own biases
and prejudices").
185. See Stempel, Impeach Brent Benjamin Now!?, supra note 1, at 34-80
(describing how Justice Brent Benjamin denied recusal motions, sometimes in
very defensive fashion, four times over a three-year period, enlisted state supreme
court bureaucracy in his defense, and lobbied U.S. Supreme Court to deny
certiorari). Observing Justice Benjamin's tenacity in repeatedly refusing to
correctly apply governing disqualification law, one might reasonably conclude that
his violation of the law was intentional. However, giving him the benefit of the
doubt that this was mere error, it must result from emotional investment warping
judgment.
186. See Stempel, Chief William's Ghost, supra note 40, at 899-918 (noting
instances of insufficient sensitivity to disqualification issues and impartiality
values under current United States Supreme Court approach); Stempel, Rehnquist,
Recusal and Reform, supra note 53, at 845 (urging that the Court cease the practice
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Here again is an area where many of the states are ahead of
the federal system in that a significant number of states use this
procedure, 8 7 while the federal model is one in which the trial judge
that is the target of the recusal motion makes the decision on the
motion, subject, of course, to appellate review.'8 In addition, state
and federal courts should give serious consideration to a system in
which recusal motions bypass the challenged judge entirely so that
the judge does not become aware that his participation has been
challenged.
Lawyers think long and hard before bringing disqualification
motions and may well be too reluctant to make meritorious (or at
least colorable) motions out of fear of alienating a judge who will
preside over the matter if the motion is denied.'8 9  Placing such
motions before a judge who will not be in an immediate position to
punish counsel during the remainder of the case if the motion is
denied will give further breathing space to lawyers wishing to
exercise the rights of free speech advocated by Professor Margaret
Tarkington.190 To make this aspect of the system effective, the judge
of allowing each individual justice to make an unreviewable decision on his or her
own participation in cases).
187. See William E. Raftery, "The Legislature Must Save the Court From
Itself'?: Recusal, Separation ofPowers, and the Post-Caperton World, 58 DRAKE
L. REV. 765, 772 (2010) (explaining that as of 2000, fifteen states provided for
decision on recusal motions by a different judge, and although four states have
since given serious consideration to this procedure, the number of states providing
for this protection remained static).
188. See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2006) (setting forth recusal standards but
permitting trial judge in question to make initial disqualification decision, which is
like all trial rulings subject to appellate review at the conclusion of the case, or
perhaps earlier, if an exception to the final order rule applies).
189. See Geyh, supra note 6, at text accompanying notes 85-86 (explaining
that because recusal motions are often denied, party and attorney making motion
face significant risk that not only will purportedly disqualified judge remain on the
case but also will be even more inclined to rule against the movant based on
defensiveness over the motion). Certainly, this is consistent with litigation
protocol in the law firm where I practiced in Minneapolis, Minnesota during the
1980s and is the consistent view expressed by lawyers I have known in the legal
communities of Minneapolis, New York, Florida, and Nevada.
190. See Tarkington, supra note 7, at 850-51 (expressing concern that
attorneys exercising free speech rights on behalf of clients or the judicial system
face substantial risks of reprisal by judges). See generally Margaret Tarkington, A
Free Speech Right to Impugn Judicial Integrity, 51 B.C. L. REV. 363, 364-66
(2010) (arguing that lawyers have substantial constitutional and ethical right to
criticize judges but that attorneys are too often improperly or unduly punished for
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who is the subject of the motion should not even be aware of which
party is making the motion.
In advocating for disqualification rulings made by a different
judge, I am to some degree backtracking on my views of a quarter-
century ago, a time when I viewed the federal model as adequate at
the trial level'91 but problematic at higher levels, particularly in the
U.S. Supreme Court.' 9 2 Over time, I have become either wiser or
making such criticisms); Margaret Tarkington, The Truth Be Damned: The First
Amendment, Attorney Speech and Judicial Reputation, 97 GEO. L.J. 1567, 1569-
75 (2009) (arguing that courts reviewing attorney speech have been unduly
sensitive to judicial reputation and public appearances but too insensitive to the
value of attorney criticism alerting courts and the public to purported judicial
improprieties).
The attitude that lawyers question judges at their peril appears to be widely
held among judges themselves. In December 2010, I was quoted in a local
television newscast commenting on a Las Vegas state court judge's management
of a trial in which she required jurors to deliberate almost until dawn so that the
case could be concluded in time for her planned vacation. Doug McMurdo, Judge
Stands by Decision to Keep Jurors Overnight, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., Dec. 31, 2010,
at IB. Not surprisingly, the comments had a bit of a critical tone, although I was
careful to note that sometimes uncontrollable circumstances impose burdens on
courts and jurors and to defend a judge's general right to flexible scheduling and
conducting court business as necessary outside the nine-to-five time slot. Much to
my surprise, the story was picked up by national wire services and even included a
brief appearance on Fox and Friends (largely without my qualifying nuances).
Later that month, I ran into a judge from another state who is a long-time
acquaintance and who had seen the story and found it amusing, albeit with some
empathy for the judge who had lost control of her scheduling. My friend's
assessment of the consequences of saying anything even this mildly critical of the
judge: "If you ever have to appear before her, you can forget about winning that
case." Obviously, I hope that judges are not this thin-skinned. As this anecdote
indicates, however, strong disqualification practice is essential to a fair judicial
system.
191. See Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal and Reform, supra note 53, at 632-37
(generally approving of federal system in which challenged trial judge makes
initial determination regarding disqualification because of backstop of appellate
review).
192. Although each justice acts as his or her own unreviewable umpire in
this regard, there may be informal consultation on such matters by particular
justices in particular cases. See Stempel, Chief William's Ghost, supra note 40, at
813-14 (noting that Justice Rehnquist in Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 835 (1972)
(Rehnquist, J., mem.), despite making a decision as to his own participation,
consulted with colleagues and sought their approval of his decision to issue a
memorandum explaining his decision not to recuse).
Although this is better than nothing, it hardly solves the problem. In Laird v.
Tatum, for example, Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justices Potter Stewart and
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more cynical, and now believe that there is simply too much inertia
in favor of non-disqualification, which results in insufficiently
frequent recusal when challenged judges assess questions of their
own impartiality or public perception of it.
In addition, I have come to appreciate the manner in which
the final order rule, whatever its overall attributes, exacerbates the
problems of disqualification at the trial court level. Under the final
order rule, matters in a case are not generally subject to appellate
review unless the case has been resolved on the merits. 3 By
definition, an order granting or denying judicial disqualification does
not decide the case on the merits and thus, it is not automatically
eligible for appellate review.1 94 Neither is Rule 54(b) certification
available,195 and because the recusal decision does not grant, deny or
modify an injunction, it is also not immediately reviewable pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a).196
Byron White all rallied to Justice Rehnquist's defense, supporting his position of
non-disqualification under circumstances where it was clear he should never have
participated. See Stempel, Chief William's Ghost, supra note 40, at 813-14, 851-
63 (describing support of other Justices for Justice Rehnquist's widely criticized
failure to recuse in Laird v. Tatum).
Although this reaction may indicate widespread insensitivity to recusal in the
Court, it more likely represents the power of personal relationships and collegiality
to warp independent judgment or to result in conflict avoidance. The other
justices, presuming they understood the situation (and they may not have,
depending solely on Justice Rehnquist's memorandum, which presented the matter
favorably to his decision) should have told Justice Rehnquist to forgo the
memorandum, step aside, and support rehearing.
193. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006) (codifying final order rule); FLAMM, supra
note 14, ch. 32 at 959-81 (outlining law of appellate review of disqualification
decisions generally); LARRY L. TEPLY & RALPH U. WHITTEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE
966-67, 969-70 (4th ed. 2009) (addressing final order rule).
194. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006) (providing appellate jurisdiction over all
"final decisions" of trial courts). A final decision is generally defined as one that
completely ends the litigation on the merits and leaves "nothing for the court to do
but execute the judgment." Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945).
195. Because a ruling on a disqualification motion does not even address the
merits of the lawsuit, much less decide them, Rule 54(b) immediate appeal is not
available for denials of disqualification. See FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b) (providing for
immediate appeal when final judgment is entered against fewer than all parties in a
case or on fewer than all claims in a case where the judge finds no just reason for
delay).
196. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (2006) (providing for immediate appeal of
orders granting, denying, or modifying injunctions); see also FLAMM, supra note
14, ch. 32 at 959-81 (outlining law of appellate review of disqualification
decisions).
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The additional limitation of the collateral order doctrine
exception to the final order rule' 97 makes appellate review an
unlikely vehicle for immediately challenging recusal decisions.
Certification for immediate review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)
is ineffective because the certifying judge must be convinced that the
decision certified is a reasonably close one on which there is
substantial ground for difference of opinion.198  For the cognitive
reasons previously discussed, 199 judges are unlikely to think their
failure to recuse was erroneous or even a close call (and may even
assert that if the matter had been a close one, recusal would have
been ordered). This leaves only the petition for mandamus as a
vehicle for immediate review of a disqualification decision, and
mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that, as a practical matter, is
only successful when there appears to have been a clear abuse of
discretion by the trial judge.20
197. See Mohawk Indust., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 604-08 (2009)
(holding court order of disclosure rejecting assertion of attorney-client privilege
not eligible for immediate appellate review under collateral order doctrine, which
provides that an order that is not final on the merits may be accorded interlocutory
review where the order fully decides an important issue completely separate and
independent from the merits that cannot be effectively reviewed after final
judgment on the merits); FLAMM, supra note 14, § 32.4 (describing collateral order
doctrine); TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 193, at 972 (describing collateral order
doctrine).
198. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2006) (setting forth requirements for
discretionary certification of a matter for interlocutory appeal; requiring
controlling question of law, substantial ground for difference of opinion, and
judge's conclusion that immediate appeal will advance ultimate termination of the
case); FLAMM, supra note 14, § 32.3 (describing codification of disqualification
orders). In addition, an appellate court is free to reject the trial court's conclusions
as to whether a matter qualifies for § 1292(b) certification where the trial judge is
"of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which
there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal
from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation."
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2006). In effect, three out of four judges on a panel
addressing a denial of a disqualification motion must find the § 1292(b) criteria
satisfied if there is to be interlocutory appellate review of the denial.
199. See supra notes 24-45 and accompanying text (explaining that
cognitive traits and biases affecting people logically affect judges as well,
distorting their ability to correctly assess their own impartiality).
200. See TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 193, at 972 (describing review by
writ of mandamus); FLAMM, supra note 14, §§ 32.6-32.8 (addressing interlocutory
review of recusal denials through writs of mandamus or prohibition).
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Under these circumstances, the legal system would do well to
invest more resources to ensure that initial recusal decisions are as
accurate as possible. Reassignment to a different judge-even at the
trial court level in federal court-is a wiser system worth the extra
expenditure of judicial resources. Additionally, all parties to the
litigation should be permitted to be involved in the recusal motion
process to better ensure that the recusal motion will not be granted
too quickly and that litigants who are perfectly comfortable with the
challenged judge will be heard. In general, a fuller airing of
disqualification issues is desirable at the outset of litigation.
3. Written Decisions Regarding Disqualification
Motions with Reasons (Considered Published
and Citable)
Disqualification decisions should also be made in writing or
on the record in open court, accompanied by reasons for the court's
decision to recuse or remain on the case. Although it is not the
gravest problem with modem disqualification, the clipped, abrupt,
and uninformative manner in which many disqualification decisions
are delivered undermines the public confidence the process should
inspire. Many decisions are simple orders with no information about
the nature of the motion, the asserted grounds for disqualification, or
the court's rationale. Recusal practice would be enhanced by
reasoned opinions that force judges to give greater reflection to an
issue and reduce the chance that decisions will be made hastily or
reflexively.
Written explanations of recusal decisions would also in turn
develop a more comprehensive body of precedent to guide the legal
community and the bench. In the service of greater information and
transparency, these written and explanatory opinions should be
easily available on court websites and available in legal research
databases such as Lexis and Westlaw. Similarly, recusal decisions
should be considered citable precedent that can be used by lawyers
and litigants in making and resisting recusal motions.
Unsurprisingly, the U.S. Supreme Court is perhaps the worst
court in America in this regard. 201 The public is routinely informed
201. See Stempel, Chief William's Ghost, supra note 40, at 813-14, 851-68
& 899-918 (discussing the Supreme Court's tendency to take judicial qualification
less seriously than lower courts); see generally Caprice L. Roberts, The Fox
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only that Justice X took no part in the consideration or decision
regarding a case. Citizens are left to ponder whether Justice X had
health problems, was financially disqualified due to personal
interests or those of a relative, or instead invoked 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)
notwithstanding the lack of any pending motion. Although Court-
watchers can often figure out the basis for recusal (e.g., Justice Elena
Kagan sitting out cases involving the federal government stemming
from her service as Solicitor General), the situation is unduly
secretive and uninformative. Admittedly, lack of information about
a voluntary recusal is less of a problem than Justices unreasonably
failing to step aside and making these decisions unilaterally without
review. Nonetheless, this cryptic aspect of Court practice is in
keeping with the Court's generally arrogant attitude toward
disqualification. 20 2
This minimalist treatment of disqualification matters is also
puzzling given the Court's professed concern for recusal or absences
that reduce the number of participating judges. If, as the Justices
assert, the absence of even a single Justice raises important concerns
because of the unavailability of substitutes,203 one would logically
expect that the Court would treat a Justice's absence sufficiently
seriously to provide an explanation for the absence. In addition, the
regular announcement of reasons for voluntary recusals would help
to establish working guidelines on the issue for litigants, counsel,
and the public.
Guarding the Henhouse: Recusal and the Procedural Void in the Court of Last
Resort, 57 RUTGERs L. REv. 107, 153-65 (2004) (voicing concern that U.S.
Supreme Court disqualification process is particularly problematic because there
exists no review of an individual justice's denial of disqualification, even when
denial is clearly erroneous).
202. See Stempel, Chief William's Ghost, supra note 40, at 899-918
(reviewing and criticizing Court's approach to disqualification).
203. Press Release, United States Supreme Court, Statement of Recusal
Policy (Nov. 1, 1993), reprinted in GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 89, at 724-25
(stating it was signed by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, O'Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Ginsburg; Justices Blackmun and Souter did not
sign); See Stempel, Chief William's Ghost, supra note 40, at 899-918 (noting the
Court's position to this effect and the Court's generally lax attitude toward judicial
disqualification).
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4. Elimination of the Pernicious "Duty to Sit"
As discussed above, the so-called "duty to sit" mindset needs
to be more formally and completely eradicated from the system.204
In attacking the duty to sit, I want to be clear that I am not attacking
the sentiment expressed in ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct,
which provides that a judge has a "responsibility to decide" cases
and directs that the judge "shall hear and decide matters assigned to
the judge, except when disqualification is required by Rule 2.11 or
other law." 205 This admonition that judges not shirk duties or dodge
difficult, controversial, or unpopular cases 206 reflects what should not
need to be said. To the extent it establishes a "duty" to sit, it is a
benign and reasonable concept of the duty, one that must yield to the
need for disqualification.
However, a different concept of the duty to sit began in the
nineteenth century and held the most sway during the mid-twentieth
century.207 Properly understood, even these precedents need not
204. See infra text accompanying note 209 (arguing that duty to sit concept
is problematic because it encourages judges to decide against disqualification in
close cases when inclination should be exactly the opposite).
205. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.7 (2007).
206. Comment I to Rule 2.7 (the sole Comment to the Rule) fleshes out the
concept embodied in the Model Code:
Judges must be available to decide matters that come before the court.
Although there are times when disqualification is necessary to protect the
rights of litigants and preserve public confidence in the independence,
integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, judges must be available to
decide matters that come before the courts. Unwarranted disqualification
may bring public disfavor to the court and to the judge personally. The
dignity of the court, the judge's respect for fulfillment of judicial duties,
and a proper concern for the burdens that may be imposed upon the
judge's colleagues require that a judge not use disqualification to avoid
cases that present difficult, controversial, or unpopular issues.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.7 cmt. 1 (2007).
Although I might have preferred that this implicit aspect of judging (at least I
always assumed that part of the attraction of judging was the opportunity to face
difficult, controversial or unpopular cases) not be codified at all lest it be
misinterpreted as an edict to unduly resist recusal, Rule 2.7, properly understood,
creates no barrier to sound disqualification practice pursuant to ABA Model Code
Rule 2.11 or 28 U.S.C. § 455.
207. See Stempel, Chief William's Ghost, supra note 40, at 840-51 (tracing
the evolution of duty to sit concept and its relation to the older, now outdated
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create a barrier to sound recusal practice. Nevertheless, the notion
of a judge's obligation not to shirk work and responsibility morphed
into a more pernicious concept of the duty to sit, one that encouraged
judges to be unduly resistant to disqualification and to resolve close
cases against disqualification. 209  This "pernicious" version of the
duty to sit concept should be distinguished from its more benign
cousin stressing judicial responsibility.2 1 0
Although this pernicious version of the duty to sit was
abolished in federal courts in 1974 and was effectively eliminated in
the ABA Model Codes by 1972, it remains in effect in about a half-
Blackstonian notion that judges were reliably impartial and virtually beyond
challenge).
Although the roots of the doctrine can be traced to Blackstone and
the pre-1800 English attitude that only direct financial stake in a case
disqualified a judge, neither the 1924 [ABA] Canons [of Judicial Ethics]
nor the 1972 [ABA] Code [of Judicial Conduct] embraced the duty to sit
in their texts, although the 1990 [ABA] Code [of Judicial Conduct], like
the 2007 [ABA] Code [of Judicial Conduct], notes that judges have an
obligation to discharge their responsibilities as judges. The first reported
American case to use the term appears in 1824, one of approximately
twenty cases using the term in the nineteenth century, most after 1880.
The duty to sit as a basis for declining to recuse in non-compelling cases
began appearing with more frequency in reported opinions during the
1950s and 1960s. Perhaps the most prominent duty to sit case, Edwards
v. United States, 334 F.2d 360 (5th Cir. 1964), was decided in 1964, less
than a decade before Justice Rehnquist's memorandum invoking the
concept in defense of his failure to recuse in Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S.
824, 835 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., mem.).
Id. at 846-47 (citations omitted).
208. See Stempel, Chief William's Ghost, supra note 40, at 847-51
(discussing Edwards v. United States, a widely cited duty to sit case, and
demonstrating that the Fifth Circuit was not advocating a pernicious version of the
doctrine unduly resistant to judicial recusal). See also id. at 850-51 (explaining
that Edwards was "really only applying the benign version of the duty to sit rather
than its more pernicious cousin") (citation omitted).
209. See id. at 847-68 (noting development of duty to sit concept is
excessively resistant to valid recusal motions and its use by Justice Rehnquist in
Laird v. Tatum, a move sufficiently unpopular that it helped spur the abolition of
the pernicious duty to sit doctrine in the 1974 amendments to the federal
disqualification statute; noting also absence of duty to sit rationale opposing
recusal in 1972 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct).
210. See id. at 818-34 (discussing concept and distinctions between the two
forms of the duty to sit doctrine at greater length).
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dozen states, with some lingering use in judicial decisions in
jurisdictions (including in the federal system) where the doctrine has
been eliminated. 2 11 To a degree, this continued use appears to result
from courts' reliance on Justice Rehnquist's Laird v. Tatum
memorandum without any apparent appreciation that the Rehnquist
memorandum is viewed by most informed observers as legally
erroneous and an embarrassment to the judiciary.212
For whatever reason, the pernicious duty to sit doctrine
continues as official policy in a few states and exerts influence on
judges in others, with this form of the doctrine urging courts to resist
disqualification as a general matter and to resolve close questions
against disqualification. For reasons that I hope are obvious, sound
recusal practice should aim in exactly the opposite direction. Where
a disqualification question is close, the court should err on the side of
recusal in order to avoid inadvertent lack of neutrality due to
unconscious bias and to enhance public and litigant confidence in the
courts. Properly understood, ABA Model Rule 2.7 is not to the
contrary.213
211. See id. at 891-94 (listing Alabama, Arkansas, Mississippi, Nevada, and
South Carolina as states formally retaining duty to sit, while states in which the
pernicious form of the doctrine appears to have some continued vitality, or at least
in which there is some non-overruled duty to sit case law, are Alaska, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, New
Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, and
Wyoming).
212. Id. at 860-62. See also Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal and Reform, supra
note 53, at 594-96 (noting legal community's criticism and essential rejection of
Rehnquist's analysis in his memorandum defending participation in Laird v.
Tatum).
213. See supra text accompanying note 199 (positing that judges are
unlikely to recognize a failure to recuse as erroneous or even a close question
because of cognitive biases); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 2.7 (2007)
(providing that the judge "shall hear and decide matters assigned to the judge,
except when disqualification is required by Rule 2.11 or other law"). By
specifically referencing the disqualification provisions of Rule 2.11, the ABA
Model Code expressly resolves close cases of recusal in favor of disqualification
rather than adhering to a duty to sit irrespective of other factors. This is not to
suggest that the current system lacks these procedural protections completely. On
the contrary, the American justice system as a whole in my view scores rather well
on this dimension. Nonetheless, examples like Caperton or other miscarriages of
recusal justice are too frequent. See generally Miller, supra note 9, at 450, 454,
460-62 (discussing egregious examples of judges sitting in cases where they
should have recused); see infra text accompanying notes 226, 303-04 (noting that
individual judges may be very confident of assessments that prove to be "wrong"
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5. Disqualification Decisions Reviewed De Novo
with an End to Abuse of Discretion Review
and Harmless Error Exceptions
Because a variety of psychological, sociological, and
professional cultural forces auger against disqualification even in
cases where the judge's ability to be impartial may be in question, 214
some recalibration of appellate review of disqualification decisions is
in order. Historically, trial court disqualification decisions have been
reviewed under the deferential abuse of discretion standard2 15 and, as
at least as measured by appellate court review and reversal); Stempel, Chief
William's Ghost, supra note 40, at 868-954 (noting the degree to which the
wrongfulness of the former Chief Justice's failure to recuse in important case
continues to be under-appreciated, as are other instances of Supreme Court
Justices' failures to recuse); Stempel, Completing Caperton, supra note 1, at 254-
67 (noting the great error of West Virginia Justice Benjamin in refusing to recuse
despite multiple opportunities and strong arguments repeatedly made by Caperton
counsel); Stempel, Impeach Brent Benjamin Now!?, supra note 1, at 7-10 (arguing
that despite ultimate disqualification of Justice Benjamin, the matter as a whole
was a disgraceful black eye for the American legal system).
214. See supra text accompanying notes 33-43 (discussing unconscious
cognitive factors affecting judges).
215. See FLAMM, supra note 14, § 33.1 (stating that abuse of discretion is
the dominant yardstick for appellate review of judicial recusal).
Abuse of discretion review is contrasted with de novo review, in which the
appellate court treats the issue (e.g., whether there exist grounds for
disqualification) as one of first impression, and is less deferential than abuse of
discretion review. See generally STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, 1
FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REviEw: CIVIL CASES AND GENERAL REvIEw
PRINCIPLES (4th ed. 2010). Most deferential to trial courts is review under a
"clearly erroneous" test under which a trial court's decision is set aside only if the
reviewing court is left with the definite and firm impression that a mistake has
been made. See STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REvIEw H
4.21 & 4.22 (1992) (stating that in determining whether a trial court has abused
discretion, focus is on the reasonableness of judge's actions).
Under the abuse of discretion standard, a judge's determination is reversed
only if the reviewing court concludes that the judge has exceeded the bounds of
permissible discretion or "abused" the discretion accorded the judge. Id. § 4.21 at
4-162, 4-165 By definition, a reviewing court's determination to apply the abuse
of discretion standard presumes that the decision to be made regarding
disqualification is one of discretion. This imbedded assumption is arguably
erroneous. The governing statutes and the ABA JUDICIAL CODE Rule 2.11 (2007)
do not expressly make recusal a matter of discretion and there is not a logical
reason that a judge should be able to deny recusal on a discretionary basis if the
movant has established the requisite grounds for recusal. Accordingly, de novo
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previously noted, harmless error analysis has usually been applied
even in cases where a refusal to disqualify was erroneous. 2 16
In combination, these approaches make it unduly difficult to
overturn trial court decisions mistakenly concluding that reasonable
observers could not have reasonable doubts about a judge's ability to
be impartial in a particular matter. The prevailing tendency of
judges to shrink from criticizing or countermanding one another in
public, combined with difficulties and divisions in such cases, make
it likely that refusals to recuse will be under-policed by appellate
courts.
To combat this result, the abuse of discretion standard of
review should be replaced with de novo appellate review of
disqualification decisions.217 Where trial court decisions are found
to be incorrect, matters should be remanded to the trial court without
appellate inquiry into whether a mistaken failure to recuse was
"harmless" error. As discussed above, a harmless error backstop for
incorrect failures to disqualify creates too much risk of injustice in
an area where sorting out the impact of a tainted judge is difficult. A
matter may look to have been correctly resolved on the merits even
though the judge should have recused. However, because it is
difficult, if not impossible, to know what the case's result would
have been absent the tainted judge, the apparent inevitability of the
substantive outcome of a case may be a mirage created by the
activities of a presiding trial judge who should have stepped aside. 2 18
Appellate inquiry unbounded by the deference of the abuse of
discretion standard and harmless error limits to remedy would serve
as an important quality control mechanism for disqualification
practice.
review makes more logical sense as well as better vindicating the values
underlying disqualification law.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 64-65 (discussing the prevalence of
harmless error analysis for appellate review of disqualification matters and
outlining harmless error concept).
217. See supra note 215 (describing de novo appellate review standard).
218. See supra text accompanying notes 61-75 (discussing "spoliation"
problems of determining impact of tainted judge when conducting both merits
review and harmless error review).
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III. AVOIDING THE ACCLAMATION FALLACY: A MORE
REASONABLE TRIGGER OF THE REASONABLE QUESTION AS TO
IMPARTIALITY STANDARD AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE
NEW APPROACH FOR POLITICALLY AND IDEOLOGICALLY
BASED APPEARANCES OF PARTIALITY
Although procedural protections are important, an effective
disqualification regime requires the breadth, flexibility, and
backstopping characteristics of a stricter "reasonable question as to
impartiality" standard. The appearance-based standard can catch
situations of concern that might otherwise fall through the
metaphorical "cracks" of a system of procedural protections. It can
also set an overall tone in the judicial community of erring on the
side of ensuring judicial impartiality and public confidence rather
than lionizing judges, ignoring unconscious bias, privileging
efficiency, and unduly fearing strategic disqualification motions.
According to Professor Geyh, however, the reasonable-
question-as-to-impartiality standard is under attack and seemingly in
eclipse, perhaps primarily because of the great division of opinion in
the legal profession.
[I]t is not enough that the legal establishment and the
public agree that the judiciary should strive to
preserve the appearance of impartiality. Rather, they
must share a basic understanding of what constitutes
an appearance of partiality. Currently, the legal
establishment is deeply divided over when it is
reasonable for the presumption of impartiality to yield
to the suspicion that extralegal influences may have
compromised the judge's impartial judgment. The
general public is comparably divided, and between
the legal establishment and the general public, there
are still further divisions. The net effect is that except
in extreme or well-settled cases, consensus on when it
is fair or reasonable to doubt the impartiality of a
judge is elusive-we do not know it when we see
it.219
219. Geyh, supra note 6, at 676.
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I quibble a bit with the breadth of this statement. Although
there has been, particularly at the United States Supreme Court level,
sharp division over disqualification law,220 the judiciary is, at least
ostensibly, united behind a basic vision of the rules of recusal.
Nevertheless, courts still divide at the margin regarding issues such
as whether the Constitution should reach recusal errors by state
221judges, or whether constructive or actual knowledge supports
disqualification (Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition).222
Among opinion leaders or public intellectual forces such as media
outlets and commentators, there also appears to be more consensus
than Professor Geyh posits. The public at large is perhaps most
united in sentiment but appears to hold stronger views about threats
to impartiality than the legal and political intelligentsia. This is
reflected in surveys showing that four out of five Americans believe
that a judge's acceptance of a campaign contribution violates the
appearance of the impropriety ideal. If the legal profession and
political elites agreed with the public, mandatory disqualification in
cases involving campaign contributors would be the rule.224
220. See supra text accompanying notes 39, 87-88 (discussing 5-4 Supreme
Court splits in Caperton v. Massey and Liljeberg v Health Services
Administration).
221. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2267 (2009)
(Robert, C.J., dissenting with three other justices from majority decision to apply
Due Process Clause to require recusal of state court justice due to massive
electoral support provided to justice by CEO of litigant).
222. Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition, 486 U.S. 847, 864-67 (1988).
See supra text accompanying notes 39, 87-88 (discussing Court splits in Caperton
and Liljeberg). Of course, it is possible that the dissenting Justices in Caperton
and Lileberg, although outwardly disagreeing with the majority based on these
more technical grounds, were actually opposed to the disqualifications in those
cases because they simply saw nothing improper in the judicial behavior under
review. There is certainly some of this tone in Justice Roberts's Caperton dissent,
and particularly in Justice Scalia's dissent. 129 S. Ct. at 2273-74 (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting); 129 S. Ct. at 2274-75 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Stempel,
Playing Forty Questions, supra note 142, at 27-65 (dissecting Justice Roberts's
dissent and concluding that Roberts's technical and operational objections to the
majority holding are not well-taken and readily resolved).
223. See generally Bert Brandenburg, The Role of Public Opinion in the
Debate Over Recusal Reform, 58 DRAKE L. REv. 737, 738-45 (2010) (reviewing
survey data consistently reflecting that a majority of the public lacks confidence in
the impartiality of judges receiving campaign contributions from lawyers or
litigants who appear before them).
224. See Baum & Devins, supra note 22, at 155-56. (pointing out that
justices are relatively unmoved by public opinion, which expresses concern about
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At present, there is insufficient empirical information to
effectively resolve whether there is as much consensus on when the
impartial appearance standard overcomes a rebuttable presumption
of judicial neutrality, as I posit, or whether there is as much division
on the question as is posited by Professor Geyh.225 But without
doubt, his observation is true at its core: there is substantial
disagreement among both lawyers and laity as to what constitutes a
reasonable question as to impartiality.226 Nevertheless, Professor
Geyh and I divide over what impact this disagreement should have
on the positive law of disqualification. He suggests that the division
requires increased use of procedural mechanisms upon which there is
wider consensus and that these are the best means for policing
judicial neutrality.227 I agree, but also argue that the legal system
and the body politic needs to accept an updated, "post-modem,"
approach to operationalizing the appearance standard.
Professor Geyh seems to suggest, as does disqualification
case law, that the appearance standard is not triggered until there is
widespread, almost universal agreement that the appearance of
impartiality standard has been breached.228 As I read his assessment,
case precedent, and scholarly commentary, a judge's impartiality is
not subject to reasonable question unless nearly the entire viewing
audience-as represented by the hypothetical "reasonable person"-
has this perception. 229  At the very least, the judge deciding the
motion has this perception about the hypothetically well-informed
lay public's perception. This de facto insistence on consensus is the
judicial neutrality due to judicial elections and political activity by judges; justices
are more concerned with opinions of social, economic, and political elites).
225. Geyh, supra note 6, at 676.
226. Id. at 701.
227. Id. at 719.
228. See id. at 694 ("Achieving the appearances-based regime's second goal
of making disqualification more workable by relying on an objective standard ...
assumes that there is a shared view of when to doubt a judge's impartiality that can
be embodied in the 'reasonable person' of song and story.").
229. See, e.g., In re Mason, 916 F.2d 384, 386 (7th Cir. 1990) (judges must
imagine how a single well-informed observer of the judicial system would react;
no suggestion that reasonable well-informed observers may divide over a judge's
impartiality). See also FLAMM, supra note 14, § 5.6.3 (discussing "[t]he
Reasonable Person's Point of View" and the mind of a reasonable, uninvolved
observer) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); id. at § 5.7 (focusing on a single
reasonable person as an exemplar of all opinion on questions regarding judicial
impartiality).
[Vol. 30:4808
HeinOnline  -- 30 Rev. Litig. 808 2010-2011
APPEARANCE STANDARD
norm even if it is not expressly articulated.23 0  As a leading
commentator summarized:
Even when it is accepted that a judge's impartiality is
to be determined from the standpoint of the fictitious
"reasonable person," rather than from that of the
judge or a party litigant or its counsel, problems may
and often do arise in determining precisely who this
so-called "reasonable person is, and how she would
determine an appearance of bias or impropriety." 2 3 1
Note that the inquiry described in this treatise is filtered
through a single reasonable person that purports to represent what
any and all reasonable lay observers would conclude. In a world of
varying opinions, this standard seems hopelessly outmoded. It is a
little like attempting to intuit what the mythical reasonable person
will conclude regarding deficit spending, tax rates, universal health
care, or the Obama presidency. On issues like these, the public is
230. See FLAMM, supra note 14, § 5.1 at 104 (noting that standard for
disqualification based on reasonable question as to impartiality is "an objective
one, pursuant to which recusal is called for whenever a judge's impartiality might
reasonably be questioned by a disinterested observer") (citations omitted); JAMES
J. ALFINI ET AL., supra note 14, § 4.04 at 4-11 ("The test for an appearance of
partiality is meant to be an objective standard, that is, whether an objective,
disinterested observer fully informed of the relevant facts would entertain a
significant doubt that the judge in question was impartial. This is objective in the
sense that the standard is filtered through the eyes of a reasonable observer, rather
than through the subjective view of the judge in question.") (citations omitted).
Accord, Tyler v. Purkett, 413 F.3d 696, 704 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating that test for
disqualification "asks whether, from the perspective of 'the average person on the
street,' a reasonable man knowing all the circumstances 'would harbor doubts
about the judge's impartiality'); Higganbotham v. Okla. Transp. Comm'n., 328
F.3d 638, 645 (10th Cir. 2003) (same proposition); United States v. Wilderson,
208 F.3d 794, 797 (9th Cir. 2000) (same proposition); Pepsico, Inc. v. McMillen,
764 F.2d 458, 460 (7th Cir. 1985) (same proposition).
Implicit in these treatise summaries and the prevailing case law is the notion
that the yardstick for this inquiry is a hypothetical, reasonable, disinterested,
adequately informed lay observer who represents the entire populace. There is no
mention of the possibility of division among objective lay observers or
consideration of a substantial minority view. Rather, the unspoken assumption is
that all reasonable observers can only see the disqualification issue one way-as
either a case where the judge's impartiality is questionable or a case where it is
not.
231. FLAMM, supra note 14, § 5.7, at 130 (citations omitted).
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deeply divided. Although we each may have our favored positions
on these matters, can it really be said that those with whom we
disagree are unreasonable? In effect, we do something like this
under current disqualification practice by embracing the fallacy that
there will be consensus or supermajority agreement on all matters of
recusal and then relegating any potential disagreement to the
category of the unreasonable.
The current implicit operational definition to policing judicial
neutrality is almost doomed to failure in the modem-post-modem
world of diverse communities, differing ideologies, varied
backgrounds, and competing ideologies that often color perceptions
of neutrality. Even in cases as extreme as Justice Benjamin's refusal
to recuse in Caperton despite benefiting from $3 million of political
support from someone involved in the case23 2 -- the archetypical
"extreme" case envisioned by Professor Geyh 233-has its defenders.
The defenses may vary, but collectively there is a non-trivial
segment of society that appears to see nothing wrong with Justice
Benjamin's behavior, 234 and a larger group (including four Supreme
Court Justices) that is willing to allow such behavior notwithstanding
the awful appearance. 2 35
Against this backdrop of a segmented society,
disqualification law is unduly constricted if the legal system adopts
(even implicitly) the notion that there must be broad consensus
approaching uniformity before it may deem a situation one that
raises a reasonable question as to a judge's impartiality. The system
begins with a presumption of judicial impartiality that, although not
as strong as in Blackstone's time, remains quite vigorous.236 Added
to this presumption is some inevitable lack of transparency. 237
232. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2256 (2009)
(Robert, C.J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, JJ.).
233. Geyh, supra note 6, at 676.
234. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Playing Forty Questions, supra note 142, at 4
(noting that although Caperton holds that disqualification was widely praised, a
significant number of commentators, including The Wall Street Journal, The
Tampa Tribune, and the Las Vegas Review-Journal, opposed disqualification and
supported the dissenters).
235. See supra text accompanying notes 1, 39 (reviewing the Caperton
decision and the 5-4 division of the Supreme Court).
236. See supra text accompanying notes 197-205 (highlighting the
persistence of pernicious version of duty to sit doctrine).
237. See supra text accompanying notes 193-95 (noting the cryptic nature
of many recusal decisions).
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Society and the legal profession can seldom know what a judge
really thinks about people, companies, situations, and the world,
238
unless the judge is unusually loose-lipped. Beyond this, judges,
like everyone else, are subject to unconscious attitudes that may
undermine their neutrality. 239 Additionally, when assessing recusal
motions directed at them, judges deciding these motions are gripped
by cognitive traits that reduce their ability to assess themselves fairly
and accurately.240 When assessing recusal motions directed at
colleagues, judges remain subject to these and other cognitive and
sociological traits that make for under-enforcement of the
impartiality norm.241
Under these circumstances, insisting on something
approaching consensus before deciding that the appearance standard
has been met is a prescription for unduly weak disqualification law.
Rather, the legal system's notion of when reasonable questions as to
impartiality exists must expand to match the reality of illusive
consensus. Instead of insisting that every "reasonable" observer
harbor questions as to impartiality in order to trigger disqualification,
we should find the standard met whenever a substantial segment of
the reasonable public would harbor doubts about a challenged
judge's impartiality.
My rough stab at operationalizing this notion would look
something like this. Judges deciding recusal motions cannot, as a
practical matter, conduct a plebiscite or public opinion survey. Even
if it was possible logistically and financially, getting the electorate or
the respondents adequately informed would be nearly impossible.
Often, the facts surrounding a recusal motion are too numerous,
detailed, or subtle to adequately communicate to outsiders with any
efficacy. Judges are necessarily reduced to conducting a thought
experiment as to how the hypothetical informed layperson would
react to a potential disqualification scenario.
In conducting this thought experiment, however, judges
should not be imagining whether every observer would harbor
238. See supra text accompanying notes 93-99 (noting the difficulty in
knowing degree to which judge may harbor bias or prejudice).
239. See supra text accompanying notes 23-27 (discussing human tendency
toward unconscious bias or prejudice).
240. See supra text accompanying notes 30-32 (discussing judges' tendency
toward cognitive error in evaluating their own abilities).
241. See supra text accompanying note 23 (describing cognitive constraints
affecting judges' assessments of colleagues' conduct).
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questions about the judge's impartiality or even whether a majority
would have reasonable questions regarding judicial neutrality.
Rather, the judge should be asking whether a substantial segment of
the public would have such doubts. Although there is no magic
figure for this inquiry (at least not one I would advance at this time),
my instinctive view is that if twenty-five to thirty-five percent of
observers would question a judge's impartiality, the judge should
step aside.
I set out this rough standard by reference to the common
practice of democratic societies in establishing supermajority
standards for decision in matters of great importance. For most
government decision-making, even for many important matters, a
simple majority rules. John F. Kennedy, Richard Nixon, George H.
W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush won presidential
elections by relatively small or even razor-thin margins. Neither
Clinton nor the younger Bush was supported by a majority of those
243
voting. But nonetheless, all were accepted as legitimate winners
by the vast bulk of the body politic and, to state the obvious, all
obtained unquestioned executive authority.
But in a number of areas, American political society has long
demanded supermajorities for decision-making deemed particularly
important or otherwise subject to special circumstances. The United
States Constitution may be amended only if the proposed
amendment is supported bl two-thirds of Congress and ratified by
three-quarters of the states. Presidential vetoes may be overridden
only with a two-thirds vote of both houses of Congress.245 Treaties
242. See President, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 7, 1996, at 4 (showing that in 1988
George Bush, Sr. won by a little over seven million votes-approximately 7.8%;
in 1992 Bill Clinton won by 5.8 million votes-approximately 6.9%; in 1996 Bill
Clinton won by a margin of 7.7 million votes-approximately 9%); Eric Black,
The 2004 Election in Historical Context, STAR TRIB., Dec. 13, 2004, at 5A
(discussing that in 2000 George W. Bush had .5% less of the popular vote than Al
Gore but received five additional electoral college votes; in 2004 George W. Bush
won by 2.9% of the popular vote); Philip E. Converse, Angus Campbell, Warren
E. Miller & Donald E. Stokes, Stability and Change in 1960: A Reinstating
Election, 55 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 269, 275 (1961) ("Popular vote tallies show that
Kennedy received 49.8 percent of the two-party vote outside of the South and 51.2
percent of the popular vote case in the South."). See generally J. CLARK ARCHER,
ET AL., HISTORICAL ATLAS OF U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 1788-2004 (2005).
243. ARCHER, supra note 242, at 1788-2004.
244. U.S. CONST. art. V.
245. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
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must be ratified by two-thirds of the U.S. Senate. 246  Although a
president may be impeached by a majority vote of the House of
Representatives, 247 he may only be convicted by a two-thirds vote of
248the Senate. Senate matters can be thwarted by a forty percent
minority through use of the filibuster, which requires sixty votes for
cloture and a vote on the merits of the matter.24 9
Analogously, many states have similar rules in their state
constitutions 0 while many cities have supermajority requirements
for charter amendment. 25 1 Many private organizations take a similar
attitude toward important decision-making. For example,
corporations frequently require a supermajority of sixty to seventy-
five percent support for changes to bylaws or removal of officers or
246. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
247. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
248. U.S. CONST. art I, § 3.
249. Standing Rules of the Senate, H.R. Doc. No. 102-9, at 16 (2007);
RICHARD S. BETH, VALERIE HEITSHUSEN, & BETSY PALMER, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., RL30360, FILIBUSTERS AND CLOTURE IN THE SENATE 2 (2011).
250. See OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 33 (two-thirds vote of legislature required
to override governor's veto); R.I. CONST. art. IX, § 14 (same); NEV. CONST. art. 4,
§ 35 (same); see also Elmer Cornwell, Constitutionalism in Rhode Island:
Continuity of Colonial Design, in THE CONSTITUTIONALISM OF AMERICAN STATES
565, 573 (George E. Connor & Christopher W. Hammons eds., 2010) (stating that
Rhode Island requires three-fifths vote to override veto); Ronald M. Peters, Jr. &
Michael K. Avery, Oklahoma's Statutory Constitution, in THE
CONSTITUTIONALISM OF AMERICAN STATES 565, 573 (George E. Connor &
Christopher W. Hammons eds., 2010) (noting that the Oklahoma constitution
requires three-fourths vote of legislature to initiate new taxes or raise income
taxes).
251. See EUGENE MCQUILLIN, 4 THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §
13.31.20 (3d ed. 2010) ("Acts regarded as of more than ordinary importance may
require a two-thirds vote, or in some cases considered of greater public interest a
three-fourths vote, of the local legislative body; for example, in event of
remonstrance on the part of property owners, where they are required to pay for
the contemplated improvement by local assessment or special tax, or in case of
proposed restrictions in the use of real property, as so-called zoning regulations.
Other examples are to remove an officer, expel a member, or to vacate a street. To
accomplish certain things, even a greater vote, such as four-fifths, may be
prescribed; e.g., to expend money for extraordinary purposes, as to celebrate some
notable event of general or local interest. Where protest of a specified percentage
of the owners of property likely to be affected is made, sometimes a unanimous
vote is exacted; and such a vote is sometimes required to alter a zoning district or
to change a highway grade.") See also LAS VEGAS MUN. CODE §19.06.090(l)(6)
(describing three-fourths vote requirement for designating a historic district if there
is community objection).
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252directors. Many law schools (including my own at UNLV)
require a two-thirds vote for hiring or for tenure and promotion.253
Retention election systems for state court judges sometimes require
254
more than a majority vote in favor of retaining a judge.
Reviewing these longstanding practices in politics, academia,
and business, one is left with the general feeling that our system
strives to ensure that particularly important matters enjoy more than
mere majority support, with the two-third figure frequently cropping
up. My hypothesis is that public confidence in the impartiality of
judges is a sociopolitical value on a par with constitutional
amendment, treaty confirmation, important hiring and retention
matters, or changes to organizational rules. Applying society's
implicit calculus, I posit that the public and profession should be
confident-to at least a two-thirds level-that adjudication outcomes
do not involve judges hampered by reasonable questions regarding
impartiality. If something approaching a third of the profession or
public harbors such questions, the adjudicatory outcome does not
sufficiently enjoy the confidence of the profession or the public.
252. See WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYC. L., PRIVATE CORPS. §
4209.10 (2011) ("Supermajority voting and quorum requirements can be
cumbersome. Nevertheless, shareholders in closely held corporations frequently
choose them to protect their interest, and directors in publicly traded corporations
will adopt them to help fend off takeover bids."); Id. at §5760.10 ("State
corporations codes generally allow shareholders to impose supermajority quorum
or voting requirements on themselves, either in the articles of incorporation or in
the bylaws if the articles of incorporation authorize such bylaws.")
253. See, e.g., William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada Las
Vegas, Bylaws art. 2.6 (Nov. 19, 2010) (requiring a two-thirds vote for faculty
hiring and amendments to bylaws); William S. Boyd School of Law, University of
Nevada Las Vegas, Substantive Standards and Procedural Guidelines for
Promotion and Tenure §§ IV(B)( & IV(D) (Feb. 2010) (requiring a two-thirds vote
for promotion from assistant professor to associate professor and from associate
professor to full professor).
254. See, e.g., N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 33A (57% required for retention); ILL.
CONST. art. 6 § 12(d) (60% required for retention). Nevada's proposed merit
selection system, which failed to obtain the necessary two-thirds vote for a state
constitutional amendment, would have required a 55% vote for retention. But see
Sarah Elizabeth Saucedo, Note, Majority Rules Except in New Mexico:
Constitutional and Policy Concerns Raised by New Mexico's Supermajority
Requirement for Judicial Retention, 86 B.U. L. REv. 173, 177-78 (2006) ("In all
but two of the states that employ some form of merit selection followed by
retention elections, judges are required to garner only a bare majority of the vote
(i.e., more then 50%) to remain in office.").
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Consequently, judges should order recusal whenever that confidence
level is unmet.
One can make a good case that a three-quarters or seventy-
five percent rule is superior to my proposed two-thirds rule.
Perhaps. But for now, I would be satisfied to see the legal system
move away from the current notion that there is an insufficient
question about impartiality in the absence of uniform shock or
rioting in the streets regarding a failure to disqualify. Further,
imposing a supermajority rule regarding public perception could
cause excessive administrative problems by making recusal too
common and excessively empowering a relatively small minority of
observers. Even long-established and logical supermajority rules are
subject to the criticism that they can lead to de facto minority
tyranny. Requiring recusal when less than thirty percent of the
hypothetical reasonable audience has doubts could give an
unrepresentative group excessive power.
Even if the judge is in fact neutral and even if a majority of
observers perceive no reasonable question as to impartiality, the
legal system should not be conducting adjudications about which
one-third of the public has serious concerns regarding fairness.
Public confidence is unduly undermined as is the confidence of the
system's participants: litigants; their constituents (e.g., taxpayers
and corporate shareholders); interested parties (e.g., the investment
and banking communities); lawyers; witnesses (to the extent they are
aware of the issue); court and government staff (including law
enforcement personnel frequently in contact with adjudication); and
other judges (who over time will slouch toward weaker recusal
practice themselves after witnessing adjudication where such large
segments of the community have doubts about judicial neutrality).
An obvious objection to my "substantial group of doubters"
trigger for recusal is that it seems inconsistent with the traditional
legal view that community sentiment is to be measured through the
vessel of a single objectively reasonable person. This standard,
however, although useful in many areas of law such as determining
negligence in tort, is both unrealistic and unattainable in many
instances. Perhaps more important, the legal system's use of the
reasonable person standard for substantive law usually carries with it
an automatic mini-plebiscite in the form of a jury determination. In
effect, the jury as mini-society decides whether given conduct is
reasonable. No similar controlled public feedback takes place
regarding judicial failure to recuse unless the matter results in
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appellate review after final order or through mandamus, becomes
salient in an election, or is sufficiently egregious to trigger
impeachment or corruption challenges.255 Rather, under current
practice, the trial judge decides disqualification questions in a
unilateral vacuum, subject to limited review by an electorate of three
appellate judges inclined to defer to a colleague under the abuse of
discretion standard and harmless error review.
Another undoubted objection to my standard for triggering
appearance-based disqualification is that it can be characterized as a
heckler's veto in which the views of a small minority thwart the
larger public interest. Obviously, my suggestion would not create a
classic "heckler's veto," as Professor Harry Kalven used the term.256
255. One potential counter-argument to my view that a substantial
minority's concerns should satisfy the reasonable question standard is that the
system regularly allows a single judge to determine that no reasonable person
could find facts sufficient to support a party's claims and therefore grants summary
judgment. As discussed below (see infra text accompanying notes 256-60), cases
like Scott v. Harris and the cognitive illiberalism problem make suspect much of
the modem rationale favoring a "strong," more jury-displacing approach to
summary judgment suspect. See generally Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted
Mirror: The Supreme Court's Shimmering View of Summary Judgment, Directed
Verdict, and the Value of Adjudication, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 159-81 (1988)
(arguing that the shift in this direction by the U.S. Supreme Court's 1986 trilogy of
summary judgment decisions was insufficiently sensitive to the possibility of law
disagreement); Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts on
Summary Judgment, 100 Yale L.J. 73, 108-14 (1990) (presenting a similar
criticism of trilogy cases).
Even if these concerns are misplaced (and I think, if anything, the judiciary
has been too dismissive of academic criticisms of the modern trend toward greater
use of summary judgment), the fact remains that the judge granting summary
judgment is nonetheless looking to establish that there is not a single reasonable
law observer who could find the material, legally controlling facts undisputed. If
there is even a small perceived minority who might find the light red rather than
green or who might characterize conduct as unreasonable rather than legally
permissible, the court is supposed to deny summary judgment, at least if it is
following the rules. But see Stempel, supra note 14, at 343 (noting that forty
percent of trial court summary judgments are reversed, hardly a very comforting
tract record for trial judges if in fact they are following the rules regarding
determination of a genuine factual issue).
256. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Harry Kalven, Jr., in ROGER K. NEWMAN, THE
YALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW 305 (2009) (noting that
Kalven invented the term "heckler's veto" to describe circumstances in which
government stifled speech due to objections of some in a potential audience and
that terms such as heckler's veto and "public forum"-also invented by Kalven-
[Vol. 30:4816
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-I would require a substantial segment of the community to have
nontrivial and reasonable concerns about a judge's impartiality as a
prerequisite to recusal. A single person or even a fairly significant
minority group would not be enough to command disqualification
unless their numbers amounted to something approaching a third of
the public (and their concerns about impartiality had sufficient
intellectual rigor, a qualifier discussed in more detail below).
Although there is of course some diminution of judicial
legitimacy whenever there is any question among any persons
regarding a judge's neutrality, an inevitable corollary to the
contemporary pluralistic world is that there will almost always be
some people who are not only dissatisfied with adjudication
outcomes but who also question the bona fides of the adjudicator
with whom they disagree. This "tail" of public or legal community
sentiment cannot be permitted to wag the metaphorical "dog" of
sound recusal practice and effective court administration.
Under my proposed triggering point, there must be a
sufficiently large group of doubters regarding impartiality and their
doubts must be, in the minds of the adjudicator, sufficiently
reasonable that they cannot be dismissed as the ravings of the lunatic
fringe, even where it is a relatively large fringe. There must be at
least colorable concerns regarding a judge's impartiality and they
must be shared by a sufficiently substantial segment of the legal
community or the public before a judge must recuse. Unlike the
status quo's implicit standard of a single, unrealistically uniform
view regarding neutrality, or Professor Geyh's notion of rough
consensus of at least a majority of doubters required to force
disqualification, my proposal would set a more realistic and more
frequently met standard, resulting in somewhat more judicial
disqualification.
In my view (which I admit will not be universally shared in a
pluralistic legal community), this move toward a more easily pulled
trigger and more disqualification will enhance actual and perceived
fairness at minimal cost to the system. The legal community need
not agree on precisely what triggers the reasonable-question-
regarding-impartiality standard in all circumstances and it need not
wait for an overwhelming community verdict on the matter. Rather,
the judicial system should look only for sufficient rational doubt
"transformed not only the language but also much thinking about First
Amendment issues").
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regarding a judge's impartiality shared by a substantial segment of
the community that is based on nonfrivolous grounds. With this
yardstick, the appearance standard becomes sufficiently vigorous to
catch current non-disqualification falling through gaps in the wall of
procedural protections endorsed by most commentators and also
generally moves the bench toward disqualification in close cases
rather than excessively clinging to initial case assignments of judges.
My suggestion has at least the implicit intellectual support in
the emerging notion that the judicial system must be wary of
"cognitive illiberalism" among judges. The term is most associated
with an important law review article criticizing the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Scott v. Harris,257 in which the court affirmed
summary judgment for police officer defendants in a suit brought by
a plaintiff injured in a high-speed car chase.258 With only Justice
Stevens in dissent, 259 the Court found that there was no genuine
dispute of material fact regarding the police actions in conducting the
chase and intercepting the plaintiff-suspect (which resulted in his car
hitting a tree and severe injury).260 The Court reached this near-
consensus on the basis of a trailing police cruiser's video of the
chase, which the Court found so persuasive it posted it on the
Court's website for all to see.261
Taking the Court's invitation, Professors Dan Kahan, David
Hoffman and Donald Barman conducted a survey in which
respondents viewed the tape and expressed their opinions as to the
reasonableness of the police behavior.262 Although a clear majority
of the viewers agreed with the Court majority that the tape revealed
the plaintiff creating a dangerous situation justifying the police
interception of his flight, a substantial minority of viewers disputed
this or at least had doubts regarding the propriety of the police
263
action. Further, a substantial segment of the substantial minority
257. Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v.
Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARVARD L. REV. 837, 838
(2009).
258. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 374-75 (2007).
259. Id. at 389 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
260. Id. at 381-86.
261. Id. at 378 n.5.
262. See Kahan et al., supra note 257, at 841-43 (detailing how respondents
were shown police videotape of car chase at issue in Scott v. Harris and asked to
categorize police conduct as reasonable or unreasonable).
263. See id. at 865-68 (emphasizing that majority of those viewing the
videotape agreed with Scott v. Harris that fleeing suspect created dangerous
8 18 [ Vol. 3 0:4
HeinOnline  -- 30 Rev. Litig. 818 2010-2011
APPEARANCE STANDARD
were African-American, perhaps reflecting their personal or their
community's past interactions with law enforcement. 264
Professor Kahan and his co-authors labeled the Court
majority's inability to even imagine that reasonable persons could
view the tape in a way different than its own as "cognitive
illiberalism. 2 65 The term has caught on and was labeled by the New
266York Times as one of the "big ideas" of 20092. In the roughly
eighteen months that the study has been in the public domain, it has
already been cited more than seventy-five times in scholarly law
journals267 and mentioned prominently in popular news accounts. 26 8
Even before the phenomenon was given its catchy moniker, viewers
of adjudication had long observed that too much judicial decision-
making proceeds on the judge's notion (or the panel's or Supreme
Court's notion) that no sane person could view the case in any other
way than does the deciding court.269
Obviously, this sort of empirical certainty is incorrect. The
judiciary itself demonstrates this again and again when judges
themselves disagree regarding what is "negligent" or "material" or
"ambiguous." The Kahan study of the Scott v. Harris video
demonstrates that even when there is widespread consensus among a
situation justifying police bumping maneuver, but that one-third disagreed and saw
no such exigent circumstances).
264. See id at 843-48 (responding to the Court's invitation to "see for
yourself' and concluding that the "obvious" views come from troubling
psychological bias).
265. Id. at 843. See generally Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal
State, 60 STAN. L. REv. 115 (2007).
266. See Christopher Shea, Ninth Annual Year in Ideas, N.Y. TIMES
MAGAZINE, Dec. 13, 2009, at 30, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/projects/magazine/ideas/2009/#c-1 (noting attention
gained by Kahan, et al. study and finding notion of differing impressions and
conclusions varying by viewer as one of 2009's major emerging ideas).
267. This information is based on a search of the LexisNexis Legal
Periodicals database on February 15, 2011 (search of Dan w/2 Kahan w/9 Scott
w/2 Harris).
268. See, e.g., Christopher Shea, Ninth Annual Year in Ideas, N.Y. TIMES
MAGAZINE, Dec. 13, 2009, at 30 (describing the concept of cognitive illiberalism
articulated in the Kahan article as one of the major ideas of 2009); Bruce Weber,
Umpires v. Judges, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2009, Week in Review at 1 (noting the
Kahan study and racially differential responses to the Scott v. Harris videotape);
Ben Arnoldy, In video age, a rush to judgment?, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR,
Jan. 13, 2009, at 1 (referring to the study and quoting Kahan).
269. See supra text accompanying note 255 (discussing similar issues
presented by excessive judicial enthusiasm for summary judgment).
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particular group of judges, there may be considerably more division
among other legal or lay observers.270 As a result, some greater
degree of judicial humility is required, as well as a more realistic test
for determining a reasonable question as to impartiality that does not
insist on uniformity, consensus, or even majority rule.
Presumably fearing that open acknowledgement of the
implications of differences of perception and opinion will undermine
judicial authority, courts persist in pretending that there is greater
certainty or inevitability of adjudication results than is actually the
case-but that is a topic for another day.2 71  Applied to judicial
disqualification, the import of the cognitive illiberalism concept is
that the bench must be more willing to entertain the possibility that a
judge's or appellate panel's view regarding impartiality does not
necessarily represent public consensus. It may not even represent a
majority view of the laity. Even if it does represent the majority
view, a huge proportion of the public may disagree, perhaps even
strongly, and therefore distrust any subsequent judicial outcomes
involving the judge in question. Faced with this reality in a diverse,
pluralistic society, courts should not only strengthen procedural
provisions designed to enhance judicial neutrality but also adjust
their thinking as to when the appearance standard is triggered.
In this regard, disqualification is different than adjudication
on the merits. After a decision on the merits, there is always some
disagreement and often substantial disagreement. At a minimum,
there are disappointed litigants and often other observers with similar
270. See supra notes 265-68 and accompanying text (noting that group of
observers, all presumably reasonable people, can hold variety of views in
circumstances where judge or group of judges assumed lack of such divergent
views).
271. For example, courts routinely refuse to concede that a particular
standardized contract provision is ambiguous even though courts have differed
dramatically as to the meaning of the provision. See JEFFREY W. STEMPEL,
STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS § 4.08[B] at 4-76 to 4-79 (3d. ed. 2006 &
Supp. 2010) (noting that courts almost uniformly take the position that differing
judicial constructions of identical contract or insurance policy language do not
establish the ambiguity of the language). See, e.g., EMERIC FISCHER, PETER NASH
SWISHER & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE LAW §§ 11.06,
11.11, 11.12 & 11.14 (3d ed. 2004) (reproducing and discussing cases in which
courts have taken diametrically opposing views of the very same insurance policy
language). See also Solan et al., supra note 26, at 1269 (noting that people
generally underestimate the degree to which others may disagree with their
construction of words).
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interests who are upset. For example, after a judicial ruling favoring
plaintiffs, insurers, banks, employers, or other groups likely to be
future defendants in such cases typically criticize the decision and at
a minimum warn of its implications for the future. After a decision
in favor of any of these groups, workers, unions, policyholders, or
borrowers may make countervailing criticisms. The public may be
similarly divided, with these divergent groups waging public
relations campaigns as part of an effort to influence judges and
prospective jurors.
Notwithstanding society's commitment to the "rule of law,"
this sort of disagreement is tolerable except to the extent it is
intertwined with more troublesome lobbying efforts, such as
runaway spending on judicial election campaigns. At least in normal
circumstances, the legal profession and society accept that after
adjudication, there will be winners and losers. So long as the process
is perceived as sufficiently fair, adjudicative decisions are accepted,
even by those working to reverse or revise them, and society finds
the rule of law upheld. But where there is a substantial, serious
question about a judge's impartiality, the legal community and the
public's acceptance of the decision is imperiled. This in turn
requires a more sensitive approach to judicial disqualification than
has historically prevailed.272
Because the financial and logistical costs of a more vigorous
approach to recusal are relatively low, my proposed fine-tuning of
the reasonable-question-as-to-impartiality test also passes cost-
benefit analysis. Although some may complain about the perceived
cost of transferring cases and making available a new judge after a
successful challenge to the initially assigned judge,273 there simply is
272. Considerable work by social scientists suggests that people have a
strong desire for procedural justice that may equal or surpass their desire for
substantive justice and fairness. Research suggests that where disputants feel they
have enjoyed a chance to be sufficiently heard by a neutral, respectful decision-
maker, they are inclined to accept even adverse substantive outcomes without
much complaint. See generally Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, Procedural
Justice, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAW 65, 68-69 (Joseph Sanders
& V. Lee Hamilton eds. 2001) (stating that parties to disputes are likely to accept
tribunal's resolution of dispute as legitimate if they have been accorded respectful
opportunity to be heard before a decision-maker perceived as neutral); E. Allan
Lind & Tom R. Tyler, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988)
(same).
273. See, e.g., Las Vegas Downtown Redev. Agency v. Dist. Court, 5 P.3d
1059, 1060-62 (Nev. 2000) (requiring judge that had disqualified himself on a
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not much staff time and money required to effect a substitution of
judges, particularly if recusal takes place during the early stages of
274litigation. Under my proposed triggering point, the already
existing costs of disputing recusal will decrease as the bench is
relieved of the need to search for certainty of community opinion or
case because of receipt of campaign contributions from litigants to retain the case,
in part because the judge's recusal had triggered a "chain" of additional recusals
when the next two judges to whom the case was assigned disqualified themselves
on this basis; expressing concern that disqualification under this standard will
make staffing of cases difficult and impose undue costs on the system).
A three-link chain is fairly short and reflects the degree to which courts may
tend to overstate the burdens of expanded disqualification doctrine. In a case like
Las Vegas Downtown, the administrative costs of upholding judicial
disqualification due to receipt of campaign funds would be low. It simply does not
take much of a court clerk's time to move a file from one office to another. Even
if most of the district's thirty judges were disqualified, this would still require
perhaps a half-day or so of a court worker's time (estimating fifteen minutes or so
to transfer a file from chambers to chambers) as well as some limited judicial time
considering and ruling on the motion (likely to be short because the inquiry is
fairly simple and objective). Although this cost may not be trivial, neither is it
enough of a burden to justify a failure to recuse if there is a serious question about
judicial impartiality.
In cases like this and others involving important commercial interests in
litigation (in this case, several casino companies were interested in the
redevelopment project that was the subject of the case), the perceived problem
(based on what attorneys and judges involved in the case have said to me
privately) is fear that a culture of disqualification based on any campaign
contribution holds the potential to spur a culture of excessively easy recusal and a
rash of disqualifications inconsistent with ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct
Rule 2.7, as judges in an elected system routinely attempt to duck cases in which
there is the potential for alienating useful friends or making powerful enemies. In
this situation, there may indeed be a justification for what I have termed the
"benign" concept of the duty to sit. See Stempel, Chief William's Ghost, supra
note 40, at 818-25, 933-35.
274. It appears that the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
and state court administrators do not maintain data regarding the costs specifically
arising from transfer of cases between judges after disqualification of the initially
assigned judges. Logically, however, the cost cannot be large. Such transfers,
unless voluminous, are unlikely to require the hiring of additional court staff.
Existing staff are expected to perform assigned duties in a reasonably expeditious
manner and are generally salaried employees who do not receive overtime pay
should they stay later than 5 p.m. or work weekends, which is seldom done in any
event. Although there is undoubtedly some internalized expense or opportunity
cost when court workers transfer a file rather than perform another task, no
opponent of strong disqualification practice appears to have set forth any price tag
occasioned by more aggressive recusal practice.
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ascertain with some care whether a majority of the community
harbors doubts as to impartiality. In return for this modest increase
in judicial system resources already spent on disqualification, the
system receives greater guarantees of impartiality and greater
confidence in the fairness of adjudication.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW APPROACH FOR POLITICALLY AND
IDEOLOGICALLY BASED APPEARANCES OF PARTIALITY
Adoption of my suggested modification of prevailing notions
of when reasonable question as to impartiality exists will in general
shift disqualification law in the direction of greater protection for
neutrality without creating wholesale new categories of
disqualification. One possible exception, however, is the possibility
that my substantive approach to recusal may require greater
imposition of disqualification based on judges' political and
ideological activities. As discussed in Part I.B. above, it is inevitable
that judges come to the bench with prevailing attitudes about the law,
the world, economics, and politics. We accept this as the price for
having educated, intelligent people on the bench. But we should be
unwilling to accept judicial participation in cases where the judge
has been involved in activity that a substantial portion of the public
regards as excessively partisan or ideological. This participation,
under my yardstick, raises a reasonable question as to impartiality.
Such activity is not only unseemly for judges but also may make
them excessively committed to results favored by affiliated persons
or organizations, thereby undermining the aspiration of neutrality for
judges notwithstanding that judges often or even usually come to the
bench as liberals, conservatives, Republicans, or Democrats.
Separating mere judicial preference from inappropriate
judicial ties to political and interest group activity presents difficult
issues of line-drawing. Two recent episodes illustrate the problem.
Most recently, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia was
booked as a speaker at a "Conservative Constitutional Seminar"
sponsored by the Tea Party.275 As the New York Times put it with
some understatement, it "was a bad idea for him to accept this
275. Editorial, Justice Scalia and the Tea Party, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 18, 2010,
at WK7, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/19/opinion/19sun3.html.
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invitation."276 At least I hope most every member of the legal
profession will agree that being a featured speaker at an avowedly
political and partisan organization's event extolling a particular
jurisprudential philosophy with a heavy dose of result orientation is a
bad idea. In addition, this behavior from Justice Scalia, who has a
history of some arguable lapses of judgment regarding
disqualification-and a tendency to extreme defensiveness when
challenged about it-is troublesome. 27 7
Justice Scalia's combativeness regarding his elbow-rubbing
with the right wing of American politics goes beyond simple bad
behavior. At a minimum, it raises nontrivial concern for many that
he approaches the Court's pending docket with a political or
ideological agenda tied to that of groups like the Tea Party or entities
like the Bush-Cheney Administration. This goes beyond merely
having a world view when coming to the bench. It instead smacks of
a justice willing and proud to carry adjudicative water for these
278groups, entities, or persons.
276. Id. But see Richard Eisenberg, If You Speak Up, Must You Stand
Down: Caperton and its Limits, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1287, 1302-21 (2010)
(suggesting that public utterances of judges should ordinarily not be grounds for
recusal).
277. See Stempel, Chief William's Ghost, supra note 40, at 900-09
(describing Justice Scalia's now-infamous duck hunting with former Vice
President Dick Cheney while a case against Cheney was pending before the Court,
and other instances of arguably inappropriate behavior); Monroe H. Freedman,
Duck-Blind Justice: Justice Scalia's Memorandum in the Cheney Case, 18 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHics 229, 229-30 (2004) (excoriating Justice Scalia's defense of his
failure to recuse); Timothy J. Goodson, Duck, Duck, Goose: Hunting for Better
Recusal Practices in the United States Supreme Court in Light of Cheney v. United
States District Court, 84 N.C. L. REv. 181, 183-84 (2005) (criticizing Scalia's
failure to recuse and his defense).
278. The Scalia Tea Party star turn recurred in a slightly different form when
he was booked for what was originally planned as a private question-and-answer
session with the Tea Party Caucus in Congress, a group largely comprised of more
conservative elements of the Republican rank-and-file and whose principal public
face has been outspoken conservative Representative Michelle Bachman (R-
Minn.). See generally Nina Totenberg, Justice Scalia Speaks to Tea Party Caucus,
Democrats, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.npr.org/
2011/01/25/133195963/scalia-speaks (reporting Scalia's appearance at Tea Party
cause was relatively brief and included question-and-answer session; noting that
although initially planned as private, it was opened to the press after complaints
and concern that in the absence of media coverage, speculation could ensue about
the Justice's statements as pre-commitments on issues pending before the Court).
Representative Bachman gave the Tea Party Caucus response to President
824 [Vol. 30:4
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Just as seriously, the act of traveling or affiliating with, or
appearing before particular political or ideological entities poses
significant risk that the jurist involved becomes, by virtue of this
involvement, less able to view their causes with sufficient neutrality.
Substantial socio-psychological research suggests that when
someone takes action or publically expresses a view, they become
more wedded to that view. 279
Obama's State of the Union address, which was viewed by at least one
commentator as upstaging the Republican Party's official response delivered by
Representative Paul Ryan (R-Wis.). See generally Frank Rich, The Tea Party
Wags the Dog, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2011, Week in Review at 8, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/30/opinion/30rich.html (describing the State of
the Union and responses as well as expressing opinion regarding media reaction to
Bachman response). As discussed below, this appearance can be differentiated
from the other Tea Party event, particularly after the sponsors invited others to
attend. It nonetheless raises concerns.
The problem with either event goes beyond appearances and is heightened
when a jurist appears before an ideological group as a featured speaker. The
Justice may have made statements reflecting a pre-commitment to particular case
outcomes that would make his continued participation in some matters
inappropriate. Although this can, of course, occur over dinner with a friend or
during family conversation, I accept that, much as I would like, certain windows
into the potentially prejudiced soul of a judge are simply closed as a practical
matter. Nevertheless, the recusal regime of American courts needs to be more
sensitive to the prospect that judges in private sessions with interest groups may
make inappropriate pre-commitments on issues.
As a practical matter, one cannot realistically insist that judges give up
interactions with friends or family that pose some dangers of undermining
impartiality. However, we can insist that judges forgo speaking gigs and honoraria
opportunities which pose such risks. Judging is supposed to be a full-time job.
Judges hardly have a "right" to make star turns at political party functions or attend
lavish retreats or summer law seminars in Europe. To the extent that a significant
portion of the body politic finds these extracurricular activities to pose too great a
threat to judicial impartiality, the legal system logically should prohibit such
outings.
Although there is undoubtedly some benefit in having a judge or justice
preside over a legal seminar in one of the great capitals of Europe, it is by no
means clear that the students and sponsoring institution would not do as well or
better with another instructor while eliminating the risk that the jurist will be
inappropriately lobbied or influenced on an issue in that private setting. By
contrast, when Judge Richard Posner writes a book, he does so in the solitude of
his home or chambers, and the resulting product is in plain public view should
anyone wish to use it as a basis for a disqualification motion.
279. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 15, at 55-60 (noting that
respondents tend to agree with prior opinions consistently expressed by others
even when experiment has been structured so that prior opinions or statements are
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The arguably harder question is whether such episodes might
provide a basis for recusal. Under the current status quo and the
implicit Geyh view requiring consensus or a strong majority opinion
to trigger reasonable-question-as-to-impartiality review, the answer
fairly clearly is that such behavior by sitting judges, although
280
regrettable, is probably not ground for disqualification. Where a
clearly incorrect; such "[c]onformity experiments have been replicated and
extended in more than 130 experiments from seventeen countries"); ROBERT
CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE 52 (4th ed. 2000) (explaining that
initial decision on a question or issue makes it more likely that same decision will
be made if issue is subsequently presented); Soloman Asch, Opinions and Social
Pressure, in READINGS ABOUT THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 13, 17-26 (Elliot Aronson ed.,
1995) (observing that people dislike holding views or taking positions at odds with
those of peers); see also TOBIAS J. MOSKOWITZ & L. JON WERTHEIM,
SCORECASTING: THE HIDDEN INFLUENCES BEHIND How SPORTS ARE PLAYED AND
GAMES ARE WON 157-59 (2011) (discussing conformity bias and socio-
psychological research identifying the trait in people). See generally LEE Ross &
RICHARD NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION (1991) (arguing that people
seek to be consistent and adhere to prior determinations made).
See also supra notes 22-43 and accompanying text regarding cognitive biases
generally. For example, a judge who appears before an interest group and
expresses views favored by the interest group has arguably established a status quo
consistent with that interest group's agenda. The judge may then be in at least the
partial grip of a status quo bias favoring that interest group as the status quo of his
or her thinking on an issue. In addition, the judge is now particularly aware of the
interest group's position on legal issues, which may make the judge's future
adjudicative thinking more vulnerable to the availability heuristic.
To some extent, this is common sense. We have all had the experience of
seeing a person take a public position on an issue (in a political campaign, in a
faculty meeting, at work, in court) and then later cling to that position out of pride
or defensiveness even as further developments make the position appear unwise.
Judges should as a general rule avoid putting themselves in situations where this
phenomenon is likely to occur.
280. See Totenberg, supra note 278 (discussing how by the evening of the
Scalia story's revelation, "there appeared to be more fizzle than sizzle to the
charge of unseemly partisanship by a Supreme Court justice"). See also FLAMM,
supra note 14, at § 10.4, (discussing how political affiliations of a judge alone
rarely compel recusal); id. at § 10.5 (discussing how institutional affiliations of a
judge rarely support recusal); id. at § 10.7 (discussing how a judge's ideological or
public policy views rarely support recusal); id. at § 9 (discussing how political
connections to a judge are generally not a sufficient basis for recusal unless the tie
is particularly close); id. at § 8 (discussing how social relationships, unless
particularly close, tend not to result in disqualification); id. at § 7.8 (discussing
how formal business or financial relationships may warrant disqualification but
informal acquaintance due to prior business activity generally does not). But see
In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764, 781-84 (3d Cir. 1992) (requiring judge's
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judge makes appearances to a range of groups, the conventional
wisdom lines up even more strongly against recusal.28 1 Perhaps the
current mainstream does not even see these episodes as regrettable.
"There's nothing wrong with it," according to one prominent legal
ethics expert, 282 while another saw it as a healthy exercise in civic
education: "I think this is a good thing. I think it should be done
maybe monthly, with a quiz at the end."
Notwithstanding the tongue-in-cheek tone of the last
comment, the norm that there are no neutrality problems when
judges speak in public is in need of serious reconsideration. This
sort of insensitivity to appearances certainly strengthens the case for
expanding per se procedural tools for fostering judicial neutrality
rather than relying solely on the reasonable question as to
impartiality standard. It also raises questions about whether jurists
are devoting enough of their available energy to judging. More
troublesome are the risks, outlined above, that the judge's interaction
with the group and even the act of public speaking may create
reasonable concern over his or her impartiality.284
When the judge speaks only to interest groups of particular
stripe or to more partisan incarnations of a group, the risks of
improper appearances are increased. For example, one might excuse
a judge speaking to the Tea Party Caucus because it is composed of
recusal in asbestos cases where he attended at asbestos litigation conference
sponsored by plaintiff lawyers featuring as speakers plaintiff s expert witnesses).
To some extent, however, the possibility that the Scalia Tea Party caucus
appearance would be seen as a serious recusal concern was mitigated when "the
caucus then broadened the invitation to include Democratic members of Congress,
too . . . ." However uncomfortable the Scalia star turn may make people like me, if
the event is open to the press and on the record, this provides litigants with an
opportunity to seek recusal on the basis of the particular content of any remarks
even if the Justice takes the position that the appearance itself is not disqualifying.
In addition, one of the attending Democrats (Rep. Jan Schakowsky of Illinois)
described the Justice's remarks as "very dry," hardly good fodder for a
disqualification motion. Totenberg, supra note 278, at 283.
281. See id ("Legal ethics experts largely agreed that Scalia violated no
ethics rules, especially because he has spoken to liberal as well as conservative
groups in the past.").
282. Id. (quoting Northwestern University Law School Professor Steven
Lubet).
283. Id. (quoting New York University Law Professor Stephen Gillers).
284. One goal of judicial ethics is maintenance of public confidence, which
may be undermined where judge or justice appears to be unduly friendly with
partisan political group.
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elected governmental representatives and at least some of the Caucus
activity can be described as lawmaking despite the clear electoral
overtones. 285 One might draw the line, however, where a judge had
addressed the Tea Party organization itself, because this entity has no
mantle of government legitimacy and is engaged in more obviously
partisan electioneering. 286
Under my proposed standard of impartiality assessment, the
question of disqualification based on appearances with interest
groups is far closer than under the status quo, which implicitly
concludes that unless nearly everybody is outraged by a judicial star
turn before an interest group, there is no recusal problem. Certainly,
285. For example, when members of the Tea Party Caucus congregate at
meetings such as that attended by Justice Scalia, they presumably discuss
legislative goals that they can then further pursue in their capacity as elected
members of Congress affiliated with the Republican party that currently controls
the House of Representatives and holds significant power in the Senate.
286. See Maureen Dowd, Mad Men and Mad Women, N.Y. TIMES, April. 3,
2011, Week in Review at 10 (noting widespread influence of Tea Party on
Republican legislative activity and active collaboration and overlap of
organizational leadership). Ironically, however, Justice Scalia himself appears to
have "waived" the right to make this argument. Although he is apparently happy
to talk in private session with the Tea Party Caucus and is willing to continue
talking if Democrats are invited to the session, Justice Scalia (along with Justices
Thomas and Alito) declines to attend the President's State of the Union address,
suggesting that the official lawmaking status of the speaker or others in the
audience is of minimal import to him. See Joan Biskupic, Tensions Rise Between
Supreme Court, Politicians, USA TODAY, Jan. 15, 2011,
http://www.usatoday.com/
news/washington/juicial/2011-01-15-Rwcourtpolitics23STN.htm. (noting non-
attendance of justices at State of the Union speech, widely thought to be reaction
to President's criticism of Citizens United v. Fed. Elec. Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876
(2010) during prior year). Nonetheless, the distinction between the Tea Party itself
and its per se political events and the Tea Party Caucus is probably worth making
in assessing whether a judge's interaction with these types of groups creates a
reasonable question as to impartiality.
Notwithstanding my criticisms of Justice Scalia regarding the Tea Party and
duck hunting with Dick Cheney, he (and Justices Thomas and Alito) have it
exactly right regarding State of the Union attendance. The entire Supreme Court
should skip that party. It makes perfect sense that Congress should attend the
speech. The President is, notwithstanding his obvious public relations objectives,
attempting to outline goals for which he is attempting to enlist congressional
support. By contrast, the Court is not supposed to be any part of any political
program. It is not supposed to be part of the President's "team" and need not be
subjected to the pep rally atmosphere of the speech nor any intended or inadvertent
lobbying by any of the other attendees.
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if my proposed standard replaced that of Professor Gillers ("it should
be done maybe monthly, with a quiz)" 287 we would at least not be
praising such behavior-a long overdue step. 288  Applying this
article's proposed "substantial segment of the public raising a
colorable concern" standard, a court reviewing similar behavior by a
judge in a case implicating Tea Party interests or Tea Party political
goals would ask whether a reasonable argument can be made that
featured speaker status creates reasonable questions about the
judicial speaker's impartiality. If so, the second question is whether
a substantial segment of the public would in fact harbor doubts as to
the speaker's impartiality.
Depending on case and context, my proposed approach to
appearances disqualification could make a difference concerning
disqualification. On the easy end of the spectrum are cases where
the Tea Party itself is a litigant. Even under the current status quo
and the Geyh consensus trigger for appearance recusal, a judge in
Justice Scalia's position should now be barred from participating in
Tea Party cases, at least for a reasonable length of time after the
speaking engagement or other affiliations with the group.289
If a case arises in which the Tea Party is substantially
interested (e.g., a challenge to the election of a favored candidate),
the judge would probably be disqualified, because it is quite
reasonable to have legitimate concerns about the speaking judge's
287. Totenberg, supra note 278, at 283.
288. Professor Gillers' comment implicitly suggests that there is some great
educational gain or elevation of public policy debate and lawmaking when
Supreme Court justices interact with lawmakers (he would have both liberal and
conservative justices make these appearances). I am honestly at a loss to
understand his rationale. Is it that the legislators might learn something about
constitutional law in a twenty-minute gab session? Can the legislators not simply
read a book or law review article (or several)? Or, more realistically, don't they
have staff that can brief them on these things? Even if we accept the implicit
premise of the Gillers comment-that legislators aren't particularly voracious
readers-what is the magic in having a sitting justice or judge interact with the
legislators? Prominent liberal and conservative academics or litigators (e.g.,
Harvard Law Professor Lawrence Tribe and former Al Gore counsel David Boies
on the left, Stanford Law Professor Michael McConnell and former Bush counsel
Ted Olson on the right) could serve the bill as well or better without raising any
concerns about judicial impartiality. There simply is not enough additional payoff
from judicial involvement to warrant even a trivial risk of undermining judicial
neutrality.
289. Where the Tea Party participates as an amicus, the analysis would be
like that when a case presents legal questions of great interest to the Party.
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impartiality regarding matters near and dear to the sponsoring
organization and because a considerable portion of the community
(e.g., the New York Times, Times readers, liberals, Democrats, and
judicial ethics purists) would have questions as to such a judge's
neutrality in such situations.
More difficult are questions where a case involves an issue of
importance to the Tea Party. Litigation about the nation's deficit or
tax structure or foreign policy or something like a challenge to
Oklahoma's recent initiative barring use of Sharia law29 are
examples that might someday present themselves in real cases.
Applying the "nonfrivolous concern and substantial amount of
concern" tests to such cases is not easy. But it is no more difficult or
indeterminate than applying the current template of the mythical
single reasonable observer.
Although many will be upset if a "Judge" Scalia were to
preside over such a case, it is unlikely a clear majority would hold
this view because of popular attitudes considering adjudication to be
inevitably political and value-laden and the likely opinion of many
that the Tea Party's interests in the matter are simply too attenuated.
With my suggested lower threshold of disqualification, however, the
case is sufficiently close that it may result in disqualification that
would not take place today. If Tea Party interests are sufficiently
tied to resolution of a pending legal determination, it is not at all
frivolous for reasonable observers to question the ability of a judge
who has been a featured Tea Party speaker to be impartial in the
matter. Much of the public (more than my twenty-five to thirty-five
percent target) is likely to share this concern and feel better if the
featured speaker judge does not participate in the case.
Under my suggested approach, jurists who accept speaking
invitations or other adulation from groups with defined legal
interests and agenda would be at considerably higher risk of
disqualification than at present. This would be a positive
development. Under the status quo, jurists, as exemplified by Justice
Scalia's behavior, play fast and loose regarding appearances of
impartiality but do so with near impunity.
290. See Associated Press, Oklahoma: New Amendment Is Delayed, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 9, 2010, at A21 (noting how in November 2010, Oklahoma voters
approved a state constitutional amendment forbidding the application of "Sharia
law," international or Islamic law, by courts sitting in the state).
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More headline-grabbing than Justice Scalia's Tea Party
invitation was Judge Henry Hudson's ruling that the Obama
administration's health care reforms exceeded congressional power
under the Commerce Clause. 291 Two previous decisions had backed
the Administration in this regard and the basic constitutional law of
the situation has been relatively clear since at least Heart of Atlanta
Motel2 92 and probably since Wickard v. Filburn.293 Medical care and
medical insurance are trillion dollar industries and frequently involve
the movement of patients, providers, and equipment across state
lines. The consequences of medical care and insurance are
widespread. To a traditional constitutional lawyer, there is almost no
291. See generally Kevin Sack, Core of Health Care Law Is Rejected by
U.S. Judge: Mandatory Insurance Is Called Unconstitutional, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
14, 2010, at Al (reporting trial court ruling that mandate to buy health insurance if
not covered under employer plan exceeds scope of congressional power under the
Commerce Clause); see also Kevin Sack, Judge Hints He May Rule Against
Health Law, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2010, at A10 (describing similar litigation in
Northern District of Florida); Jason Mazzone, Can Congress Force You To Be
Healthy?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2010, at A31 (describing case and finding Judge
Hudson's rationale more defensible than many, and suggesting that a majority of
the Supreme Court may be receptive to his reasoning narrowing the reach of the
Commerce Clause).
292. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261-62
(1966) (finding Commerce Clause power sufficiently broad to support application
of federal law requiring non-discrimination in public accommodations to hotel in
Georgia that did not advertise in other states or affirmatively seek customers from
other states); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3.3.4
(2006) (regarding the expansion of the Commerce Clause generally in the
twentieth century). Certainly, the argument that substantive due process and
freedom of contract prevents broad and stringent government regulation has been
largely rejected since West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 386-88, 400
(1937) (upholding state minimum wage law), the famous case in which the "switch
in time" (by Justice Owen Roberts who had previously supported freedom of
contract and substantive due process restrictions on such regulation) "saved nine"
by reducing support for President Franklin Roosevelt's proposal to "pack" the
Supreme Court with favorable nominees by increasing its size to fifteen. NOAH
FELDMAN, SCORPIONS: THE BATTLES AND TRIUMPHS OF FDR's GREAT SUPREME
COURT JUSTICES 115-21 (2010).
293. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1944) (holding that the
Commerce Clause allows the federal government to regulate sale of wheat even
absent a showing that particular wheat will cross state lines because grain trading
industry generally operates across state lines). See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 292, § 3.3.4 (stating that since late 1930s or 1940s, Supreme Court has taken
expansive view of Commerce Clause power of Congress to regulate).
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question that Congress had Commerce Clause power to enact the
Obama health care packages. 294
Nonetheless, Judge Hudson found the Commerce Clause not
to have the breadth taught about in law schools. Even under some
more recent retrenchment, such as United States v. Lopez,295 Judge
Hudson's decision seems incorrect in light of the traditional canon
and what seems settled law. When this entire drama is played out,
Judge Hudson may have the last laugh in that the only other judicial
body likely to strike down the law is the U.S. Supreme Court, which
consists of at lease four justices who appear to dislike the post-New
Deal, post-Civil Rights Act breadth of the Commerce Clause, while
296favoring business interests in general.
Predictably, liberal constituencies were upset with Judge
Hudson's ruling.297 But their pique was not restricted solely to the
Judge's arguable attempt to turn back the clock on the Commerce
Clause. In addition to his overall conservative orientation (which is
not disqualifying and was presumably known to the Senate when he
294. See generally JOHN NOWAK & RONALD ROTUNDA, PRINCIPLES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 334-92 (4th ed. 2010) (noting breadth of the Commerce
Clause and its reach in permitting federal government to regulate a wide variety of
social and economic activity); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 292, § 3.3 (same);
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5.4, at 807-24 (3d ed.
2000) (same). Professor Tribe's analysis of these cases is consistent with his
treatise writings a decade ago. See Laurence H. Tribe, Op-Ed., On Health Care,
Justice Will Prevail, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2011, at A27, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/08/opinion/08tribe.html? (predicting Supreme
Court will uphold health care law by comfortable margin).
295. See 514 U.S. 549, 551-53 (1995) (striking down the "Gun Free School
Zone Act of 1990" as exceeding scope of power to legislation pursuant to
Commerce Clause; concluding that local schools lack sufficient nexus with
interstate commerce).
296. See Adam Liptak, Justices Offer Receptive Ear to Business Interests,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2010, at Al (reporting that common thread in decisions of
Roberts Court has been rulings largely favorable to business interests). Of course,
business interests are not always monolithic. By most accounts, some elements of
the medical provider community and the employer community (most private health
insurance in the U.S. is group insurance provided by employers) favor at least
some parts of the Obama health care law. But large insurers in particular are
opposed to the law and are a major force in the U.S. business community and the
American economy. At the risk of oversimplifying, I regard attacks on the health
care law as representing the overall position of the business community.
297. See Letters: A Judicial Setback for the Health Law, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
14, 2010, at A30 (reproducing four letters to the editor, three voicing criticism of
Judge Hudson's ruling and one defending it).
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was confirmed after nomination by President George W. Bush),
Judge Hudson, it turns out, has an ownership interest in a consulting
firm that regularly works for Republican clients and that has worked
for such Big "R" Republicans and Big "C" Conservatives such as
Jon Boehner, Michele Bachmann, and John McCain. Estimates are
that the judge received somewhere between $15,000 and $50,000 in
2009 as a result of his interest in the firm.298 Although the firm and
its clients may not have been directly involved in the health plan
litigation, concern has been raised that Judge Hudson's financial and
business ties to a company so allied with politicians bent on
upending the health care law (including a former client of his firm,
the Virginia Attorney General who brought the suit) prevent him
from being impartial in the matter.299
298. See John Cook, Judge Who Ruled Health Care Reform
Unconstitutional Owns Piece of GOP Consulting Firm, GAWKER.COM (Dec. 13,
2010, 1:49 PM), http://gawker.com/#!5713041/judge-who-ruled-health-care-
reform-unconstitutional-owns-piece-of-gop-consulting-firm:
As the Huffington Post and others first noted last July, Hudson's
annual financial disclosures show that he owns a sizable chunk of
Campaign Solutions, Inc., a Republic consulting firm that worked this
election cycle for John Boehner, Michele Bachmann, John McCain, and a
whole host of other GOP candidates who've placed the purported
unconstitutionality of health care reform at the center of their political
platforms. Since 2003, according to the disclosures, Hudson has earned
between $32,000 and $108,000 in dividends from his shares in the firm
(federal rules only require judges to report ranges of income).
Campaign Solutions was instrumental in the launching of Sarah
Palin's PAC (though Palin has since split with the firm), and Ken
Cuccinelli, the Virginia attorney general who filed the lawsuit that
Hudson rules in favor of today, paid Campaign Solutions $9,000 for
services rendered in 2009 and 2010.
299. See Cook, supra note 298 (exemplifying how Judge Hudson was
criticized for presiding over challenge to health care legislation, opposition to
which was central to political platform of clients of consulting firm in which he
owns interest). See also Kevin Sack, Legal Battles on Health Care Law Stir
Questions of Partisanship in the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2010, at A26
("Judge Hudson has deep Republican roots as a state and federal prosecutor in
Northern Virginia. He is also a passive minority owner of a Republican political
consulting firm, Campaign Solutions, Inc. Among its former clients is Mr.
Cuccinelli, the attorney general who is the plaintiff in the Virginia case. Mr.
Cuccinelli stopped using the firm this year after news accounts disclosed Judge
Hudson's investment."); Dahlia Lithwick & Sonja West, Unplugged: When Do
Supreme Court Justices Need to Just Sit Down and Be Quiet?, SLATE.COM (Dec.
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Under the traditional approach to recusal and its seeming
search for public consensus or a strong majority view, Judge
Hudson's ties to the GOP marketing machine are perhaps
insufficient to require disqualification. But under this article's
proposed approach to appearance-based disqualification, he almost
certainly should have stepped aside. A nonfrivolous argument posits
that a judge this invested financially and ideologically with a partisan
political stance toward pending litigation should not hear cases with
such palpable partisan implications. Further, a substantial portion of
the public appears to agree. 300 Judge Hudson's participation in the
health care law litigation is the functional equivalent of a co-owner
of James Carville's political consulting business presiding over the
Paula Jones litigation against Bill Clinton or litigation related to the
Clinton's Whitewater investments. 30 1 Republicans and conservatives
would scream-and rightly so. Democrats and liberals are justified
in having similar objections to Judge Hudson's behavior.
Whatever the merits of the Commerce Clause debate relative
to the health care law, the judicial system would be better served if
decisions on the matter-particularly decisions that cut against the
grain of prevailing precedent-were rendered by judges free of taint
or suspicion. That's not Judge Hudson. Further, substitution of
another judge, particularly at the outset of the case where the matter
should have been raised by Judge Hudson himself, would pose little
14, 2010), http://www.slate.com/id/2277915/ ("Today the Internet is buzzing with
accusations that Virginia's Judge Henry Hudson has a financial connection to a
group that worked to oppose the Obama health reform law."); Rosalind S.
Helderman, Advocacy Group Calls for Recusal of Health-Care Judge Over
Investments, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 2010, available at
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/virginiapolitics/2010/08/advocacygroupcalls
forrecus.html; Sam Stein, Henry Hudson, Judge in Health Care Lawsuit, Has
Financial Ties to Attorney General Bringing the Case, HUFFINGTON POST, July 30,
2010, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/07/30/henry-hudson-
judge-in-hea_n 665240.html (discussing Judge Hudson's receipt of dividends
from Campaign Solutions).
300. See supra note 299 (explaining that media coverage of Judge Hudson's
participation in case challenging health care law was largely critical).
301. James Carville is a prominent liberal political consultant and
commentator (perhaps sufficiently prominent that this footnote is unnecessary)
who was a top advisor to President Bill Clinton. It would of course be improper
for a "Judge Carville" to preside over lawsuits in which President Clinton was
interested or involved such as Jones v. Clinton, 520 U.S. 681 (1997) (involving
sexual harassment allegations levied against Clinton arising out of incidents during
his time as Governor of Arkansas).
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logistical burden on the courts. In return, the judicial system and the
public would receive an opinion free from concerns about judicial
impartiality. Even if the health care law is ultimately overturned by
the U.S. Supreme Court, a result certain to outrage many, the
decision will be accepted if judicial impartiality is assured. Judge
Hudson's decision has, by contrast, been examined as much for his
uncomfortably close ties to the partisan aspects of the case as for his
legal analysis. A broader approach to appearance-based
disqualification and a lower threshold for requiring recusal in such
situations would better serve the system.
In similar fashion, a more realistic approach to questions of
judicial impartiality requires a fresh look at the degree to which the
status quo has tended to overlook or minimize a range of judicial ties
to partisan politics or ideology. A good recent example is provided
by Justice Clarence Thomas and his wife. 302 Virginia Thomas is a
302. I would prefer that liberal judges or justices provide some examples of
questionable political behavior for testing my proposed revised test for
determining reasonable question as to impartiality. Unfortunately, however, the
liberal justices seem not to have as high a partisan or ideological political profile as
their conservative colleagues. To be sure, however, this article's proposed greater
scrutiny of judicial extra-curricular activities would apply to the summer law
school classes, seminars, and retreats frequented by liberal jurists as well. It
appears, for example, that all justices engage in some form of this type of activity,
which, as discussed above, supra notes 277-82 and accompanying text, is
problematic.
In addition to summer law teaching and the like, we have examples such as
Justice Blackmun's frequent attendance at Aspen Institute summer seminars
addressing philosophical issues related to the law. Although none of these have
the blatant political-ideological-interest group overtones of a Tea Party gathering
(or a union meeting or a corporate shareholders meeting), they nonetheless pose
risks that judges will be improperly influenced by extra-judicial factors or make
pre-adjudication commitments to case outcomes. Although in the final analysis
many of these outings may not require recusal under my proposed approach, these
sorts of activities clearly pose more serious disqualification questions than the
system has acknowledged.
To be sure, liberal jurists can violate norms of judicial recusal just as easily as
conservatives. For example, Professor Monroe Freedman makes a compelling
case of error by Justice Breyer. See generally Monroe H. Freedman, Judicial
Impartiality in the Supreme Court - The Troubling Case ofJustice Stephen Breyer,
30 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 513, 514-15, 527-32 (2005) (discussing concerns about
Justice Breyer's transgressions in failing to recuse himself, particularly
emphasizing the Justice's role as chair of the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act
Committee). In Freedman's view, Justice Breyer's conduct violated existing law.
There is no need to adopt my proposal to find that Justice Breyer erred in failing to
recuse.
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long-time conservative activist who has worked for a number of
advocacy groups that appear to be keenly interested in certain public
policy matters likely to come before the Supreme Court. Justice
Thomas recently received criticism for failing to provide information
regarding her employment on the annual financial disclosure
statements required of federal judges. 303  This is regrettable and
appears to have resulted from rather gross negligence on the part of
Justice Thomas. But more than Justice Thomas's behavior in a
particular case, the legal system should re-examine its view that
disclosure alone is an inadequate way of dealing with a jurist's ties
(through the jurist or close family members) to particular interest
groups.
Rather than treating disclosure as a sufficient response to
concerns that judges will be insufficiently neutral because of the
extra-judicial influence of a spouse's political activism, these sorts of
situations should be tested according to this article's proposed
revised approach to operationalizing the reasonable question as to
the impartiality standard for recusal. Certainly, a reasonable
question can be raised as to whether Justice Thomas can be
sufficiently impartial in cases involving issues of particular import to
his wife's employer. If a substantial portion of lay observers hold
this view, Justice Thomas should be disqualified in such cases or
Virginia Thomas should find other employment.304
Related to the problem of excessive judicial coziness with
interest groups is the structural problem of judges being lobbied by
interest groups under the guise not only of speaking engagements but
also purported judicial education programs. The "business model"
of these interest groups is now familiar. Vested interests establish an
ostensible think tank that conducts education seminars with a
curriculum and array of speakers heavily slanted in an analytical
direction favoring the interest group. Seminars are located in posh
303. See Eric Lichtblau, Thomas Cites Failure to Disclose Wife's Job, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 24, 2011, at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/25/
us/politics/25thomas.html (noting that for several years, Justice Thomas failed to
disclose employment of his wife, Virginia, with a conservative think-tank and
advocacy group interested in issues of legal policy arguably implicated in cases
pending before the Court).
304. A job change for Virginia Thomas may not be enough, of course, in
that a spouse's identification with a particular interest group agenda at issue in
litigation before the Court might nonetheless require disqualification, even if the
spouse is not formally employed by the interest group.
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resorts or similar settings (on the beach, in the mountains, or at some
other desirable locale). Judges are invited to attend for free, are
charged a nominal fee that does not approach the actual cost of the
program, or are given "stipends" or "scholarships" for attendance by
the sponsoring organization. The judge attends and in this paradise-
like setting is brainwashed for a week or two. If things go as
planned for the sponsoring organization and its interest group
constituents, the judge returns to the bench more inclined to see the
world as does the interest group.3 05 To paraphrase the clichd about
communism, the judge has received "re-education in the country"
that may well influence votes in future cases.
Astonishingly, the legal and political system has allowed
such subtle corruptions for decades, although more attention has
been paid to the issue in recent years. Although there are some
reporting requirements of disclosure concerning judicial attendance
and payment under the 2007 ABA Model Code, the fact remains that
judges can largely attend such programs in the manner described
above.306 At present, all that keeps the judge from being
brainwashed is the judge's own sense of perspective. This may
actually be rather good protection in that judges are generally of
reasonably strong mind and even the dimmest judge can identify the
politics and goals of the sponsoring organization and its supporters.
But, as discussed above, judges, like all humans, are subject
to cognitive biases and undue influence provided by context and
surroundings, including the other attendees, sponsors, organizers and
305. See generally Douglas Kendall & Jason Rylander, Tainted Justice:
How Private Judicial Trips Undermine Public Confidence in the Judiciary, 18
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 65, 129-34 (2004) (arguing that judicial attendance at
luxurious conferences funded by interest groups and presenting programs favoring
interest group positions on issues poses significant threat to judicial impartiality).
For a short overview of these sorts of seminars and the ethics questions they pose,
see GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 89, at 607-08 (describing the phenomenon,
summarizing criticism, and noting ABA Model Code's approach to the problem).
306. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 3.14 & 3.15 (2011)
(permitting judge and guest to receive "reasonable" reimbursement for attending
such programs and to report attendance within thirty days of event and to post on
court website where feasible); GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 89, at 608-09
(summarizing Rules 3.14 and 3.15 and noting official but nonbinding comment
that a judge "must assure himself or herself that acceptance of reimbursement or
fee waivers would not appear to a reasonable person to undermine the judge's
independence, integrity, or impartiality").
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seminar faculty.o7 Where this faculty and peer group has a stake in
pending litigation or related matters, greater caution is required than
has been displayed by the system to date. Even where there is no
direct link to pending litigation, application of a more stringent test
for determining questions regarding impartiality may require that
judges attending such seminars not preside over certain types of
cases. But at present, generalized efforts to lobby the judge toward a
particular perspective on the law or a type of legal issue in such posh
seminar settings do not result in disqualification.
The Second Circuit refused to disqualify a seminar attendee
judge from presiding over a remanded environmental case involving
Texaco even though the judge had attended a seminar sponsored by
the Foundation for Research on Economics and the Environment
308(FREE), a pro-business group supported financially by Texaco.
Although this decision may be correct according to current recusal
law, it almost certainly would not pass muster under my proposed
approach. But at least the appellate court recognized the seriousness
of the problem:
[W]e caution judges that recusal may be required after
accepting meals or lodging from organizations that
may receive a significant portion of their general
funding from litigants or counsel to them-whether or
not in connection with an unbalanced presentation ...
[A]ccepting something of value from an organization
whose existence is arguably dependent upon a party
307. See supra notes 22-51 and accompanying text (discussing the
unconscious bias that affects judges).
308. See In re Aguinda, 241 F.3d 194, 198 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that a
judge did not abuse his discretion in attending the seminar because there was a
"lack of showing that . . . the seminar touched upon an issue 'material' in the
case"). A case like this, even though it did not result in disqualification, perhaps
contradicts the prior statement in this text about judges being savvy enough to
know when an organization or program may be slanted. A judge need not be
Louis Brandeis to figure out that a group named "FREE" that has the money to
provide the judge with free trip to an upscale Western lodge and is interested in the
economics of environmentalism is probably a lobbying organization for various
commercial energy interests. One does not see the Sierra Club or the National
Resources Defense Council putting on this sort of subsidized Club Med for judges.
A judge with any judgment would avoid such junkets, irrespective of whether
there was a specific link to pending or possible litigation before the judge.
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to litigation or counsel to a party might well cause a
reasonable observer to lift the proverbial eyebrow.
Presentations at bar association meetings or law
schools may well relate to particularized issues, and
recusal should be considered seriously, but on a case-
by-case basis. Judges should be wary of attending
presentations involving litigation that is before them
or likely to come before them without at the very least
assuring themselves that parties or counsel to the
litigation are not funding or controlling the
presentation . . . . Where parties or counsel to them
fund or control such a presentation, the appearance
created bears too great a resemblance to an ex parte
309contact.
Perhaps once again, Professor Geyh is right to call for per se
rules and procedural protections. 310  In a rational world, judicial
attendance at such programs would be absolutely prohibited.31' If
judges want to learn more about the cost-benefit considerations of
environmental and energy regulation and litigation, they can procure
court-appointed experts, demand additional briefing by the parties,
appoint a special master with expertise, lean on their law clerks for
some research, and just plain study the issue. They hardly need to be
"educated" through a vacation-like seminar.
In the absence of an express prohibition, an enhanced and
expanded notion of the trigger of appearance-based disqualification
can reach these cases. Under this article's suggested standard, when
a court concludes that a substantial portion of the lay public would
(to use the Second Circuit's words) "lift a proverbial eyebrow" over
a judge's presiding over a case linked to attendance at a judicial
309. In re Aguinda, 241 F.3d at 206; see also In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 977
F.2d 764, 781-85 (3d Cir. 1992) (disqualifying judge who, along with spouse,
attended a conference where many of those making presentations regarding the
science of asbestos-related injury were also expert witnesses for plaintiffs and
where plaintiffs' law firm was the source of the funding).
310. Geyh, supra note 6, at 719.
311. Lest I seem excessively critical of judges, I hasten to add that in a
rational world, judges would be paid twice their current salaries so that they and
their families could take nice vacations without being tempted to sponge off
interest groups.
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seminar, disqualification would be required.312 Unlike the Second
Circuit and the status quo, this test is met not only if there is a direct
link between parties, counsel, and a case, but also may be met where
the sponsoring organization is seeking extrajudicial influence on
judicial thinking about an issue presented in a current or subsequent
case before the court.
Well-heeled interest groups are in it for the long haul and
have broad interests beyond a given case involving a given
supporter. They are hoping to generally bring judges to their point
of view regarding a particular area of law. That is fine in an
adversary system in a free country, so long as their efforts take place
openly through the adjudication process through test case litigation,
amicus briefs, or support for litigants. It becomes improper when
attempted through extrajudicial channels such as the judicial seminar
junket.
People are influenced by their surroundings and their peer
groups. Placing a judge in an environment (a vacation-like
environment to lower the attendee's mental guard about
indoctrination) that consistently promotes a particular worldview
(both overtly and subtly) through instructors, curriculum, and
perhaps peers can have an impact on anyone, at least on a
subconscious level.313 It is not outlandish for observers to think that
a judge exposed to these types of events will become significantly
more likely to decide cases based on these influences and do so in a
manner that favors the interest groups that arranged this soft-sell
indoctrination.3 14
312. In re Aguinda, 241 F.3d at 206.
313. See supra notes 33-43 and accompanying text (regarding cognitive
psychological influences affecting humans).
314. Significant empirical research has established that in all major sports
the home team enjoys a substantially higher winning percentage, ranging from a
"mere" 54% win rate for baseball teams at home to 65% for college sports and
nearly 70% for Major League Soccer (U.S.). (Soccer purists may be relieved to
know that in the English Premier League, the home team wins at "only" a 63%
clip.)
After addressing a plethora of explanations, two researchers conclude that the
salient factor is favorable treatment of the home team by the officials (the home
team typically has fewer penalties) resulting from the home field atmosphere. See
generally MOSKOWITZ & WERTHEIM, supra note 279, at 157-67 (2011) (noting
that social context of home-crowd enthusiasm and partisanship likely influences
officials even if they are consciously attempting to be neutral and fair).
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The pressure exerted on officials in favor of the home team is not a
"kill the umpire" sort of straight-on intimidation, but the more subtle
result of context and spectator enthusiasm influencing the judgment calls
made by umpires and referees. Officials are not immune to social
pressure, and that's where we think the explanation for home team bias
lies. Referees are, ultimately, human. In test after test, psychologists
have found that social influence has a powerful effect on people's
behavior and decisions-without their even being aware of it.
Psychologists call this influence conformity because it causes an
individual's opinion to conform to a group's opinion. In other words,
when humans are under enormous stress-say, making a crucial call with
a rabid crowd yelling a few feet away-it is natural for them to want to
alleviate it. Making snap judgments in favor of the home team is one way
to do that. Umpires also may be taking cues from the crowd when they're
uncertain. They don't know whether that tailing 95-mph fastball crossed
the strike zone, but the crowd's reaction may change their perception.
In that case, umpires aren't consciously favoring the home team;
they are doing what they believe is right. In trying to make the right call,
they conform to a larger group's opinion, swayed by thousands of people,
witnessing the exact same play they did.
Id. at 159.
Chief Justice John Roberts famously has analogized judging to being a sports
umpire or referee. See Stempel, Playing Forty Questions, supra note 142, at 67
n.3 (detailing that during confirmation hearings, Chief Justice Roberts analogized
judicial role to that of umpire officiating between competing legal teams); see
generally Neil S. Siegel, Umpires at Bat: On Integration and Legitimation, 24
CONST. COMMENT. 701 (2007) (noting that at his confirmation hearings, Justice
Roberts "captured the public's imagination" with the umpire analogy in which
Roberts stated that the role of both the judge and the umpire was to "make sure
everybody plays by the rules, but it is a limited role"). Although the analogy
rightfully has its critics (e.g., RICHARD A POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 35-37
(2008)), it is not completely without basis. More importantly, this comparison is
commonly used to describe Anglo-American judges (as contrasted to the more
involved "inquisitorial" judges of continental European systems). Having
embraced this comparison, Justice Roberts and the judiciary need to live by it and
appreciate that the same contextual factors affecting officiating decisions are
almost surely present in adjudication as well, although one hopes with less
extremity.
To state the obvious, judging does not take place in an arena filled with rabid
partisans. When it does, this would be grounds for reversal. See Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 356 (1966) (reversing murder conviction of Cleveland-
area physician Sam Sheppard because of prejudicial media portrayals and circus-
like atmosphere of the trial, remarking that "[i]n this atmosphere of a 'Roman
holiday' for the news media, Sam Sheppard stood trial for his life") (internal
citation omitted).
Is a case like Bush v. Gore so different, however, from the pressure inflicted
on referees at a pack football game? See generally Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98
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For example, a litigant making a product liability or race
discrimination claim is assigned a judge who has recently returned
from a conservative law and economics conference probably has a
(2000) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause was violated by Florida's
attempts to recount ballots in dispute during presidential election requiring
cessation of recount proceedings). For example, interested partisans appear to
have attempted to intimidate election officials, if not the courts. There was the
invasion of Broward County's ballot-counting and other demonstrations designed
to intimidate opponents or influence public and judicial opinion (e.g., Republican
protestors surrounding the Vice President's residence and chanting that Al Gore
should "Get out of Dick Cheney's house"). Patty Reinert, Throwing in towel,
Gore urges Americans to unite, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 14, 2000, at Al. Both
sides regularly conducted press conferences spinning the facts and circumstances
of the dispute, most famously in Bush representative James Baker's attack on the
Florida Supreme Court for unwarranted judicial activism, a charge that appeared to
have visibly cowed some Florida justices at the next hearing on the matter. In
addition, non-partisan media relentlessly expressed gloom-and-doom concern
about the fate of the country if the election outcome remained uncertain for too
long. See generally Laurence H. Tribe, eroG v. hsuB: Through the Looking
Glass, in BUSH V. GORE: THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY (Bruce Ackerman ed.
2002) (noting that media portrayal of case important to public perception, and
"Bush spinmeisters outspun those of Gore" with result that "succession of
television images does more than represent the case . . . it profoundly shaped the
Supreme Court's understanding of the stakes involved and its ultimate holding ...
In addition, concerns were raised about whether three of the Justices who
eventually supported George Bush's position in the case should have recused. See
GWLERS & SIMON, supra note 89, at 589 (noting that two of Scalia's sons were
members of law firms arguing on behalf of Bush, that Virginia Thomas was "at the
time gathering resumes for potential Bush administration jobs on behalf of the
Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank," and that Justice O'Connor was
reported to have been upset at prospect of Gore victory as it would compel her to
remain on the Court until her successor could be nominated by a Republican
president). Even if these arguments were not persuasive under current
disqualification law-the view of Professor Gillers in STEPHEN GILLERS,
TEACHER'S MANUAL FOR REGULATION OF LAWYERS 202 (2009)-this concern
added to the Super Bowl-like atmosphere of Bush v. Gore that may have
influenced the "referees" deciding the case. See also Thomas Boswell, In the End,
Somebody Wins, Somebody Loses and Everybody Goes Home, WASH. POST, Nov.
15, 2000, at Dl (sports writer comparing public posturing of Bush and Gore
campaigns to athletic coaches attempting to influence referees or "working the
refs").
Although one does not want to push the sports-umpire comparison too far, it is
yet another reminder of what should be more obvious and admitted by judges-
they are vulnerable to extrajudicial environmental influences. Logically, the law
of disqualification should impose or at least encourage judges to avoid such
corrupting influences.
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good basis for fearing that the judge now has unduly heightened
concern about the cost of safety protocols or interference with
management personnel decisions. If I were that litigant or her
lawyer, I would harbor doubts (which I believe to be reasonable, or
at least non-frivolous) regarding the judge's ability to be impartial
regarding my claim. I might even have doubts simply because the
judge was willing to subject himself to this sort of indoctrination in
the first place. If a sufficiently substantial portion of the legal
community or the public agrees, disqualification should result. In
the absence of procedural protections such as an outright ban on
judicial attendance at such conferences, recusal doctrine is all that
protects litigants from biased judging resulting from such
brainwashing efforts.
I realize I am pushing the disqualification envelope regarding
this last example. By one popular and generally sound definition
(ironically articulated by Justice Scalia) 315 impartiality simply means
indifference to which litigant wins or loses a dispute. Judicial
attitudes about liability, free markets, cost-benefit analysis, economic
efficiency, the wisdom of discrimination law or other regulation of
markets can thus be viewed as something beyond the reach of
disqualification law. Although this may be true as a general matter,
particularly intense or hardened judicial attitudes on these
dimensions implicate recusal law and practice to the degree that they
are sufficiently strong to encourage or compel results in favor of
certain litigants irrespective of the record in the case. In such
instances, disqualification based on judicial attitudes acquired
through specific extrajudicial sources such as speaking engagements,
political activity, business interests, or conference attendance should
be fair game for analysis under a broader view of the reasonable-
question-as-to-impartiality test.
For example, in the hypothetical above, a product liability
plaintiff may have a very legitimate claim that the judge exposed to
seminars stressing the undue expense of such laws cannot be
impartial in her individual case and has an ideological bent so strong
that favoring the manufacturer is inevitable. The judge is no longer
indifferent to whether the manufacturer loses and must pay (or have
315. See Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 776 (2002)
("One meaning of 'impartiality' in the judicial context-and of course its root
meaning-is the lack of bias for or against either party to the proceeding.
Impartiality in this sense assures equal application of the law.").
Symposium 2011] 843
HeinOnline  -- 30 Rev. Litig. 843 2010-2011
THE REVIEW OF LITIGATION
its insurer pay) a judgment for plaintiffs injuries. Similarly, the
discrimination plaintiff may have a legitimate reason to doubt the
judge's neutrality (and ability to be indifferent to the case outcome)
if the judge has been told repeatedly at a recent conference that the
majority of job discrimination claims are merely efforts to extract
severance pay for substandard employees under the guise of crying
316discrimination.
Taking recusal seriously and deploying the revised test set
forth in this article also has implications for assessing whether judges
should recuse more often on the basis of social affiliations with
parties or counsel. Ironically, both the federal statute and the ABA
Judicial Code require that judges step aside if a family member or
former law firm colleague is involved as counsel in a case. 3 17 But
neither forbids a judge from hearing a case where a close social or
professional friend is involved as counsel.
The distinction between friends, former co-workers, and
family rests on tenuous grounds. One may care at least as much
about the fortunes of a friend trying an important case as one would
about the fortunes of a former law partner or a family member,
particularly about family members "within the third degree of
relationship" (cousins and closer) specified in 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5).
I actually like my cousins and most of the people in the law firms for
which I have worked. But I like and care about my friends just as
much or more. But under the current regime, I would, as a judge, be
required to recuse from cases involving former colleagues and
cousins I have not seen in twenty years while remaining free to aid
the causes of friends involved in litigation.
Unless my value structure is insufficiently tribal or
organizational as compared to the populace generally, this is a pretty
good indication that these relationship-related disqualification
316. To a degree, judicial seminars, retreats, and conferences may not be
much different from the judge simply socializing with persons who indoctrinate
the judge informally (e.g., his rich neighbors; her former plaintiffs' lawyer
buddies). This type of extrajudicial influence on judges has generally not been
viewed as grounds for recusal, although perhaps this attitude needs to change as
well. See generally Jeremy M. Miller, Judicial Recusal and Disqualification: The
Need for a Per Se Rule on Friendship (Not Acquaintance), 33 PEPP. L. REv. 575,
595 (2006) (arguing that disqualification should be automatic if friend of judge is
involved as party or counsel). In any event, these sorts of informal associations
that may bias judges should be tested rigorously.
317. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) (2006); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R.
2.11 (2007).
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grounds should be expanded to include social friendships. In the
absence of such a reform, this article's suggested approach to
determining a reasonable question as to impartiality provides the
additional benefit of encouraging disqualification in cases that now
are too quickly accepted as acceptable.
To take a well-publicized example, Justices Scalia and
Ginsburg and their families have a tradition of celebrating the
holidays with former Solicitor General Ted Olson, now a frequent
advocate before the Court. For reasons I cannot fathom, this
causes little stir. Regardless of the Justices' predispositions on a
case and its merits, it is hardly farfetched to suggest that in matters
sufficiently close, the Justices' close relation with Olson may sway
them in favor of his client or amicus position. A reasonable lay
observer could legitimately entertain serious doubts about the
Justices' impartiality in cases argued by Olson. If a large enough
proportion of observers harbor such doubts (this article's suggested
benchmark of one-third of the reasonably well-informed public),
recusal would be required under the proposed revised approach.
Although Olson's holiday socializing with Justices Scalia and
Ginsburg is probably the most well-known example of such
chumminess between jurists and a frequently appearing advocate, it
is probably only the tip of the iceberg.319
318. See Joan Biskupic, Familiar Faces Revolve Through Supreme Court;
Elite Lawyers with Ties to Justices Make Multiple Arguments, USA TODAY, Dec.
15, 2008, at A9 ("When former Solicitor General Theodore Olson stands at the
lectern, which he has done 51 times, he faces several friends among the nine,
including two of his regular New Year's Eve dining partners, Justices Antonin
Scalia and Ruth Bader Ginsburg."); Joan Biskupic, Justices Strike a Balance: Pals
Ginsburg, Scalia Ring in the New Year, Then Duke It Out In Court, USA TODAY,
Dec. 26, 2007, at Dl. Presumably, this social tradition continues notwithstanding
the 2010 death of Justice Ginsburg's husband Martin, a renowned tax law expert.
319. For example, journalist Jeffrey Toobin relates the story of an
impromptu car pool during a Washington snow storm in which Justices Scalia and
Kennedy rode to the Court with noted attorney Carter Phillips, who was
representing a party in a case before the Court that day. JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE
NINE, 121-22 (2007).
Although this makes for a good story and perhaps even falls under a weather-
related version of the "rule of necessity," it also illustrates the degree to which
some lawyers are reasonably close social friends or acquaintances with judges, an
advantage not enjoyed by all advocates. Even if the day's cases were not
discussed on the ride through the snow, Phillips opposing counsel probably wished
he or she had been part of this particular car pool.
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If disqualification were required in such instances, judges and
justices might be willing to assess whether their friendships with
litigants or lawyers, particularly with lawyers frequently appearing in
their courts, need to be dialed back. The traditional answer to this
concern is an almost reflexively defensive argument that judges
should not be forced to give up friendships and related outside
activities in return for appointment to the bench.320 But no one
urging reform is demanding that judges sever social ties, only that
the judge recuse in cases involving attorneys (or parties) who are
significant social friends. If this results in unduly frequent recusal
(the so-called small town problem), the judge needs to make a
decision. Although some distancing from former friends is
unfortunate, it is a small price to ask of jurists who wish not to be
disqualified in cases involving lawyers or litigants who appear with
considerable frequency. In a world of many judges and relative ease
of travel and communication, there is no need to impose on
concerned parties or counsel the risk that their opponents enjoy an
extrajudicial advantage because of social friendship.
V. AN AGENDA FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Although there is substantial research suggesting that judges,
like others, make decisions on the basis of a variety of unconscious
factors correlated with their differing demographic characteristics,
More disturbingly, one is left to wonder how many other court-counsel links
exist that are never brought to light in the media, and which may raise more
disturbing questions of excessive coziness between judges and counsel or litigants.
320. See, e.g., Noah Feldman, Sometimes, Justice Can Play Politics, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 12, 2011, at 9 (Week in Review), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/0 2 / 13/opinion/13feldman.html (arguing that judges
and justices should be permitted considerable latitude in outside activities;
defending Justice Scalia's appearance before Tea Party caucus, contending that
"critics of Scalia and Thomas ignore the history of the court" and that "the
justices' few and meager contacts with the real world do little harm and perhaps
occasionally some good."). See generally NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS (2010)
(focusing on careers of Supreme Court Justices Felix Frankfurter, Hugo Black,
Robert Jackson, and William 0. Douglas; book laced with examples of their
political and social ties to President Roosevelt and other politicians during their
time on the Court).
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this field of inquiry is new and almost fallow. 321 In order to better
inform litigants, lawyers, and judges addressing disqualification
issues, considerably more information is needed about the
relationship of various characteristics of judges and their decision-
making. The legal profession and the public have the right to inquire
as to the degree to which a judge's ruling and a case outcome turns
on the judge's race, gender, age, religion, political affiliation, ethnic
background, economic status, prior litigation experience, or other
factors. To the extent there exist powerful correlations between
these traits and judicial outcomes, they must be factored into the
process of determining whether to disqualify a judge.
Even if the correlation is strong, this does not necessarily
compel automatic disqualification. Automatic recusal based on
some patterns would probably be unworkable or even at odds with
the legal system and the democratic process. For example, a judge
who has worked as a prosecutor may sentence differently than a
judge who was a public defender prior to ascending to the bench. A
jurist who was an insurance defense lawyer may be more inclined to
grant summary judgment for a defendant than a judge who formerly
represented personal injury plaintiffs.
Although such correlations raise questions, it would prove
too much to require blanket disqualification of any of these groups
from presiding over particular types of cases, particularly in states
where judges are elected. In the federal system or state counterparts,
the executive may be appointing some of these judges precisely
because of their former backgrounds as prosecutors or defenders, or
claimant lawyers or defense lawyers because of what it reflects about
their background or orientation.
But only an irrational system would fail to inquire as to these
relationships or fail to take them into account in deciding whether
recusal is required. Regardless of background (whether immutable
or experiential), we expect judges to be indifferent to which party
prevails in a dispute even if the judge has jurisprudential or
ideological views that may readily be described as pro-plaintiff or
pro-defendant. Where there are serious questions as to whether a
judge is able to reach this level of neutrality, the governing law
already requires recusal. Greater empirical knowledge of the
321. See supra text accompanying note 25-55 (discussing the variety of
behavioral science factors that affect decision-making).
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relationship between judicial outcomes and judicial background can
only enhance application of the law.
Although it would prove too much to require that former
defense lawyers consistently recuse in cases where a corporate entity
is a defendant, plaintiffs suing corporate entities should be able to
obtain recusal of judges who they have reasonable ground to suspect
cannot rise above their past representation and decide fairly. If the
judge has recently attended educational seminars sponsored by the
corporation or has received its "Person of the Year" award, this is
qualitatively different than simply knowing that the judge has a pro-
business bent. Because these situations are often not clear-cut,
increasing knowledge about the degree to which judicial decisions
are a product of the judge's background tend to strengthen the case
for providing at least one peremptory challenge to litigants.
VI. CONCLUSION
In a world of occasionally egregious judicial misconduct in
failing to recuse and a world populated by humans saddled with
cognitive limitations, particularly when evaluating themselves, the
legal system would profit from having greater procedural guarantees
of judicial neutrality notwithstanding its occasional and systematic
costs. Among this article's proposals in this vein are peremptory
challenges, elimination of the de minimis exception to financially
based disqualification, referral of disqualification motions to a
neutral judge for decision, elimination of the duty to sit, and
adherence to a regime that resolves close cases in favor of recusal.
In addition, review of denials of disqualification should be de novo,
rather than application of the harmless error doctrine.
Additionally, the basic approach to determining whether a
reasonable question as to judicial impartiality exists needs to be
revised to account for the relative impossibility of achieving
consensus or even overwhelming majority opinion on such matters.
Nonfrivolous concern over judicial neutrality shared by a substantial
portion of society should be enough to require recusal in order to
preserve the actual and perceived integrity of the judiciary. At the
end of the day, judicial impartiality is a value of such sufficient
importance that it outweighs all but the most oppressive
administrative costs.
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